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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a discussion of the ethical issues surrounding the allocation of donated 
sperm and eggs to patients at fertility clinics. It adopts an empirical bioethics approach in 
which traditional philosophical analysis is combined with the collection and analysis of 
empirical data in order to ensure that the views of those involved in the field are 
represented. 
 
Following the preliminary philosophical analysis, the second section of this thesis 
presents the results of a qualitative study, which was undertaken with fertility clinic staff and 
other relevant professionals such as academics and representatives of patient organisations. 
The views and ideas that emerged from these data were considered in light of the earlier 
philosophical analysis, and where relevant, initial conclusions were revised to account for 
these considerations. 
 
The results suggest that the prioritisation of patients based on age, violent history, 
and health and health behaviours is justified, that allowing conditional and known donations 
may benefit all patients by increasing the number of donors, and that a national system of 
allocation may confer similar benefits, as well as being fairer than current, local allocation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The need for a serious attempt to examine the ethics of the allocation of donated 
gametes arises from several considerations. First, gametes are a scarce resource: the 
National Gamete Donation Trust (NGDT) reports that 384 men donated sperm in 2008, when 
the number that was needed to treat all potential recipients was more than 500 (National 
Gamete Donation Trust, 2011). Their figures suggest an even greater shortfall for eggs; in the 
same year, 707 women donated eggs compared to a need for over 1200 donors to meet 
demand.1 Insufficient supply means that decisions about gamete allocation, while bringing 
joy to some, will bring disappointment to others. This, in itself, provides a motivation for 
ensuring that we make allocation decisions fairly. 
Even if we put aside questions of resource scarcity, however, there are other 
important reasons for thinking that gamete allocation warrants some ethical scrutiny. Even if 
there were enough gametes to treat every patient, we might think that there remain reasons 
to carefully consider how gametes are allocated. It could be that treatment is not deemed to 
be in the overall interests of the patient. Alternatively, it might be best to decline to treat a 
patient due to a very important feature of gamete allocation that differentiates it from other 
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that these figures may be a little crude and simplified, as the way in which 
gametes can be said to be “available” to patients is not straightforward. Racial matching of gametes 
to recipients may mean that members of certain races perceive any shortage more keenly, as there 
may be fewer donors from the same background. Similarly, patients impose constraints on 
themselves where they ask for donors with certain characteristics, for example religious ones. Finally, 
donors can also set conditions on who can use their gametes, meaning that their gametes are not 
available across the board, exacerbating the problem for patients who do not fit the donor’s criteria. 
Regardless of these nuances, the data still show that there simply are not enough gametes available 
to satisfy every hopeful parent. 
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resource allocation scenarios; if used in treatment, gametes have the potential to develop 
into beings with interests of their own. 
Thus it is not just the potential harms/benefits to the patient that must be 
considered; we might think that there are factors about the patient that may cause the 
resulting child to have an unacceptably unpleasant life (for example being so old or ill that 
their capacities as parents are questionable, or having a history of abusing children). 
So we may not want to assist some people in becoming parents even if doing so does 
not deprive anyone else of the opportunity. There may also be some kinds of children that 
we do not want to bring into being, for example because they will suffer terrible health 
problems. Accordingly, there would be reasons to consider the ethics of gamete allocation 
even in a world where donated gametes were plentiful. 
Of course, whether or not we are using donated gametes, concerns about child 
welfare or about risks to patients can still be relevant, and hence the ethical issues discussed 
in this thesis will allow for some crossover with concerns about assisted reproduction 
treatment in general. Donated gametes present additional challenges where resource 
scarcity means that the allocation of resources to one patient means that they cannot be 
allocated to another patient. On top of this is the ethical issue of using donors who are 
known to the recipient, and how this should affect a recipient’s place on the waiting list. All 
of these issues gave rise to this project exploring gamete allocation. 
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1.1 Legal Context 
 
The UK government acknowledged the need to regulate the use of reproductive 
technologies with The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, which was amended in 
2008 (hereafter the Act and amendments will simply be referred to as “the HFE Act”, except 
where it is specified that either the 1990 or 2008 Act are being referred to), informed by the 
findings presented in the Warnock report (Warnock, 1984). The HFE Act stipulates that those 
making treatment decisions must consider ‘the welfare of any child who may be born as a 
result of the treatment (including the need of that child for supportive parenting), and of any 
other child who may be affected by the birth’ (HFE Act, 2008, section 14 (2)), and the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) Code of Practice indicates the kinds of factor 
that should be taken into account when making predictions about child welfare. 
The provisions in the HFE Act, however, by no means address all of the ethical issues 
that can and do arise in fertility clinics. Many clinics use clinical ethics committees to give 
advice in difficult cases (Frith, 2009), suggesting that the HFE Act and its attendant guidance 
do not cover all eventualities. Moreover, what the HFE Act does cover, it covers quite 
broadly, with room for ambiguity and interpretation. For example, the Code of Practice 
requires treating clinicians to ‘take into account’ factors such as ‘mental or physical 
conditions’ and ‘drug or alcohol abuse’, in cases where these are ‘circumstances that are 
likely to lead to an inability to care throughout childhood for any child who may be born’ 
(HFEA, 2009, section 8.10), but this guidance goes into no detail about how this is to be 
accounted for. When these factors are present, it is up to clinics to choose from a range of 
options that could all be described as “accounting for” these factors. These options include 
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excluding the patient from treatment, delaying their treatment, prioritising other patients 
who do not exhibit these factors, or offering them further counselling. 
Clinical staff are also bound by the Equality Act (2010), which prohibits some kinds of 
discrimination: ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others’ (Equality Act, 
2010, section 13 (1)). The protected characteristics are age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. The HFEA 
Code of Practice reflects this legislation, at least with regard to child welfare assessments: 
‘the assessment must be done in a non-discriminatory way. In particular, patients should not 
be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, disability, sexual orientation, religious 
belief or age’ (HFEA, 2009, section 8.7). It is safe to assume that “non-discriminatory” here is 
shorthand for unjustified discrimination, rather than discrimination of just any kind, as the 
purpose of performing welfare of the child assessments is to discriminate between parents 
who we can reasonably predict to provide an acceptable level of welfare for their children 
and those who we cannot. Indeed, one way of framing this project exploring the ethics of 
gamete allocation is to say that it sets out to establish which kinds of discrimination are 
justifiable and which are not. 
 
This chapter has introduced the ethical issue at hand, and provided an overview of 
the legal context of the problem. The following chapter will consider some hypothetical 
clinical cases, to further describe some of the ethical complexities that can arise in gamete 
allocation.  
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2. EXAMPLES FROM PRACTICE 
 
This section will highlight some of the ethical concerns that can arise for fertility 
clinics in allocating gametes. The following cases are all hypothetical: 
 
2.1 Case One 
 
Semen analysis has revealed that Bob has no sperm, and he and Betty have been 
presented with the possibility of treating Betty with donor sperm. During routine counselling 
at the fertility clinic, it transpired that Bob has been struggling with an alcohol problem, and 
has some anger issues that sometimes manifest themselves in the form of physical violence 
against Betty. Both Bob and Betty insist that the problems are the result of stress and 
frustration at their infertility situation, and claim that having a child together is what they 
need in order to achieve a harmonious family environment. The clinic now needs to decide 
whether to go ahead and allocate gametes to them. 
 
 
2.1.1 Case One: Discussion 
 
 
This case is more nuanced than it might seem at first glance. Perhaps the most 
obvious concern is how the child’s life will go if the clinic does decide to go ahead and give 
Bob and Betty treatment. It is not certain that Bob and Betty are being completely honest in 
saying that they believe that having a child will create harmony in the family, and even if 
they are speaking in good faith, they might just be incorrect about how their lives will be if 
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they have a child. Thus, if problems do persist, there is a chance that this will interfere with 
their ability as parents, or that Bob will start to direct his violent behaviour towards the child. 
Another complication arises when we consider the fact that not all treatments or 
pregnancies are successful; the psychological impact of a failed pregnancy or treatment cycle 
might exacerbate the already-existing problems in Bob and Betty’s relationship. At the same 
time, the clinic’s revelation to Bob and Betty of a decision not to provide them with 
treatment may have a similar effect. 
 
2.2 Case Two 
 
Jim has poor sperm motility, so he and his wife Alice cannot conceive without 
assisted reproductive technology. Alice has Huntington’s disease (HD), and while Jim does 
not and is not a carrier, Alice’s condition is a dominant trait, so any child she has with one of 
her own eggs will have a 50% chance of inheriting the disease. Jim and Alice are aware of 
this, but would ideally like a child who is genetically related to at least one of them. There is 
the possibility of the clinic’s using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to determine 
whether embryos created using Alice’s eggs and donor sperm are affected before using 
them. Alice and Jim say that they cannot afford PGD, and that even if they could, they would 
be reluctant to use it, as they would value a child with HD as much as one who was 
unaffected. 
Some staff members at the clinic have expressed concern about offering treatment 
where the child has a 50% chance of inheriting HD, particularly when PGD could be used to 
ensure that any child born from treatment would not be affected. Others agree with Jim and 
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Alice that an affected child would be just as valuable as any other, and that to select against 
HD would be offensive to the community of people with HD and undermine their place in 
society. Alice and Jim are open to the possibility of using a donor egg, as this seems to them 
to circumvent the discriminatory practice of selecting against HD. Staff at the clinic are 
reluctant to use a donor egg except as a last resort, as they are keen to avoid the complex 
psychological and social issues that they think can arise in families with donor-conceived 
children. Some also say they cannot understand why Alice and Jim are happier to use a 
donor egg than PGD, as they see both procedures as constituting selecting against HD. The 
clinic must now decide whether to treat Alice with a donor egg, or to artificially inseminate 
her with Jim’s sperm using her own egg and accept that there is a 50% chance that the child 
will inherit HD. 
 
 
2.2.1 Case Two: Discussion 
 
 
The above case demonstrates different ethical issues to those in the first case. To 
begin with, there is the important question of whether Alice and Jim should have access to 
donor eggs when, arguably, the same result could be achieved by using PGD. Donated eggs 
are a scarce resource that could be used by somebody who has no eggs of their own, rather 
than by Alice who has eggs that could yield a healthy baby through the use of PGD. So, one 
reason speaking against treating Alice and Jim is that there are other people to whom we 
might prefer to give the gametes; this points to gamete allocation as a resource equity issue, 
unlike the case of Bob and Betty where the moral concern is not so much equity in resource 
distribution, but a desire to ensure positive consequences. We might say that the reasons 
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not to treat Bob and Betty are to do with Bob and Betty themselves (and their potential 
child), whereas with Alice and Jim we may have a reason to avoid treating them with 
donated gametes because of the effect that this will have on other potential recipients. 
When gametes are scarce, whatever is best for one patient may impact negatively on others. 
So now we are presented with an issue of fairness; it may be unfair to treat Alice with donor 
eggs instead of someone else for whom there are fewer alternatives available. 
There may also be social reasons to avoid using a donor egg over another kind of 
treatment, if we think that the use of a donor egg may have a negative effect on 
relationships within the family or on the family’s relationship with their community. Gamete 
donation creates non-standard family relationships, as donor-conceived children may have 
limited or no contact with one or both of their genetic parents throughout their lives. If this 
disadvantages anyone, then in some cases it may be best to avoid using donated gametes if 
other avenues are possible. Unlike Bob and Betty, Jim and Alice have a treatment option 
available to them that does not involve the use of donor gametes. 
Another social question applying to this case is the question of the effect, if any, of 
selecting against a condition or disease on those living with that condition or disease. They 
may feel alienated or offended by the practice of selecting out future people on the basis 
that they may share this condition or disease. This raises the question of whether clinical 
staff should take such wider social issues into account. 
The difference between the first case and the second can help to illuminate different 
ways of approaching gamete allocation. On the one hand, we might consider it a first come, 
first served system, where, barring any reasons militating against treatment, everyone gets 
treated in the order that they are referred to the clinic. Thus, everyone gets treated in turn, 
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except those problem cases like Bob and Betty, who are either delayed because they need 
further ethical consideration, or are refused entirely. On the other hand, we might consider 
each patient to be in competition with every other for donor gametes, which, given 
shortages, cannot be used to treat every patient who wants them. This would mean that 
clinics would have to take more into account than just whether or not there are any decisive 
reasons not to treat certain patients: they would have to assess the moral components of 
each case to decide which patient might be the best to treat. 
Treating patients in order (except those patients who we wish never to receive 
treatment with donor gametes, like perhaps Bob and Betty) might be the most simplistic 
way of allocating gametes. A look at some other cases, however, might demonstrate some 
situations in which this system becomes problematic. 
 
2.3 Case Three 
 
Jane is infertile because she had radiotherapy treatment for cancer as a teenager. 
She and her husband Albert have been on a waiting list at their clinic for about six months, 
hoping to get treatment with donor eggs. During this time, they have made some friends on 
an internet forum. These friends say that when they received treatment at their local clinic, 
the time between being referred and receiving treatment was less than four months. Jane’s 
local clinic has a policy of not treating women aged 50 or above, and at 49 she is concerned 
that if she is made to wait much longer, she will be excluded from the list altogether because 
of her age. 
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2.3.1 Case Three: Discussion 
 
Jane’s situation is that if she does not get treated soon, she may not be treated at all. 
As well as the decision whether to treat her at all, there is the question of when to treat her, 
given that her chances of having successful treatment diminish with time. Furthermore, 
there are increased obstetric risks as she gets older (including risks to the foetus). Thus, the 
longer she is kept waiting, the less likely she is to get the successful pregnancy she wants, 
with the possibility that she will never be treated. Perhaps, then, clinics should factor in the 
age of participants too, rather than just considering the time at which they arrived on the 
waiting list. This might help to ensure that patients do not get removed from the list by 
virtue of their being too old, which may seem unfair on older patients. However, there may 
be concerns that older patients make less suitable parents, as their shorter remaining 
lifespan may present problems for the child. Equally, favouring older patients in this way 
might be unfair on younger patients if they have been waiting longer. 
This case also illuminates the problem of having different clinics operating at this 
degree of independence from each other. Jane and Albert seem to be waiting longer than 
some other people on waiting lists at different clinics. This could be due to a shortage of 
donors at their clinic, or a shortage of medical staff or facilities to provide treatment, or 
simply a greater demand for treatment at that clinic. This once again highlights the resource 
scarcity element of the issue, as the amount of funding or resources available may not be 
enough to meet demand. At any rate, Jane and Albert are left waiting while other people 
seem to be passing through the system much more quickly. In terms of their clinic’s waiting 
list, people seem to be getting treatment in turn; however, on a national level, the situation 
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seems less fair. This might provide a motivation for creating a national allocation system or 
waiting list, so that people are not unfairly disadvantaged because of where in the country 
they live. 
This next case will introduce some more complicating possibilities regarding patients’ 
positions on waiting lists. 
 
2.4 Case Four 
 
Tess and Emily are a lesbian couple hoping to get treatment with donor sperm. Their 
mutual friend Robert had agreed to donate sperm to help them conceive, but changed his 
mind at the last minute, saying he was no longer comfortable with the idea. They joined the 
waiting list to receive sperm from an anonymous donor, but after they eventually reached 
the top of the list, it transpired that the donor they had been allocated had stipulated that 
he did not want his sperm to go to a lesbian couple. As there is a shortage of sperm donors, 
Tess and Emily now find themselves waiting for a suitable sperm donor to come along so 
that they can receive treatment. 
 
2.4.1 Case Four: Discussion 
 
In this case, Tess and Emily’s position on the waiting list is not exactly clear. In one 
sense, they were top of the waiting list at one point, as they were ready to have treatment 
with Robert’s sperm, and the clinic was willing to treat them, if only Robert had not changed 
his mind. They were not, however, really “waiting” at all – the fact that they knew someone 
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who was willing to donate sperm to them put them right to the top of the list, as Robert’s 
sperm would only go to Tess and Emily, if anyone at all. Though we may sympathise with 
their disappointment at Robert’s change of heart, it is not clear in the first place that it was 
entirely fair for them to get immediate treatment just because they knew someone who was 
willing to donate sperm only to them. We must ask why it is that Robert, or anyone else 
willing to donate sperm or eggs, should be allowed to choose the recipients of their gametes, 
or specify characteristics that the recipients must have. 
On the one hand, we may have an intuition that gametes belong to a person, or are a 
part of their body, and so it is up to them (within certain constraints) what they do with 
them. However, donors might make different decisions about the recipients of their gametes 
that we find uncomfortable: someone might not want their gametes to go to same-sex 
couples, or to people of a certain race. A tension also arises when, although we want gamete 
allocation to reflect principles of fairness and non-discrimination, we may not want to deter 
people from donating gametes altogether by restricting people’s control over what happens 
to their gametes once they have donated them. The homophobic or racist donor may 
choose not to donate at all if they cannot do so on their own terms. Allocation thus affects 
donation just as donation affects allocation. 
It is not always the donors themselves that have such controversial views with regard 
to who is eligible to receive gametes, however. We saw in case three that there is an issue 
regarding age cut-offs for recipients, and relevant to case four there are discrepancies 
between clinics’ treatment of same-sex couples, too: not all commissioning bodies will fund 
treatment for same-sex couples, meaning that they will have to travel elsewhere for 
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treatment where heterosexual couples would not have to do so. Such policies might be 
regarded as unjustly discriminatory against people of certain ages or sexualities. 
Another argument might run the other way, suggesting that it is more unfair to treat 
same-sex couples than not to treat them. This comes from the idea that the individuals in 
such couples are not medically infertile – they could, if they wanted, find a partner of the 
opposite sex, and reproduce with them, but they choose not to do this. On the other hand, 
heterosexual individuals with medical infertility cannot reproduce regardless of with whom 
they try. The idea of a couple’s being infertile as a result of their own “choice”, rather than 
by unavoidable medical circumstances, then, may serve as a justification for treating 
heterosexual couples over same-sex ones. 
 
2.5 Case Five 
 
 Rajkumar and Gulab are an Indian couple, and Rajkumar needs donor sperm if he and 
Gulab are to reproduce together. They have indicated that they would like to be treated with 
sperm from a white donor because they would like a child with fairer skin than they have. 
Some members of staff in the clinic have expressed concern about accommodating this 
preference, as this goes against their usual practice of allocating donors to recipients with 
similar physical characteristics, including ethnicity. Furthermore, some staff members have 
also expressed a concern that a mixed race child with two south Asian parents might look 
strange to other members of the community, and that this might have an impact on the 
family, especially the child. Rajkumar and Gulab have stated that they do not care how their 
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family is looked upon by society, and that it may in fact be a good thing to challenge 
prevailing expectations of how families should look.  
 
2.5.1 Case Five Discussion 
 
 This case shows that patients may not want gametes from a donor with similar 
physical characteristics to them, raising the question of the extent to which clinics should 
account for the particular desires and preferences of patients. Our answer to this question 
may be influenced by the availability of the type of gametes being requested – if there is a 
preponderance of gametes from a certain type of donor, someone’s request for this may 
matter less than if someone requests gametes that are in low supply. We may question the 
claim that we have any more reason to allocate gametes to someone who matches the 
characteristics of the donor over someone who is less of a match. 
There is also a putative welfare of the child concern in this case. In the above case, 
staff are worried that the family’s community may stigmatise them for having a child with a 
different ethnicity. This raises the question of whether this would actually occur, and if it 
would, whether it is the family’s choice to take the risk, or whether the clinic can legitimately 
insist that they choose gametes from a more closely matching donor. There are once again 
wider social issues, as we may consider the extent to which society’s potential expectations 
about families should be conformed to or challenged. 
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2.6 Summary Remarks 
 
In all of the above cases, the couples concerned need assistance to reproduce; that is 
why they are involved with fertility clinics in the first place, and why staff have become 
aware of their situations. But although these individuals have fertility problems in common, 
the clinics’ reasons for not offering treatment (and ultimately allowing these people to 
reproduce) are different in each situation. So, it is their infertility in combination with these 
various other factors about them that creates obstacles to them reproducing. In this sense, 
they are just unlucky: circumstances that would not prevent them from reproducing 
naturally (if they were physically able to) prevent them from reproducing with treatment. 
Outside of clinical settings, violent alcoholics, carriers of Huntington’s disease, 50-year-olds, 
and those with diminished capacity all reproduce. Choosing one’s reproductive partner is 
also the norm. There may be a motivation for attempting to treat patients as they would be 
treated “in the real world”, i.e. to give them treatment that will bring them closer to how 
things would be if they did not have fertility problems. But for the people in the cases above, 
their need for clinical assistance means that in part, the decision rests with the clinical staff 
that choose whether or not to help them, raising the question of whether these staff 
members are obliged to help patients simulate a “normal” reproductive experience, or 
whether they have other obligations because of their involvement in the process. 
This opens the door to many ethical issues: perhaps it is an infringement of people’s 
liberty or autonomy to make decisions about whether or not people can reproduce based on 
judgements about their characters. Statutory obligations and professional codes of conduct 
may require staff to treat some patients regardless of whether they are comfortable doing 
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so. Certainly there is a legal responsibility, but this does not necessarily mean that there is an 
ethical responsibility. 
 This discussion may seem somewhat cursory; the issues discussed above will receive 
more detailed treatment later. These cases nevertheless illustrate some of the ethical issues 
that are at work in gamete allocation and that can face staff working in fertility clinics, and 
why there is a need to spend time considering them. These are the kinds of cases that can 
lead to disagreement between staff members, between staff members and patients 
themselves, or between these groups and entire sections of society. 
Much that has been written in moral philosophy will have an indirect bearing on this 
issue, and this is considered in chapter four below. Some philosophers have also attempted 
to address the gamete allocation question directly. Pennings attempted to systematise the 
problem of allocating donated eggs (Pennings, 2001). This thesis’ conclusions agree with 
Pennings that a priority or points system should be used for gamete (many of the ethical 
issues that apply to egg allocation apply also to sperm allocation, so this project will consider 
both of these issues together) allocation, but diverges from Pennings’ view with regard to 
how criteria should be weighed into this system. Pattinson (2012) also discusses some 
putative criteria for gamete allocation, as part of a wider discussion of a national allocation 
system. This thesis considers these criteria in greater detail than Pattinson, exploring why 
they are valuable, and how they should be weighed. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
A project was designed and undertaken to help address the ethical issues outlined in 
the previous two chapters. This chapter describes this project in detail. 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to generate a set of philosophically robust yet 
practically useful conclusions about how clinical staff should allocate gametes, including the 
use of known donation and a national allocation system. 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
1. What criteria are being used in the UK to allocate gametes donated for reproductive 
purposes – including criteria that are used to determine whether a potential recipient 
is accepted on to a waiting list? 
2. What criteria ought to be used to allocate gametes for reproductive purposes? 
Should donors be permitted to influence the allocation process? Should known 
donors be used? 
3. What are the ethical arguments for and against a national register of recipients and 
donors? 
4. What are the ethical opinions of fertility clinic staff about gamete allocation, and how 
acceptable to them are the ethical conclusions relating to research questions 1-3 
above? 
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3.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
The overarching aim of the thesis was met by breaking it down into a series of 
smaller aims and objectives, the results of which address the overarching aim when taken 
together. These smaller aims were: 
 
1. To explore what allocation criteria for donated gametes are being used by clinics in 
the UK, including those which govern admission to waiting lists. 
 
Achieved by meeting the following objectives: 
i) A survey of publicly-available allocation criteria at UK fertility clinics. 
ii) Interviews with staff working in fertility clinics across the UK. 
 
2. To determine what criteria ought to be used to allocate donated gametes. 
 
Achieved by meeting the following objectives: 
iii) An ethical analysis of some of the potential criteria for allocating gametes. 
iv) An ethical evaluation of the use of known and conditional donors. 
v) An analysis of the ethical opinions of service providers, and of their reactions 
to the results of objectives iii) and iv) 
 
3. To determine whether a national allocation system should be developed. 
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Achieved by meeting the following objectives: 
vi) An ethical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the national 
system, taking account of: 
vii) An analysis of the reactions of service providers to the arguments for and 
against a national register. 
 
3.3 Project Design 
 
The project was designed to draw conclusions and make suggestions that will be 
useful to fertility clinic staff, policy-makers, and those with influence over practice. To that 
end, serious efforts were made to determine and engage with the ethical views of these and 
other relevant stakeholders, so that their opinions could be considered alongside, and where 
appropriate integrated with, a more abstract theoretical analysis. This approach attempts to 
take seriously Mill’s view that: 
 
In the case of any person whose judgement is really deserving of confidence, how has 
it become so? […] Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can 
make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be 
said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which 
it can be looked at by every character of mind (Mill, 1991, p. 25) 
 
 
 
The project is thus a combination of philosophical theory and empirical research, often 
referred to as empirical bioethics. 
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Before the empirical study was undertaken, the project involved a placement at a 
fertility clinic in the UK, providing the opportunity to engage with the kinds of staff members 
whose practice was to be considered in the project, and to observe laboratory work. The 
project also provided the opportunity to sit in on consultations with patients at a secondary 
clinic, where fertility patients who had seen their general practitioner (GP) would receive 
further care and examination before potentially being referred to a tertiary clinic for 
treatment. This provided an idea of how emotionally fraught the pursuit of fertility 
treatment can be. In addition, throughout the course of the project it was possible to 
observe the meetings of a fertility clinic ethics committee, which allowed exposure to real-
life cases and ethical dilemmas occurring in fertility treatment. These experiences helped to 
ground the research in the real-life practices it aims to influence, and to foster 
understanding of the different perspectives at play, developing familiarity with the 
environment that the project was embedded in. It was important that this stage occurred 
prior to data collection, so that when the time came for data collection, some of the ethical 
issues that would be pertinent to explore with fertility clinic staff had already been identified. 
  
3.3.1 Project Execution 
 
Objective i) was completed by collecting data from the HFEA website, and, where 
they existed, the websites of clinics themselves. Data was also added from interviews in the 
first phase of the embedded study undertaken as part of this project, more details of which 
are described on pages 129-157. In addition to data on criteria listed on the HFEA website, 
the database also sought to include data on whether each clinic would offer treatment to 
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same-sex couples or single patients. These factors were of particular philosophical interest 
given their status as protected characteristics in the Equality Act (2010). In light of the 
emphasis on conditional and known donation as a research aim, the database also aimed to 
include information on this. 
A philosophical exploration of gamete allocation was then undertaken. This 
considered some of the putative concerns and ethical issues arising. These issues were 
selected based on their salience in the philosophical literature, the statutes governing 
fertility treatment, and from observations made during the field placement. This 
philosophical analysis culminated in some tentative philosophical conclusions about gamete 
allocation ethics. 
To meet the aim of ascertaining which criteria fertility staff employ in practice, how 
guidelines are interpreted, and how service providers would react to an ethical analysis, the 
project included an empirical study. This involved collecting qualitative data from 
professionals working in fertility clinics, academics with an interest in reproductive ethics, 
and representatives of relevant organisations, such as the HFEA (the organisation 
responsible for licensing fertility clinics in the UK) and the National Gamete Donation Trust (a 
charity providing information about gamete donation). This data comprises both practical 
information about what practitioners do and why, and information regarding their ethical 
opinions on current practice, for example the practices of which they approve or disapprove, 
and why. This data was then analysed in light of the earlier philosophical investigation, and 
the philosophical conclusions reassessed so as to accommodate the fact that the study’s 
findings may indicate practical barriers to their implementation. These findings were then 
presented in a workshop, which itself was a phase of data collection (detailed descriptions of 
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the data collection phases are contained in chapter five). The conclusions then underwent 
final revisions in light of the workshop data. The project therefore used theory and data 
iteratively: preliminary philosophical exploration influenced the design and execution of the 
empirical study, which itself had a bearing on the theoretical elements of the project where 
philosophical conclusions were modified in light of the data. The next section will provide a 
detailed description of the relationship between philosophical theory and empirical data 
within this project. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Bioethics 
 
The approach used in this project is referred to as “empirical bioethics”. The 
quotation from Mill above (see page 19) provides a good starting point in considering why 
this approach is appropriate – final conclusions will be strengthened if varied and opposing 
views have been considered and appropriately dealt with. 
One reason to adopt an empirical bioethics approach in this project is that, as noted 
on page 20 above, seeking fertility treatment is a highly emotional endeavour. The empirical 
bioethics approach aims to take seriously the issue, as expressed by Ives and Draper, that 
‘there is something lacking in an approach that appeals solely to abstract theoretical 
principles and rationality when the problems addressed are experienced in a particular 
context and arouse high emotion’ (Ives and Draper, 2009, p. 250). The emotional context in 
which gamete allocation decisions are made in practice is far removed from an ordinary 
academic context, and the need to adequately understand this emotional context gives rise 
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to the need for the project to include a more practical grounding than a straightforward 
philosophical thesis alone could provide. 
The interests of stakeholders are even more acutely affected when ethical discussion 
has the potential to inform policy, as is the case with this project. Ives and Draper (2009) call 
this ‘normative policy oriented bioethics (NPOB)’ (p. 251). The heightened implications for 
such stakeholders in scenarios when ethics seeks to inform policy call for ‘encounters with 
experience’ to achieve ‘contextual understanding’ (Ives and Draper, 2009, p.251), where 
those engaged in ethical analysis immerse themselves in the experiences of others to the 
greatest tenable extent. The approach to this project thus attempts to give due concern to 
the experiences of those who are involved in the relevant processes of deciding how to 
allocate gametes. 
The notion of sensitivity to emotional context is important, but so is the idea of 
context-sensitivity in general. In a discussion of context-sensitivity, Musschenga notes that 
empirical ethics ‘takes seriously the intention of all practical ethics, not only to prescribe 
actions, but also to actually guide people in their behavior’ (Musschenga, 2005, p. 468). This 
practical usefulness makes empirical ethics particularly advantageous in a project like this, 
which sets out to have high potential for impact on policy and practice. The result is a set of 
empirically informed ethical conclusions about gamete allocation practice, underpinned by 
robust philosophical justification. Note that the acknowledgement of the value of this 
context-sensitivity does not entail a commitment to the full-blown contextualism described 
by Musschenga, which ‘rejects importing alien, external principles into a context’ 
(Musschenga, 2005, p. 468). The next subsection will describe this thesis’s theoretical 
approach, which includes the application of general principles to particular contexts. 
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Having now explained why an empirical approach is appropriate to this project, let us 
now turn to a discussion of the nature and structure of this approach. The iterative 
relationship between theory and data in the study has already been described, and this is 
key to understanding the manner in which ethical theory is integrated with empirical data in 
this project. 
 
3.3.3 Relationship between Theory and Empirical Data 
 
The project adopts a top-down approach to the relationship between theory and 
data, such that “upstream”, higher-order, theoretically justified conclusions will always be 
given priority over intuitions or opinions that are unaccompanied by robust argument. This 
means that the theoretical assumptions and starting points of the thesis (to be described in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 below) are unlikely to be affected by the data, but rather, the data will 
be considered in the light of this theory. This is in line with Singer’s argument that ‘moral 
expertise would seem to be possible’ (Singer, 1972, p. 117), in that some credence is given to 
the value of ethical theory over the views of those with little or no experience in it. 
This is not to say that theory can provide answers on all ethical questions. In the 
same piece, Singer is clear about the value of information: ‘to be moral experts, it would be 
necessary for moral philosophers to do some fact-finding on whatever issue they were 
considering’ (Singer, 1972, p. 117). This in itself provides a reason to collect empirical data. 
Applied to this project, information about how clinics currently allocate gametes may help us 
towards the goal of arriving at philosophical conclusions that are practically viable. Being 
aware of the status quo in how guidance and statutes are interpreted in practice may give a 
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clearer picture of what the next stage should be in terms of making conclusions about how 
to make practice more ethical. Further to this, exploring how acceptable staff find these 
conclusions will help create a picture of what kinds of conclusions might be realistically 
adopted into practice. Given that there is little existing data on clinical staff members’ 
opinions about how to allocate gametes, a study collecting data directly from staff, regarding 
both their practices and their views, will provide useful facts in negotiating these questions. 
In terms of how likely staff are to accept the conclusions made in this project, where 
the data shows that clinical staff have strong feelings about particular issues, this is taken 
seriously as a potential barrier to changes in policy or practice. This results in conclusions of 
different kinds, which diverge from each other: there will be “ideal world” conclusions that 
are recommended by philosophical theory, and pragmatic conclusions that strike a balance 
between what the theory being used would recommend, and what can reasonably be 
expected to actually occur in practice, given the strength of feeling of those who would be 
expected to act in the way suggested; as Huxtable puts it, ‘[d]iluting one’s claims makes 
sound pragmatic sense when the likely alternative is the emptying of the whole draught’ 
(Huxtable, 2013, p.132). This is somewhat oversimplified, as the value of potential outcomes 
needs to be considered as well as their likelihood. In some cases it may be better, on balance, 
to persist in arguing for a strong conclusion. The strong conclusion may be of enormous 
value, or the diluted one may be of too little value. At any rate, Huxtable is right in principle 
that compromise for the sake of practicality may sometimes be rational. 
Let us consider the limitations of moral expertise outlined by Archard. Archard’s 
argument is twofold: he begins by pointing to a flaw in the concept of moral expertise that 
renders it ‘limited’ (Archard, 2009, p. 125) at best, and then goes on to suggest that even if 
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fully-fledged moral expertise were possible, to acknowledge this in practice might have 
pernicious consequences. Both of these positions can be shown to be problematic. 
Archard’s argument that moral philosophers can have only ‘limited’ moral expertise 
rests on the premise that ‘moral philosophers see themselves as required to construct moral 
theory on the foundations of common-sense morality[, which is] the set of moral maxims of 
which ordinary people have knowledge and of which they make use in their quotidian lives’ 
(Archard, 2009, p. 123). This argument suggests that moral philosophers only deal with non-
expert subjects, and that any expertise is in the ‘systematization, clarification, 
disambiguation and – where necessary – modification of common-sense morality’ (Archard, 
2009, p. 125) rather than in normative judgements themselves. One need only deny this 
empirical claim about the practice of moral philosophers and the nature of moral theory to 
undermine Archard’s argument against moral expertise. Indeed, this is one of the moves 
adopted by Gordon in his criticism of Archard’s argument, who concludes that Archard’s 
argument is ‘unconvincing’ (Gordon, 2012, p.4). It therefore seems that our acceptance of 
the possibility of moral expertise must rest on our ideas about the nature and purpose of 
moral reasoning; if we adopt the top-down approach, as is proposed in this thesis, there is 
room for moral expertise of a fuller kind than Archard allows. 
Archard’s second, consequentialist criticism of the notion of moral expertise is that to 
allow extra weight to the views of putative moral experts within the context of policy-
making would be undemocratic: ‘Exclusion from debates subverts the acquisition and 
strengthening of those traits, and consequently enervates democracy’ (Archard, 2009, p. 
127). 
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This thesis does not fall foul of democratic principles, as it does not seek to exclude 
anyone from debate.2 Rather, the empirical approach hopes to add a variety of voices to the 
philosophical discussion, by inviting participants not just to disclose factual information, but 
to share and discuss their moral views on the topics at hand. This makes this project’s 
philosophical analysis more democratic than would be the case with a non-empirical 
philosophical project. The top-down approach means that ethical theory is afforded a 
weightier vote, but voices are not excluded from the debate in the way that worries Archard 
– if the data suggests that there is enough support for, or opposition to, an idea, then the 
idea may be considered, regardless of whether it is supported by theory. 
Beauchamp and Childress note that ‘cases lead us to modify and refine embryonic 
theoretical claims, especially by pointing to inadequacies in or limitations of theories’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1989, p. 16). Whereas Hedgecoe (2004), and arguably Frith 
(2012), take this sentiment as support of a more data-driven approach, this thesis takes the 
view that not all moral theory should be considered “embryonic”. In cases where moral 
theory is lacking, we can look to empirical data for help, but this does not make empirical 
data ‘theory challenging’ (Hedgecoe, 2004, p. 137) in the way that Hedgecoe would have it, 
because we must accept the conclusions to which a sufficiently robust theory leads. This 
thesis will subscribe to a paradigm of moral theory that affords greater weight to principles 
and their application than to considerations arising from individual instances of moral feeling. 
Data must thus go some way towards demonstrating where theory is flawed, rather than 
                                                          
2
 There is, however, the question of who is included in the debate, and decisions about inclusion may 
amount to decisions about exclusion. Chapter five of this thesis will describe the study’s participants 
and the rationales for the inclusion criteria and sampling methods. Subsection 7.1.2 explains why 
patients were not directly included in the study. 
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just disagreeing with it. Preserving a unified, principled moral theory in this way provides a 
more appropriate backdrop for discussing questions of distributive justice, where 
distributions of resources must be justified to others. This means that data and lived 
experiences are examined and tested against moral theory, and at times can be used to 
revise it where it is already lacking, but they do not themselves put moral theory to the test.  
As Borry et al. comment: ‘[e]mpirical research cannot by itself determine what is 
good or evil, right or wrong. The inductive approach runs the risk of lacking a critical attitude 
and assigning a sacred meaning to the facts without testing them against normative 
principles and theories’ (Borry et al., 2004, pp. 48-49). The empirical bioethics approach in 
this project is thus something akin to that of Borry et al.  Empirical data can help us to 
identify moral problems, and it can help us to evaluate them: ‘empirical research can play a 
role in the description of the morally relevant facts. […E]mpirical research plays a role in 
assessing the moral question […and] in evaluating the decision-making process’ (Borry et al., 
2004, pp. 50-51). It is only in limited circumstances, however, afforded enough weight to 
influence theory – either those circumstances in which theory leaves questions open or 
unanswered, or when data suggests that theoretical conclusions are unlikely to be adopted 
into real-world practice. 
Aside perhaps from placing this emphasis on the role of empirical data in the 
identification of moral problems, the approach being taken has parallels with Ives’ “Reflexive 
Bioethics” approach to empirical bioethics, in that it includes a ‘naive inquiry into the 
problem’ (Ives, 2013, p.10) before in-depth analysis begins. In this case, the naive inquiry is 
the pre-empirical philosophical analysis. The final stage, ‘reflexive balancing’, is in this case 
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the integration of the philosophical analysis with the data. This process will be described in 
detail in subsection 5.4.3 below. 
Now we have some idea of the relative weighting of theoretical conclusions 
compared to conclusions arising from the data. In general, there is little room for the 
empirical data to challenge any established and robust theory, though it can do so when the 
data suggests that the theory’s conclusions are not pragmatically feasible, i.e. when a 
conclusion is expected to meet with so much opposition that it is unlikely to be adopted in 
practice. Now that the relationship between theory and data has been established, let us 
explore how this will be applied in this project. 
Where the empirical data show that participants appear to agree with the 
conclusions in the philosophy chapter, they will require less discussion. This is not to assume 
that the participants’ agreement ensures that the conclusions are correct, but it is at least 
helpful, pragmatically and perhaps theoretically, if there is some consensus, limited though 
it might be. In cases where the interview and workshop data show that participants have 
views that would oppose the recommendations in the philosophy chapter, then more in-
depth analysis will be needed to establish whether the conclusions should be revised in light 
of their views if they are to be modified into conclusions that will be more likely to shape 
future policy and practice for the better. 
These revisions could be needed for two reasons: the first is where the participants 
introduce theoretical considerations that had previously been given too little weight. In this 
case, the weightings may need to be reconsidered, which could result in different 
conclusions. This is consistent with the approach to empirical bioethics being used in this 
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thesis, where data can ‘lead us to modify and refine embryonic theoretical claims’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1989, p. 16). 
The second is that where there is opposition to one of the conclusions, the question 
arises of whether there is anything to be gained by making a recommendation that would 
most likely be rejected. For practical reasons it may thus be useful to try to strike such a 
compromise. 
 
3.3.4 Theory within Context 
 
Another feature that may cause us to modify theory is the legal context of gamete 
allocation. Much of the discussion to follow will thus consider moral factors in light of the 
broader legal context, as described above (pages 3-4). The philosophical work in this thesis 
may still suggest that the legal position is wrong, but moral theory that is to be of use to 
practitioners must account for the current legal situation, and offer guidance in accordance 
with it.  This is not an example of data challenging theory per se, but rather an example of 
theory being sensitive to context in order for it to have practical application. 
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4. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GAMETE ALLOCATION 
 
This chapter will define and categorise some of the different moral factors that may 
be relevant in gamete allocation scenarios, and consider how these factors can be used to 
assist in gamete allocation, and how they may interact and be weighed up against each 
other. It will also explore some technical matters regarding the relationship between 
philosophical theory and practical concerns.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.1 lays out some of the initial 
philosophical assumptions being made in this thesis. One of these, a conception of equality, 
is explicated in section 4.2. Section 4.3 outlines some considerations that may be valuable 
under the framework described in sections 4.1 and 4.2, and which thus potentially require us 
to deviate from the position of equality. Section 4.4 considers different characteristics to see 
how they relate to our commitments to the moral considerations identified in section 4.3, 
and how they interact with our commitment to equality. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 bring these 
considerations together and reflect on how they should be weighted. Section 4.7 discusses 
the concept of a national allocation system. Finally, section 4.8 tests the conclusions of this 
chapter using the hypothetical examples detailed in chapter two. 
 
4.1 Moral Considerations 
 
The moral dimensions of gamete allocation are so multitudinous that there will not 
be room to discuss them all. Some considerations, and some putative selection criteria for 
gamete receipt, will have to be omitted. Those moral issues that have been chosen are those 
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that seemed the most salient, based on the time spent in the field placement, and a survey 
of the philosophical and legal literature. These choices of what considerations to include 
have, therefore, both a theoretical and a practical underpinning, consistent with the 
empirical bioethics methodology being used here, and the intention that the project should 
produce practical conclusions. The work undertaken here is intended to provide a useful 
framework for considering similar moral questions in the future – the moral features of the 
considerations discussed may also apply to considerations not discussed. 
Similarly, different moral theories could present totally different analyses of the 
situation, and it would be impossible to include a full discussion of every moral theory’s 
implications for gamete allocation. This thesis has also been selective in terms of the moral 
framework used. While a context-independent case can be made for adopting the moral 
theory described below, there may also be contextual reasons that speak in favour of it. If 
we are selecting a theory with the intention of applying it to healthcare provision, then a 
theory that accords with some basic principles that tend to be applied within that context 
will speak in favour of using that theory. This is not to say that context is theory-challenging, 
as the issues therein have already been discussed (see page 27). It is merely to say that, 
when faced with a range of equally plausible higher-order moral theories, contextual 
applicability may speak in favour of choosing one theory over another. 
To that end, one starting point of this thesis is the ‘formal principle of justice’ 
regarded by Beauchamp and Childress as one of the four principles for healthcare ethics: 
‘Equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally’ (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2013, p. 250). According to this principle, discrimination requires justification: one 
must provide reasons for treating one person in a certain way and another person in a 
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different way in relevantly similar circumstances, on pain of acting in morally arbitrary ways. 
These reasons must appeal to defensible moral values in order to have legitimacy. These 
reasons must also go beyond mere favouritism; treating a person better because you like 
them is insufficient, particularly in healthcare settings where we expect benefits to be 
distributed according to less personal standards than this. It will therefore be presumed that 
we cannot distinguish between patients until a good reason is given to favour or disfavour 
anyone. Section 4.2 will therefore discuss considerations of equality, and what this might 
mean for gamete allocation decision-making. 
Beyond this starting point of equality, this thesis will take a broadly consequentialist 
approach in determining how and whether to factor in other putative considerations. Again, 
while there are independent justifications for the general use of consequentialist theories of 
various types (see Bentham (1948); Mill (1998); Sidgwick (1901); Hare (1965 and 1981), 
Smart (in Smart and Williams 1973); Singer (1993); and Hooker (2000)), the kind of 
consequentialist theory described below is appropriate for our purposes here. 
Consequentialism as here defined serves only to distinguish the types of values that will be 
discussed in this thesis from retributive or desert-based values (except insofar as such values 
are useful from a consequentialist perspective). 
This conception of consequentialism is roughly the “minimal consequentialism” 
advanced by Caws (1995). Caws rejects common descriptions of consequentialism that 
portray it as necessarily committed to certain theories of value or the imperative to 
maximise. He describes the following definition from Scheffler as an example of this 
common position: ‘Consequentialism in its purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine 
which says that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best 
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overall outcome’ (Caws, 1995, p. 318). Instead, Caws characterises the consequentialist view 
much more broadly: ‘the rightness or otherwise of an act lies in its foreseeable 
consequences’ (Caws, 1995, p. 317). 
This broad notion of consequentialism is also explicated by Dreier, who describes 
‘strictly consequentialist theories’ as ‘those whose specification of relevant kinds of 
consequence make no reference, explicit or implicit, to times other than the time of the 
state of affairs that constitutes the consequence’ (Dreier 1993, p. 23). Dreier also notes the 
way in which a plurality of values can be drawn into a consequentialist theory like this:  
 
We merely take the features of an action that the theory considers to be relevant, 
and build them into the consequences. For example, if a theory says that promises 
are not to be broken, then we restate this requirement: that a promise has been 
broken is a bad consequence. Notice that the weighting is not yet specified. If the 
theory under consideration includes an absolute side constraint against promise-
breaking, then we have the consequentialist version give a lexically prior negative 
weight to promise-breaking (Dreier 1993, p. 23). 
 
 
 
Brown criticises this approach by suggesting that the assimilation of these values into 
consequentialism undermines consequentialism itself. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
consider Brown’s argument in much detail, except to say that Brown’s argument is 
problematic in that it commits the same mistake as the one that Caws attributes to Scheffler, 
where the most minimal form of consequentialism offered is one that erroneously describes 
maximisation as ‘[t]he non-negotiable core of consequentialism’ (Brown, 2011, p. 751). This 
thesis sides with Caws in denying that consequentialism must be committed to maximisation. 
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At the same time, we should be conscious that there seems to be a prima facie 
reason to bring about more of a valuable thing. This is convincingly exemplified in this 
thought experiment from Mulgan:  
 
Achilles knows that n is the number of people who are living below the poverty line. 
He also knows that, as soon as he enters a number into the computer, that number 
of people will be raised above the poverty line (at no cost to Achilles) […]. Achilles 
enters a number (p) that, although fairly large, is significantly less than n. We ask him 
why he opted not to raise a further n-p people above the poverty line. He replies that 
he is a Satisficing Consequentialist who thinks that saving p people from poverty in 
one day is ‘good enough’ (Mulgan, 2001, p. 131). 
 
 
Mulgan thinks that Achilles obviously acts wrongly in this example. Even without entering 
into more detail about what exactly a “Satisficing Consequentialist” is, the point is clear: if 
we can do more good at no extra cost, we ought to do so. Hence, this thesis takes a 
pluralistic maximising approach. 
A key question at this point is how “good” is to be conceived. The minimal version of 
consequentialism proposed could espouse a plurality of different values, including concepts 
typically not viewed as being consequentialist. For this reason, any mention of the welfare of 
stakeholders should be interpreted broadly, and could include concepts like happiness, 
interests, or autonomy. Minimal consequentialism could also involve mechanisms for 
negotiating these values not typically associated with consequentialism, like absolute 
constraints (of a deontological kind) on some actions. 
The pragmatic, compromising approach (see page 25) that this thesis follows will also 
have some bearing on the theoretical choices made in this thesis. Given that the goal is to 
generate useful conclusions, the best move may be to adopt a pluralistic value theory, to 
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ensure that philosophical conclusions can plausibly impact the real world. We may also need 
to consider context to decide what theory of value to use here, as was a factor in the choice 
to adopt a (minimally) consequentialist theory in the first place. 
Beauchamp and Childress’s other principles of biomedical ethics can offer help here. 
The minimal consequentialist framework can employ autonomy and beneficence/non-
maleficence principles (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013, pp. 101-241), so that we are 
operating with a theory of value that is not totally foreign to a healthcare setting. Much 
work can be done to flesh these principles out, but that is not the task of this thesis. It is 
sufficient at this stage to say that considerations of those types are values to be at least 
putatively considered. To align the discussion with the HFE Act, these values will be 
collectively considered as “welfare”. This conception of welfare is broad, as it seeks to be 
open to a plurality of values – this thesis is not committed to a particular value theory, 
because exploring different ways of conceiving of value may be more palatable to policy-
makers and practitioners than considering the question only under a narrow theory of value. 
 
4.2 Equality 
 
As has already been said, one starting standpoint in this thesis is a presumption in 
favour of equality. An allocation system that unjustifiably allows inequality may be described 
as an unfair one. Later sections will consider other morally relevant considerations, on the 
basis of which deviation from equality may be permissible, and in those cases it will be 
argued that our commitment to these other considerations ought to be taken to outweigh 
our commitment to equality. This section will examine the notion of equality, as well as 
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some of the arguments surrounding groups of people with different characteristics. We may 
want to preserve equality between certain groups when making decisions about gamete 
allocation, or we may think there are morally relevant differences that justify inequalities 
between these groups. 
Clinical decisions must conform to legal standards of non-discrimination as laid out in 
the UK Equality Act 2010 (discussed above). Any discrimination must be justified not simply 
on features of a patient, but on considerations arising from these features. So for example, 
age can be a consideration, but it has to be shown that this is because it creates some other, 
attendant moral problem; for instance that efficacy is affected by age; that elderly parents 
cannot provide sufficient support for the child; or the presence of age-related health risks in 
pregnancy. In these cases, it is not strictly the patient’s age that is our concern, but rather 
some problem associated with age. These may be risk factors common to specific younger 
women (for example, pregnancy risks associated with high blood pressure). Similarly, it is not 
the patient’s age in itself that is the problem if we are concerned about sufficient parental 
support: perhaps the real issue may be more specific, for example how physically active the 
parent is, or how long they are expected to live. 
There are two kinds of discrimination: direct and indirect.  Direct discrimination is 
when someone is (dis)advantaged simply on the basis of membership of a certain group (like 
an age group). Indirect discrimination is where a policy3 or action with some other aim 
incidentally disadvantages members of a specific group: the policy ‘applies to everyone but 
disadvantages a particular [group]’ (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 2011, p.2). 
As an example, a fairground ride may have a policy requiring people to be at least 140cm tall 
                                                          
3 Both direct and indirect discrimination become systematic if they are made into policy. 
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if they are to ride it (and let us say that there is no explicit age restriction for this ride). This 
policy directly (though not necessarily unjustifiably) discriminates against those whose 
height is under 140cm, and indirectly discriminates against people on the basis of age, 
because (amongst children at least) there is a correlation between height and age, and so 
younger people are disadvantaged (albeit, in this case, for justified safety reasons). 
The Equality Act includes an important clause that will in some cases allow indirect 
discrimination in relation to a protected characteristic. For this to be permissible, the 
discriminator must ‘show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ 
(Equality Act, 2010, section 19 (2)(d)). Lippert-Rasmussen echoes this:  an act or policy is 
indirectly discriminatory against a group (in the moralised sense) only if the disadvantages to 
the group are ‘disproportionate in the sense that the achievement of the goals promoted by 
such a requirement is not sufficiently important to justify the [...] effects on minorit[ies]’ 
(Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011, p. 1). 
This is crucial to the coming discussion, as it looks like pure equality between people 
of certain groups (defined as equal treatment irrespective of membership of such groups) 
gives way to other considerations. The goals of discriminatory practices, then, must be 
justified by balancing the loss and disadvantage to discriminated-against groups (not 
necessarily minorities as Lippert-Rasmussen would have it) against the advantages conferred 
by the discrimination. In the fairground ride case, the advantage (or legitimate aim) is safety, 
which outweighs the disadvantage of not being able to ride the ride. We now know what to 
consider if endorsing any practices that deviate from equality. 
Being accurate about why discrimination is justified is key to avoiding the unjustified 
discrimination that may occur when some factors are over-generalised. Generalisation may, 
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however, be justified by an appeal to practicality when there is a high statistical likelihood of 
problems associated with membership of a group, even though the risk will not manifest in 
every case. It may not be possible to know who exactly will be affected, only that certain 
groups of people present higher risks than others. In effect, these generalisations are 
justified through our lack of knowledge – if we had perfect knowledge of the consequences 
of treating each individual patient, we would not need to generalise on the basis of other 
characteristics. Some of these characteristics will be considered more specifically in section 
4.4. Even if these generalisations are being used, there can be provisions such that patients 
can still receive treatment if they can demonstrate their suitability in spite of being part of a 
group that is usually deemed ineligible.  
It is thus important to discuss what reasons we may have to discriminate against 
some people, to make sure any generalisations we make are based on reasoned 
consideration. Now that we have a concept of when it is justifiable, in principle, to deviate 
from treating patients equally, we can go on to flesh out which aims count as legitimate, and 
which do not.4 The following section will consider different groups of people amongst whom 
we may discriminate when making allocation decisions, and consider whether our other 
moral commitments allow for this discrimination. 
The commitment to equality is a decision-making principle, asking that deviations 
from equal treatment are properly justified. It is not a commitment to distributions that are 
egalitarian in terms of their outcome. If we think that egalitarian distributions may be of 
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that our moral commitments to equality may extend beyond the protected 
characteristics outlined in the Equality Act. The protected characteristics may only have been 
identified as needing such protection because they encompass the ways in which historically people 
have discriminated commonly and unfairly against others. Other forms of discrimination may 
similarly be unfair, even though they are not listed alongside these characteristics.  
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value, we must consider whether this value is sufficient to justify deviation from equal 
treatment. 
 
4.3 Welfare 
 
Our commitment to welfare may be a factor that justifies deviation from the 
principle of equality, however that equality is conceived. If different patients, or groups of 
patients, present different likelihoods for outcomes with regard to welfare, then it may be 
permissible for us to favour some patients over others based on the value of these outcomes. 
We must bear in mind, however, that ‘we need evidence to support the differential 
attribution of welfare to the different groups’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1147). An evidential 
standard is important to justify any differential treatment, and pages 261-263 will discuss 
this standard further. 
 
4.3.1 Global Welfare  
 
Broome argues that ‘we must give up the idea that changes to the population are 
neutral. Adding to the population, or subtracting from it, may be either good or bad’ 
(Broome 2004: 207). Given the global community that is the modern world, the impact of 
adding one person could spread anywhere, and make things better or worse overall. The 
question of whether the addition of another life would be positive, negative, or neutral 
would require a calculation using a huge number of factors. Things like a person’s 
contribution to climate change, their patterns of consumption, and their employment 
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choices and contributions to the economy might all have a bearing on global welfare. The 
prediction looks very complex for clinics to make, and would likely have to be generalised: if 
clinics can make any judgement at all about whether a person will contribute positively or 
negatively to welfare, they will have to make relatively sweeping judgements about what 
people are likely to do, based on their membership of particular communities or societies. 
Such judgements may offer little help with gamete allocation. If UK citizens are said to be 
positive to welfare, so much the better for them, but this does not provide clinics with 
reasons to treat one patient over another if they are only choosing amongst UK citizens 
anyway. 
If UK citizens are said to be negative for welfare, then this seems to speak against 
reproduction at all, assisted or otherwise. This seems to be a step further back from the 
starting point of this thesis. This thesis works within a framework that views assisted 
reproduction with donated gametes as being permissible at least some of the time, in order 
to consider what constitutes equitable allocation of gametes. This starting point is consistent 
with the HFEA’s recommendation that ‘[t]here should be a presumption to provide 
treatment to all those who request it’ (HFEA, 2005a, p. 3), although this thesis will conclude 
that there are many potential reasons not to treat a patient or couple. 
Consequently, consideration that the practice of treating patients with donor 
gametes might be wrong in itself is a discussion for another time. At any rate, even if we 
think a practice is wrong in itself, there may be value in ensuring that it is done in the best 
way possible, if we expect the practice to continue. Hence, the discussion will proceed on 
the basis that providing fertility treatment to UK citizens, generally conceived, is at least 
neutral from a global welfare perspective. 
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This does not mean that all fertility treatments offered in the UK are at least neutral. 
It only commits us to saying that for the purposes of this thesis, we cannot condemn the 
treatment of UK citizens per se. This means that we will ignore factors that might speak 
against5 the treatment of all UK citizens, and only consider factors that help us distinguish 
between them. 
This does not necessarily mean ignoring wider factors like environmental or 
economic ones, though. In some cases, clinicians may be able to make more specific 
judgements about groups of people within the UK context – for example, if there are 
differences in environmental impact between socioeconomic groups,6 rough judgements 
could be made on this basis. This may help us to choose between patients within the context 
of a UK fertility clinic. 
Nevertheless, there is also the question of practicality with regard to considering 
multitudinous factors. Even if a system could be devised that would come up with strict 
guidelines about who or who not to treat based on information about certain groups’ 
environmental, social, and economic impacts (or more specifically the impact of the children 
of members of these groups), and this system could be applied to clinics so that staff 
working there would not have to do any calculations of this sort for themselves, this would 
be an enormous and multi-faceted question that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, a sophisticated, all-things-considered calculation of the relevant advantages 
and disadvantages may be beyond what we can reasonably and practically expect of clinics. 
                                                          
5 This chapter will make repeated mention of “factors speaking for/against treatment”, “reasons for 
treatment”, and “reasons to favour certain patients”. See pages 104-106 for further discussion of 
what terms like these should be taken to mean in this thesis. 
6  See page 49 for a discussion of a narrower potential consideration regarding patients’ 
socioeconomic status. 
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Hence, the discussion on welfare will be narrower in scope, and will be limited to 
stakeholders who clinical staff will be more accustomed to considering, and whose welfare is 
more easily predicted. These stakeholders are the children born of treatment themselves, 
and anyone else within the family unit who will be (relatively) directly affected by the birth. 
The clinic’s obligations towards some of these stakeholders are already enshrined in 
law – the HFE Act requires that account is taken of the welfare of any child born from 
treatment, or any other child who will be affected by this birth (HFE Act, 2008, section 14 
(2)).  For our purposes here we will take this to mean only other children within the same 
family. We can construe this broadly so as to include non-genetic family relations and other 
non-standard families, but the nuances of this will not affect the arguments made in this 
thesis – suffice it to say that we are simply excluding other children who will be affected in 
broader societal and global ways. To take account of child welfare, we must have a 
conception of the kinds of things that can influence a child’s welfare. In the context of 
guidelines for treatment of patients, only things that can reliably be predicted before 
treatment occurs can be included. Accordingly, we are in the peculiar position of trying to 
determine a child’s welfare before it is even conceived. It may not only be the child’s welfare 
that needs to be considered, and in these calculations too we may find ourselves in similar 
difficulty in trying to make predictions about the welfare of the relevant stakeholders. The 
following subsections will come loosely in order of the level of difficulty they present when it 
comes to predicting the relevant factors, beginning with the most straightforward. 
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4.3.2 Welfare of the Child 
 
As has already been mentioned (see page 3), clinical staff have statutory obligations 
to consider children’s welfare. The Code of Practice splits child welfare considerations into 
two groups: ‘past or current circumstances that may lead to any child mentioned above 
experiencing serious physical or psychological harm or neglect’, and ‘past or current 
circumstances that are likely to lead to an inability to care throughout childhood for any 
child who may be born, or that are already seriously impairing the care of any existing child 
of the family’ (HFEA, 2009, section 8.10). These stipulations require clinical staff to consider 
a number of factors, many of which are mentioned explicitly in the Code. 
This discussion will not follow in the way the Code splits up child welfare issues, as 
this introduces certain complications. To begin with, the Code places heritable medical 
conditions in the second group, rather than the first. Perhaps this is to avoid the complex 
issue of whether causing a child to exist can affect his/her welfare, when the alternative is 
his/her not existing at all (this issue will be discussed in greater detail on pages 51-56). But it 
seems odd to affiliate the wrongness of creating a child with a certain medical condition with 
his/her parents’ inability to care for him/her, rather than grounding it in the child’s suffering. 
Confusion is also introduced when “neglect” is mentioned in the first group, when it would 
seem more appropriate to associate neglect with the parents’ (in)ability to care for the child. 
Perhaps the kind of neglect at play in the first group is of a more deliberate kind, so the 
second group is meant to deal with circumstances that are further beyond the parents’ 
control. 
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Instead, this discussion will consider these issues in terms of how reliably clinical staff 
can make predictions based on them, beginning with the most straightforward. The class of 
factors for which clinical staff may be the most qualified to make predictions is health-
related factors. Among these, heritable conditions are potentially the easiest to predict, as 
the likelihood of a child’s inheriting a condition from its parents can be estimated as a 
function of the status of the parents, where known7, as carriers or sufferers of the condition 
and the status of the condition as a dominant or recessive trait. In spite of this, the severity 
of the condition may not be predicted as easily because an assessment of “severity” engages 
normative views about quality of life that are more subjective than calculations of 
percentage chances of risks manifesting. 
 
4.3.2.1 Heritable Conditions 
 
Allocating gametes to a couple or patient with a risk of passing on such a condition or 
disease can reduce the chances of any child born to that couple having it. Couples may seek 
treatment with donor gametes because they know that they are otherwise at risk of passing 
on a certain condition or disease to any child they have, and indeed the HFEA advised 
putative patients that a reason for using donor gametes could be that ‘you have a high risk 
of passing on an inherited disease’ (HFEA, 2013a). Donors are screened for heritable 
conditions8 so treatment with donor gametes will, if successful, result in a child without the 
condition or disease the couple are seeking to avoid. The use of donor gametes to avoid such 
                                                          
7 A discussion of whether it would be reasonable to instigate a battery of genetic tests for all patients 
prior to accepting them for treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
8 Though not all conditions can be tested for. 
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conditions complicates matters because a patient’s having such a condition or being a carrier 
for one actually seems to speak in favour of treating them with donor gametes, rather than 
against. 
Let us call the couple with the risk of passing on a heritable condition or disease 
“couple A”, and another couple who are simply infertile “couple B”. Let’s also assume that 
there is an equal likelihood of success in both cases. At first glance, it seems that treating 
either couple will have the same result. If we treat couple A, then all other things being 
equal we have the same likelihood of a healthy child as couple B, and there are no grounds 
on which to distinguish between them. 
A difference appears when we consider the potential consequences of the actions of 
those we refuse to treat. If we treat couple A, couple B will remain childless, unless they 
adopt. However, if we treat couple B, couple A may reproduce naturally and risk having a 
child with the heritable condition. If this possibility is undesirable, then there is a reason to 
avoid it and this may be a reason to favour couple A for treatment. 
The wording of the HFE Act suggests that the responsibility of staff does not extend 
beyond their treatment decisions: it requires clinics to consider the welfare of children born 
as the result of treatment, rather than as a result of a failure to treat. The HFE Act only 
governs the creation and storage of embryos outside the body and their subsequent use, 
and the use and storage of gametes taken from the body. It is not designed to regulate 
unassisted reproduction however it arises, including as a result of decisions not to treatment. 
Whether clinics should have some moral responsibility for reproductive behaviour 
subsequent to a refusal of treatment is unclear. As Savulescu asks (about the scope of 
medical practitioners’ responsibility): ‘Should doctors be influenced by reasons for action 
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which go beyond the welfare of the individual concerned? Should they be influenced by the 
welfare of others or political values?’ (Savulescu, 1999, p. 124). There may be good reasons 
to answer “no” to these questions: our faith in the integrity of the medical system may rely 
on, for example, doctors refraining from killing patients in order to give their organs to 
others, even where this means saving more lives overall (Harris, 1975). Savulescu agrees 
with this individualised approach to treating patients, with the important exception that 
‘when no individual is harmed by promoting these other values, there is less reason to object 
to taking them into account’ (Savulescu, 1999, p. 124). 
Applying this to the case of donated gametes and heritable diseases, the “other value” 
to promote is the avoidance of a child born with a heritable disease. We are now faced with 
the question of whether the clinic harms couple B (and “couple” can here substitute the 
“individual” of which Savulescu speaks) by choosing to treat couple A. If we think this, we 
are also committed to the converse – that by treating couple B, the clinic harms couple A. If 
we accept this claim that to de-prioritise a patient is to harm them, then harm does not give 
us a reason to distinguish between couple A and couple B, because in either case we harm 
someone. If a couple is to be harmed whatever we do, then Savulescu’s restriction on 
doctors accounting for other values is irrelevant, and we can legitimately take into account 
the risk of a child being born with a heritable disease. This means that all other things being 
equal, we should treat couple A, who risk creating such a child if they go untreated by the 
clinic, over couple B. 
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4.3.2.2 Substance Use 
 
Of course, it is not only heritable health factors like these that will have an impact on 
the health of a child: features of a child’s environment, both before and after birth, can 
affect their health. A good example of this is parental behaviour. Imagine that clinical staff 
have reason to believe that a woman will use potentially noxious substances9 during 
pregnancy that may adversely affect the developing foetus.10 This is not a genetic health 
concern, and is thus perhaps not quite as easy to predict, as we may be wrong in our 
estimation that the woman will continue these behaviours during pregnancy.  If we think, 
however, that a woman is more likely than some other patient to use foetus-damaging 
substances during pregnancy, then an appeal to potential harm to the child might ground a 
reason to treat the non-substance-using patient over the substance-using one. 
Such harms can extend beyond pregnancy: for example, being exposed to passive 
smoking increases one’s risk of lung cancer (Taylor et al., 2007), sudden infant death 
syndrome (Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians, 2010, p. 81), and 
respiratory illness (Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians, 2010, p. 81-
83). This may provide a reason for clinics not to treat patients with any smoking family 
members who can be expected regularly to smoke in the vicinity of the child in a closed 
environment. People with drug or alcohol problems are also more likely to neglect or abuse 
their children (Chaffin et al., 1996; Ammerman et al. 1999; Smith et al., 2007, p. 151; 
                                                          
9 I use this term loosely, to refer to the use of illegal drugs, harmful legal drugs, drinking alcohol, or 
smoking tobacco. 
10 It is widely agreed that alcohol, tobacco, and certain drugs (the NHS names cannabis, ecstasy, 
cocaine, and heroin as examples) while pregnant can harm one’s baby .See (National Health Service, 
2014a) and (National Health Service, 2014b). 
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Appleyard et al., 2011). Given that a child with a substance-abusing parent is likely to be 
exposed to risks of various harms, then all other things being equal, we should treat a non-
substance-abusing patient ahead of a substance-using one. 
 
4.3.2.3 Violence 
 
 There are other parental behaviours that clinics can consider as indicating risks of 
harm for a child. It seems clear that treating a person with a history of violence could result 
in a child at greater risk of violence than treating a patient without such a history. Moreover, 
even indirect exposure to domestic violence (i.e. witnessing it) may lead to problems for 
children, at least of a psychosocial if not a physical nature (Hester et al., 2007, pp. 66-68; 
Kaufman et al., 2011). The case seems strong for favouring non-violent histories over violent 
ones. 
This risk assessment may need to be sensitive to other indicators of an elevated 
potential for violence against children. The connection between substance use and child 
abuse has already been noted (pages 48-49 above). Controversially, both low socioeconomic 
status and having been a previous victim of child abuse (including physical abuse, sexual 
abuse, and neglect) are also both associated with a higher risk of abusing children (Glasser et 
al., 2001; Brown et al., 1998, p. 1066). Arguments might be made that someone’s 
socioeconomic status should not be a barrier to their procreation, or that those who have 
been abused should not be doubly disadvantaged by having this count against them for 
fertility treatment. 
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These two arguments can be described as arguments from equality, and arguments 
from patient welfare, respectively. Section 4.6 below considers how equality should be 
weighed against commitments to child welfare, and it will be argued that child welfare must 
take priority. With regard to tensions between patient welfare and child welfare, again child 
welfare should be prioritised. This is because even if value at a more abstract level tells us 
that these individuals are all equally valuable, this does not mean that we must treat all of 
them the same. While a child may be just as valuable as an adult, the fact that a child is more 
at risk than an adult may offer us a reason, in decision-making and in practice, to act as if we 
are favouring the child rather than the adult. The target is actually to minimise the risk of 
something bad happening to this more vulnerable group of stakeholders, not to suggest that 
one group is any more valuable than the other. There is thus a practical reason to prioritise 
children’s welfare. In the case of the previous victim of child abuse, the very reason that we 
sympathise with such a person is that they have been a victim of such abuse. This means 
that the argument about doubly disadvantaging patients itself marks out child welfare as of 
value. We must remember to be vigilant in preventing future instances of this, rather than 
giving dispensation to past victims. We should thus take a patient’s history of abuse, either 
as perpetrator or as victim, as a reason against treating them. 
 
4.3.2.4 Reasons for Procreating 
 
One final consideration for clinics when assessing the prospective child’s welfare is 
the parents’ reasons for procreating in the first place. Lotz, for example, suggests that 
‘acceptable procreative reasons would be those other-referring reasons that augur a 
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parenting capacity that is at least compatible with and not contrary to, the good of any child 
who comes into existence’ (Lotz, 2009, p. 4). As she notes, however: ‘[f]rom the limited 
empirical evidence that is available, [...] it would seem that we are not entitled to infer very 
much at all from procreative motivations to parenting capacity’ (Lotz, 2009, p. 5). This is thus 
probably not something that can be accounted for in child welfare assessments. This 
conclusion is consistent with the HFEA consultation’s finding that ‘there was little appetite 
for clinics to continue to consider an individual’s or couple’s commitment to having children’ 
(HFEA, 2005a, p. 7).  
 
4.3.2.5 The Non-Identity Problem 
 
The above discussion has painted a picture of some of the factors that clinics may 
reasonably consider in order to assess the welfare that a child can be expected to experience 
if it is brought into existence, comparing the different possible welfares of different potential 
children to arrive at solutions for deciding who to treat above whom. 
Mulgan gives Tay-Sachs as an example of a disease that results in a life that ‘contains 
nothing but suffering’ (Mulgan, 2006, p. 5), such that anyone who would ‘gratuitously’ 
(Mulgan, 2006, p. 5) (though “intentionally” may be a better word) create such a child would 
be acting wrongly. His suggestion is not that the parents would be wrong to create the child 
with Tay-Sachs disease in the face of the possibility of creating a healthy child instead. 
Mulgan simply suggests that it would be wrong outright, because the overall balance of 
suffering and pleasure (should there be any of the latter) in the child’s life tips so much in 
favour of suffering. In such circumstances, it may be wrong to allocate sperm or eggs to a 
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person regardless of whether these gametes could go to another patient to create a “better” 
child. The question this raises is whether it can ever be possible for a child to have been 
better off not living at all. Mulgan seems to think that it can.11 
 The concept of someone’s being “better off not having been born” is controversial. It 
assumes that we can make statements about the welfare of non-existing, or not yet existing 
people. Making statements about potential people is conceptually difficult; of the potential 
Tay-Sachs child, we may intuit that “(s)he would be better off not being born”. If we 
rephrase this as a more typical conditional proposition, the problem is clearer: “if (s)he is not 
born, (s)he will be better off”. The problem is that the “(s)he” in this statement refers to 
what is at that time a non-existent entity. To speak of a non-existent child being “better off” 
than they would be if they were brought into existence strikes some as peculiar or 
conceptually impossible (Heyd 1992; Broome 1999; Herstein 2013). 
 Parfit describes a move to accommodate this peculiarity, calling it The Person-
Affecting View. This is that ‘[i]t will be worse if people are affected for the worse’ (Parfit, 
                                                          
11 Benatar argues for an even stronger claim that it is always better for someone not to have been 
brought into existence. This antinatalist position rests on an asymmetry between the presence of 
sensations and the absence of them: Benatar argues that while pleasure is good and pain bad, the 
absence of pain is good whereas the absence of pleasure is only “not bad” rather than bad. ‘[I]f the 
absence of pleasure [...] is ‘bad’ rather than ‘not bad’ then we should have to regret, for X’s sake, 
that X did not come into existence. But it is not regrettable’ (Benatar, 2006, pp. 38-39) Much of 
Benatar’s argument seems to rest on this last assumption that we should not regret a person’s non-
existence. This assumption is, perhaps, made too swiftly. At any rate, if we accept Benatar’s 
conclusion as true, then we should consider the whole practice of assisted reproduction, and 
reproduction in general, morally wrong. As this thesis aims to negotiate the moral problem of the 
distribution of this resource under the assumption that some distribution is ethically permissible, an 
acceptance of Benatar’s view would shift the goalposts somewhat. Thus, the starting point of this 
thesis is a point at which we have already assumed Benatar’s view to be false, and consequently no 
further time will be devoted to it. 
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1984, p. 370). Mulgan’s reformulation of this view may give it some clarity: he describes The 
Person-Affecting Principle, which goes like this: ‘[a]n action can be wrong only if there exists 
some particular person who is worse off after that action than they would have been if some 
other action had been performed instead’ (Mulgan, 2006, p. 9). Both views incorporate the 
idea of particular, existing people being worse off, thus denying that actions or situations can 
be judged on the basis of how they “affect” people who would not exist if the action had not 
been performed, or if the situation had not been brought about. 
 Let us apply the idea of person-affectingness to the case of the child who will suffer 
from Tay-Sachs disease. We will start with Parfit’s own formulation of person-affectingness: 
‘It will be worse if people are affected for the worse’. The question is whether creating a 
child with Tay-Sachs disease constitutes “affecting a person for the worse”. Before the 
moment of conception, there was no one to affect. To speak of a non-existent person as 
being “affected” seems peculiar. If we think that this idea is unintelligible, then the Person-
Affecting View allows us to say that the situation where the Tay-Sachs child exists is not 
worse than one where it does not. 
 
4.3.2.5.1 A Poor Solution 
 
One route towards reconciling the conceptual difficulties of positing the welfare of 
non-existing people with the condemnation of the creation of such people is to suggest that 
person-affectingness is contingent on the time that judgements about welfare are made. 
This means that while a non-existing person is not better off not existing, an existing person 
can be said to be worse off existing, as they are in existence at that time. The difference 
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between these two cases is that the assessment of welfare applies in the first case to a non-
existing person, and in the second case to an existing person. 
 Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem, but only serves as a complicating 
sidestep. The first case certainly posits the welfare of a non-existing person, if we conceive 
of a person who does not exist (but who we could bring into existence) and say that they are 
“better off” not existing. The problem, again, is that to say of a non-existing person that they 
are better off than anything seems odd, seeing as, by virtue of their not existing, they do not 
seem to be better or worse than anything at all. Now, the second case seems to be making a 
different move, but really it is not. We have before us the child with Tay-Sachs disease, and 
say of them that (s)he is “worse off”. The question here is: worse off than whom? This 
welfare assessment refers to an existing person (and let us call the thing, existing or not, to 
which a welfare assessment refers the “welfare referent”). What we must remember, 
however, is that assessments like “better off” and “worse off” are comparative. So to say 
that a person is better or worse off than someone or something else is not to posit one 
welfare referent, but rather, two12. In this case, the first welfare referent is the child with 
Tay-Sachs disease. The second, hypothetical welfare referent is this same child “if (s)he did 
not exist”. The assessment is that the Tay-Sachs child is “worse off” than his/her non-existing 
counterpart, and to make such a comparative assessment, we must treat the non-existing 
person as a welfare referent, and this is exactly what the Person-Affecting View does not 
allow. Thus we once again come up against the problem of positing the welfare of a non-
existing being. 
                                                          
12
 Remembering that a welfare referent can be something hypothetical. 
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4.3.2.5.2 A Practical Solution 
  
 Harris thinks that child welfare considerations can sometimes speak against bringing 
a child into existence, apparently in spite of the conceptual problems detailed above. He 
suggests, however, that the extent of this is overstated in the HFE Act. He notes that ‘unless 
the child’s condition and circumstances can be predicted to be so bad that it would not have 
a worthwhile life, a life worth living, then it will always be in that child’s interests, to be 
brought to being’ (Harris, 2000, p. 29). He goes on to say that ‘[w]herever that child’s life, 
despite any predictable sup-optimality’s [sic], will be thoroughly worth living, then it cannot 
be that child’s interests which justify any decisions or regulations which would deny it 
opportunities for existence’ (Harris, 2000, p. 33). The concern is that child welfare, 
considered in isolation from its wider impact on society or on anyone else but the child itself, 
seldom generates an injunction against creating that child altogether (because of the relative 
rarity of so-called “wrongful life” scenarios), yet the legislation suggests that it should. 
The position on this matter taken by this thesis will echo that of Harris in that it aims 
at the practical rather than the theoretical. This may be theoretically unsatisfying, but it is at 
least practically useful with regard to the questions in this thesis. In effect, the problems of 
person-affectingness do not matter for the majority of gamete allocation cases. This is 
because most of these cases will involve comparisons between two different people, rather 
than comparisons between non-existing and existing people. For any couple generating child 
welfare concerns, there is likely to be another couple the treatment of whom does not 
generate these child welfare concerns and who could be treated instead – resulting in a child 
with a higher degree of welfare. We are thus rarely in the position of having to make the 
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conceptually bizarre comparisons identified by Heyd (1992), Broome (1999) and Herstein 
(2013). Instead of having to compare a potential child’s welfare to its “welfare” were it not 
to be born, gamete allocation only requires that we compare a potential child’s welfare with 
other potential children’s welfare. The questions of this thesis are thus not affected by the 
non-identity problem. This means that we can consider heritable conditions as reasons 
against treating patients when patients without those conditions could be treated instead. 
  
4.3.2.6 Final Remarks on Children Born from Treatment 
 
We have now considered what kinds of things can affect the welfare of children born 
as a result of treatment. So far, we do not have many answers about the theoretical 
weighting of these considerations, and how far they legitimise deviation from the principle 
of equality. The more theoretical question of what level of welfare we ought to be seeking 
for children will be addressed in section 4.6.1.1. We have seen some of the issues that are at 
play, and some of the theoretical issues that underpin them. Given the nature of the gamete 
allocation decision as necessarily taking place before the existence of any child, many of 
these issues revolve around factors surrounding the patients themselves. As we have seen, 
these range from heritable conditions that can have a direct bearing on the wellbeing of the 
child, to issues with substance abuse and violence that may call into question the suitability 
of the patients as parents. Before we can make any firm judgements about how these 
considerations must factor into decision-making, however, there may be other factors to 
consider. 
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4.3.2.7 Other Children 
 
There are more stakeholders involved in gamete allocation decisions than just the 
children born from the gametes. The HFE Act tells fertility clinics that they must account for 
‘the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of 
that child for supportive parenting), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth’ 
(HFEA, 2008, section 14 (2), my emphasis). It is doubtful that a literal reading of “any” is 
intended here.13 Parliament probably had in mind here other children within the same 
family unit, allowing clinical staff to decide against gamete allocations where siblings might 
be disadvantaged. The disadvantages of the arrival of a sibling include the potential to be 
deprived of a number of resources, like time, money, or even affection. It may be impossible 
or impractical to try to judge whether parents have sufficient affection to care for another 
child.  Other, more material resources, however, might be taken into account, such that if 
fertility clinic staff have reason to believe that the arrival of another child may cause parents 
to struggle to provide for an existing child’s material or chronic health needs, this could 
count as a reason against treating them. 
 Outside of this, we might reasonably assume that a sibling will improve the lot of an 
existing child, from an emotional/social perspective.14 This might be taken as a reason to 
treat patients with existing children ahead of those without. We will see later, however, that 
                                                          
13 See section 4.3.1 
14 There is also the possibility that an existing child’s life could be improved if the potential new child 
could act as a saviour sibling. Given the rarity of this in gamete donation cases, however, this issue 
will be set aside here. 
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there are overriding reasons not to do so (see pages 88-90 for this discussion of the 
relevance of parental status). 
The previous subsection considered situations where a parent has been known to 
cause harm or be neglectful to existing children. This has implications for the welfare of 
existing children as well as for any new child that is added to the family; if an existing child is 
already being harmed or neglected, the addition of a new child may exacerbate this problem 
by providing the parents with additional burdens and therefore increase stressors that may 
escalate their violent reactions. It thus appears that considerations of the welfare of children 
born from treatment carry over to welfare considerations for pre-existing children within the 
family, too. Thus, many of the same risks apply, and so if we have reason to believe that a 
new child will increase the likelihood of an existing child’s being the victim of physical or 
emotional abuse, or neglect (which might include parents’ inability to provide for them), 
then this is a reason against treating them. 
 
4.3.2.8 Final Remarks on Child Welfare 
 
A recent study found widespread concern for child welfare amongst those working in 
fertility clinics but also that, in practice, very few patients were denied treatment on this 
basis (Lee et al., 2012). While we must be open to the possibility that child welfare issues are 
simply not very common, we must also acknowledge the possibility that child welfare issues 
may be going undetected or are insufficiently weighted in decisions about treatment. 
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4.3.3 Welfare of Recipients 
 
Another thing to consider is the welfare of (putative) parents themselves. If it is the 
case that both parents want treatment to occur (i.e. there is no coercion), then there is a 
welfare presumption (and this could be fleshed out in terms of psychological benefit, or in 
terms of satisfying reproductive autonomy – the distinction is not important for us here) in 
favour of treating. It is conceivable, however, that we think a person’s welfare rests on more 
than just their desire to have treatment, and so it is possible that other welfare 
considerations about the parents might outweigh their desire to have a child. 
One example is obstetric risk. A woman may have pre-existing conditions such that 
any pregnancy she undertakes has a higher risk than normal of complications. Such risk is 
something that could speak against treatment. Related to this is another child welfare 
concern, as obstetric complication can impact upon the welfare of both the child(ren) in 
utero and any existing children of the patient. It is also reasonable to assume that harm to 
one member of the couple in a loving relationship will have a negative impact on the other 
member. The patient’s welfare is valuable both in itself, and instrumentally insofar as it 
affects child welfare and that of their partner. 
In a sense, all pregnancies are risky given the possibility of complications that may 
harm or even kill the mother, even though these risks have been reduced by modern 
medicine.15 Unless we are to condemn donor gamete treatment altogether, a move we have 
already rejected, then we need to accept that these risks are simply par for the course when 
                                                          
15 See (Centre for Maternal and Child Enquiries (CMACE), 2011). 
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it comes to pregnancy. This means that we are theoretically committed to saying that the 
goods, for a patient, of having treatment, can outweigh some risk to their health. The 
important question now is how much of a risk we can accept. 
The scarcity of resources will give us an answer to this question. We know that not 
every patient can be treated so that, effectively, treating one patient means refusing 
another. If two patients are equal in every way except one of them presents a higher risk to 
their own health if they are treated (ignoring child welfare risks for the moment), then the 
better option is clearly to treat the one with the lowest risk. Again, this provides a higher 
level of expected welfare overall. 
 
4.3.3.1 Efficacy 
 
There is yet another dimension to consider. Some patients’ desires are easier to fulfil 
than others, by virtue of the fact that some patients are more likely to have successful 
treatment than others. Hence, the risk of embarking on treatment must be weighed against 
the likelihood of the treatment being successful. This likelihood can be described as the 
efficacy of the proposed treatment. In the context of prioritisation of health resources, the 
value of efficacy is rooted in the welfare of patients, as taking it into account can help to 
ensure that more patients get the successful treatment that they want. All other things being 
equal, someone with a 25% chance of their next cycle being successful should be given 
priority over someone with a 15% chance, because in the case of the patient with the 25% 
chance, the cost-benefit analysis works out more favourably. The fact that resources are 
scarce adds another dimension to these efficacy considerations. One patient’s treatment 
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may come at the expense (or at least delay) of another patient’s treatment. Hence, we are 
not only weighing efficacy against the risk of patient harm (an intra-patient calculation); we 
are also weighing up each patient’s efficacy/risk ratio with the efficacy/risk ratios of other 
patients (an inter-patient calculation). 
This concern for efficacy must be weighed against equality, because favouring 
patients with a better prognosis (assuming the other patients still have some chance of 
success) constitutes unequal treatment, and a form of discrimination. For the time being, it 
is sufficient merely to note that efficacy is a value that should be accounted for. Efficacy will 
be considered in greater detail later, particularly with regard to patients’ age (pages 73-85), 
and we will also consider the extent to which efficacy is important when compared to 
equality (pages 115-118). 
 
4.3.4 Welfare of Donors 
 
This chapter has said little so far about the gamete donors themselves. While donor 
welfare is an important consideration (particularly when we are considering intrusive 
procedures like egg collection), this project is concerned with gamete allocation, and thus is 
only concerned with donors insofar as they pertain to this question. The most interesting 
and relevant question regarding donors and allocation is thus whether donors should have 
any choice about how their gametes are allocated. 
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A gamete donor might make all kinds of stipulations, like directing their donation to a 
particular person, 16 or not wanting their gametes to go to people of a certain race, or 
sexuality, or marital status. This latter kind of gamete donation will henceforth be referred 
to as “conditional donation”, in line with the terminology used by the HFEA (HFEA Ethics and 
Law Advisory Committee, 2011). 
It may be good for clinics to honour donors’ wishes, if they have a right to use their 
gametes as they wish (with certain limitations), and if this improves their welfare. 
Importantly, it may also increase the number of gamete donors, if those whose stipulations 
are refused will simply not donate their gametes at all. This is likely to be the case for known 
donors. 
Also, since donor anonymity was lifted in the UK (as of 2005 (HFEA, 2004)), once a 
donor-conceived person reaches the age of 18, they will have access to identifying 
information about their donor. This means that a great many more donor-conceived children 
will now be able to form relationships with those who donated gametes for their parents’ 
use. The UK’s new system means that donors’ involvement in the parental project has the 
potential to extend far beyond the process of donation. A donor’s desire to enter into such a 
relationship with their donor-conceived child may provide a reason for us to respect their 
wishes with regard to with whom their gametes are used for treatment, if we regard the 
fulfilment of these desires as a good thing – we might build this into our conception of 
                                                          
16 “Known donors” are donors who are known to the recipient, and who donate on the presumption 
that their gametes go only to that recipient. In a straightforward case, a man may donate sperm to a 
friend or relative whose own sperm are not suitable, or who has no sperm. Similarly, a man may 
donate sperm to a lesbian couple known to him. As for eggs, a woman may also donate them for a 
female friend or relative, or a male couple known to her. 
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welfare either by saying that desire-fulfilment is good in itself, or that it conduces to 
psychological wellbeing. 
One possible argument against respecting donor choice in these circumstances is that 
clinical staff may be uncomfortable with doing so. They may feel unhappy (in such a way that 
diminishes their welfare) about, for example, prioritising a heterosexual couple over a 
lesbian couple to fulfil the sperm donor’s wishes. If donors’ wishes should be respected 
because it makes them better off, then perhaps those of clinical staff must be respected too, 
for the same reason. This leads to a conflict when these wishes are not compatible. 
We might resolve such conflicts, however, by finding a way of prioritising the wish 
fulfilment of one or other of the parties. For example, in spite of their direct involvement 
with the assisted reproduction process, we may feel that it is the job of clinical staff to 
perform procedures whether or not they are comfortable with them, and not to question 
donors’ wishes if certain kinds of wishes have already been pre-established as worthy of 
respect (by, for example, legislation). 
The possibility of unjust discrimination may be a factor here. Allowing certain kinds of 
discrimination in fertility clinics may undermine the principle of equality being used in this 
thesis, particularly if donors are allowed to have a say in gamete allocation. If equality has 
this value, this provides a reason to refuse the gametes of a potential donor who wants to 
discriminate on the basis of things like race, age, or sexuality. This would also appear to be in 
line with the Equality Act (2010), which prohibits discrimination by public institutions on the 
basis of these and other ‘protected characteristics’ (Equality Act, 2010, section 4). 
There is, however, an issue that complicates this matter. We may also think that we 
do not want to discriminate against people on the basis of certain beliefs, either. One of the 
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protected characteristics in the Equality Act is ‘religion or belief’. If respecting this protected 
characteristic involves respecting beliefs (which may themselves be religious) about gamete 
donation, then a conflict arises in cases where such beliefs seem to violate other protected 
characteristics. The clinic, then, faces a dilemma, where respecting the donors’ beliefs seems 
to violate commitments to equality between recipients, but refusing to respect their beliefs 
seems to violate the commitment to ensuring that donors are not discriminated against due 
to their beliefs. 
Discrimination is, however, not necessarily bad. Certainly there seems to be a reason 
not to discriminate against certain people just because of their beliefs. But if those beliefs 
are in themselves unfairly discriminatory, then perhaps it better serves the cause of non-
discrimination to actually discriminate against those with such beliefs in the context of 
conditional gamete donation. Discrimination is therefore permissible when what we are 
discriminating against is discrimination itself. If so, then arguably it is the would-be donor 
who attempts to introduce discrimination into the equation, so that a policy amongst clinics 
not to respect such requests is one that stops unjustifiable discrimination by permitting 
justifiable discrimination. This might mean that we should not accept stipulations on 
donations. 
This philosophical position above is reflected in the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission’s proviso, stated in the Code of Practice on services, public functions and 
associations, that the belief ‘must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not 
incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others’ 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011, p. 36). The example they give of a belief that 
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fails to meet these criteria is of a person who has a belief about racial superiority. This may 
suggest that such stipulations from donor gametes cannot lawfully be allowed. 
The protected characteristics represent criteria on which it is widely acknowledged to 
be wrong to discriminate against people. Moving away from these protected characteristics, 
however, we face some questions about the limits of the value of equality. Equality between 
people of certain ages, races and the like seems to be valuable, but there are may be other 
inequalities that should be considered. Conditional and known donor cases are examples of 
this: with conditional donation, the fact that a patient is a member of a group that a donor 
favours generates an inequality between that patient and other patients who are not 
members of that group. For known donation, the fact that a patient knows their donor 
generates an inequality between them and those who do not know someone who is willing 
to donate gametes for them. 
 If we are unwilling to allow discrimination based on features like the protected 
characteristics detailed in the Equality Act, perhaps we should be similarly unwilling to allow 
donors to discriminate by donating only to those they know. After all, the problem of 
discriminating unfairly on the basis of the protected characteristics comes from the fact that 
such protected characteristics do not, in themselves, provide adequate reasons for 
discriminating. We do not want someone to suffer, or be treated worse, just because they 
are a certain type of person. Discrimination because a person knows or does not know a 
certain other person may be an example of this. 
So far, it looks as though permitting donors to make stipulations may cause problems 
in that it will, at least in some cases, undermine principles that we hold to be more 
important. However, if we are to champion equality instead of donors’ welfare (and the 
66 
 
added welfare that this brings by increasing the pool of donated gametes), this must be 
done consistently. We need a reason to value equality between people with regard to the 
protected characteristics without similarly ensuring equality between people with regard to 
other characteristics, for example between those with brown eyes and those with blue eyes. 
Conditional and known donation cannot guarantee that the exclusion of anyone from 
treatment is the result of considered moral deliberation based on true and relevant facts. 
This is true even if there are legal limits to the kinds of specifications that donors can make. 
It is clear that allowing donors to choose who can receive their gametes opens the 
door to deviations from equality that are potentially unjustifiable. Pennings appears to agree, 
and his response is to argue that gamete donors should be allowed to make choices about 
recipients only based on pre-set categories and criteria derived from ‘categories judged 
important by the different moral communities’ (Pennings, 1995, p. 2740). This is a restrictive 
version of allowing donor stipulations, which gives donors choices while echoing the Equality 
Act’s requirement that certain groups are not subjected to unjust discrimination. 
It is important to remember, however, that whilst it may be wrong of the donor to 
make certain stipulations, it may be acceptable for clinicians to accept their donations 
nonetheless. After all, there is something to be gained from doing so, because if these 
donors’ stipulations really are conditions, and not just preferences, such that they will only 
donate if the stipulation is respected, then in fact nobody is disadvantaged by that donation 
being allowed. A patient who gets discriminated against by a stipulating donor may not have 
access to that donor’s gametes, but adding gametes to the pool removes some competition 
on the waiting list, making that patient better off than they would be if the donation was 
refused. Moorlock considers this feature with regard to conditional organ donation, 
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describing it as ‘negative loss; that is a loss of benefit for somebody without a corresponding 
increase in benefit for somebody else’ (Moorlock, 2012, p. 117). Ideally, we might wish that 
everyone would just donate without making stipulations so that we can use the donation as 
we wish, but if this is not the case, we may as well take what we can get in order to benefit 
everyone on the list. This notion of serving equality by removing resources (or the 
opportunity to attain resources) from the better-off instead of by providing the resources (or 
the opportunity to attain them) is known as “levelling down”. Raz notes that ‘often the only 
way to avoid violating [egalitarian principles] is to create or allow waste’ (Raz 1986: 227). If 
waste is something we should avoid (and the resource scarcity angle of this project assumes 
that it is), then this method of serving equality is not to be allowed. Temkin’s classic example 
provides a forceful argument against levelling down (the Levelling Down Objection): 
 
[I]magine that C is a world where half are blind, D a world where all are. One could 
always transform C into D by putting out the eyes of the sighted. However, many find 
the view that this would improve the situation in even one respect more than 
incomprehensible; they find it abominable. That D is more equal than C gives one no 
reason at all, they think, to transform C into D; and only a hardened misanthrope, or 
someone motivated by the basest form of envy, could think otherwise. After all, they 
ask, how could D’s greater equality make it better in any respect, if there is no one for 
whom it is better? (Temkin, 1993, pp. 247-248) 
 
 
Temkin later summarises the intuition thus: ‘[g]reater equality is only desirable when 
it benefits the worse-off, not when it results from levelling down the better-off!’ (Temkin, 
2002, p. 132). This discussion will proceed on the basis that levelling down is a problematic 
way of securing equality, but that the Levelling Down Objection does not present a knock-
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down case against the promotion of equality in all cases. It is consistent with the approach 
adopted in this thesis that equality is merely one value among many. 
Accepting known and conditional donations avoids the problem of levelling down.17 
This may suggest that there is a moral objection to applying the Equality Act when it asks us 
to level down. There is, however, the question of whether the Equality Act really asks this. 
The Equality Act asks that nobody be treated ‘less favourably’ (Equality Act, 2010, section 13 
(1)) because of a protected characteristic. If refusing these donations would be levelling 
down, then by definition, accepting them means that nobody is treated less favourably. 
Hence, the Equality Act arguably does not actually prohibit conditional donation. The HFEA 
may support this interpretation of the Equality Act:  
 
When deciding whether or not to recruit donors who place conditions on the use of 
their gametes or embryos, the centre should judge whether this will result in less 
favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic (eg, if it will reduce the 
choice of donors for a particular person by virtue of a protected characteristic) (HFEA, 
2013b, section 11.20). 
 
 
The example of choice-reduction seems carefully chosen, as it speaks to the notion of 
levelling down described above – if the conditional donation is accepted, choice is not 
limited if the alternative is to not have that donation at all. 
 The potential benefits of allowing conditional and known donation are thus quite 
weighty, and the Levelling Down Objection provides a reason to deviate from the principle of 
                                                          
17 Those distinguishing between acts and omissions will point out that this does not constitute a true 
example of levelling down. They would argue that there is a distinction between those who are made 
worse off (true levelling down) and the people in this scenario, who are instead denied the 
opportunity to become better off.), We will not give credence to this distinction here. 
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equality in this case. This means that we should allow conditional and known donation 
across the board, regardless of whether or not they apply to pre-set categories, as suggested 
by Pennings. The legal situation is complex, but the Equality Act may not actually prohibit 
the permission of all conditions in the way suggested. 
 
4.3.4.1 Rewarding Donors 
 
The previous discussion argued that donors should be allowed to set conditions on 
the use of their gametes, as this does not disadvantage anyone. Pennings advances a 
donation system in which donors are rewarded for donating, by being prioritised for the 
receipt of gametes. This leads to a ‘mirror exchange’ (Pennings, 2005, p. 2990) system 
wherein a person’s donation of sperm gives them priority in receiving eggs (i.e. for their 
partner), and a person’s donation of eggs gives them priority in receiving sperm (again for 
their partner’s use). 
Pennings draws on a basic principle of reciprocity, suggesting that those who use 
gametes in the donation system should repay into the system if they are able (there are 
provisions for those who are unable to contribute, such as those of a certain age or those 
with heritable conditions). Framed in terms of gamete allocation, then, Pennings’ argument 
is that a patient’s or a patient’s partner’s willingness to donate gametes should count in 
favour of that patient’s receiving treatment. He considers this mutually beneficial, describing 
‘[a] win-win system in which contributors have a mutual advantage’ (Pennings, 2005, p. 
2991). The system confers advantage by introducing additional gametes into the system, and 
any disadvantage to donors is redressed by the reward they receive in the form of 
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prioritisation. It may be objected that the separateness of sperm and egg waiting lists 
renders this untrue: a patient’s use of donor sperm does nothing for others waiting for 
sperm if all she has contributed is eggs. Given, however, that such a system would overall 
also include a mirrored system for those contributing sperm and using eggs, this does not 
constitute a problem. Even if the shortfall for sperm is different from the shortfall for eggs 
(the figures given on page 1 would suggest that this was the case at least as recently as 
2008), all patients seeking gametes will still be better off than they would be without the 
system, if the system encourages more people to donate gametes overall. Such a system 
would continue to confer benefit until there was no shortfall for either sperm or eggs. 
Given the benefits of the use of such a system, it might be suggested that it could be 
extended, such that a person could recruit anyone to donate on their behalf, rather than 
only their partner. As an example, a single woman might recruit a friend (male or female) to 
donate gametes to the general pool, in exchange for treatment with donor eggs from 
another donor who is unknown to her. This is close to known donation, in that the recipient 
gets priority for treatment by bringing in someone they know to donate gametes. The only 
difference is that the recipient is not ultimately treated with that person’s gametes. 
Such a donor does not even really need to be “known” to the patient who brings 
them in. A person may recruit any donor who is willing to donate in order to give them 
priority for treatment. This improves the waiting list situation in the same way, by alleviating 
the scarcity of gametes. 
This system might be said to place more emphasis on the fact that it confers 
advantage on everyone than on any principle of reciprocity – it might be argued that if a 
patient can avoid their obligation to donate gametes by just recruiting someone to donate 
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on their behalf, then they themselves are no longer paying into the system, and so the 
reciprocity element is lost. 
Given the importance of improving the welfare of patients, the idea that the 
reciprocal element of the system may be compromised by a person’s gaining points by 
recruiting someone else to the system is not problematic, as long as overall benefit is 
created for those seeking treatment with donor gametes. With this in mind, then for the 
purposes of this thesis, reciprocity might better be conceived as considering who benefits 
rather than who pays – if a person is generating benefit for the system (by bringing in a 
donor), we should not be concerned that they personally are not the ones paying into the 
system, as long as, just like in any case of known donation, adequate safeguards are in place 
to ensure that the donor is not being coerced or exploited. The most important fact is that, 
were it not for them, that benefit would not exist, and so this should be incentivised. Second, 
it is not obvious that someone who recruits a donor is not, in fact, paying into the system – 
they are at least doing some work in recruiting, which the clinic would otherwise have to do 
themselves, so the reciprocal element is at least partly preserved. 
It is thus the conclusion of this section that anyone who is able to alleviate the 
pressure on the waiting list should be given priority for doing so. This process removes that 
patient from the waiting list and does not diminish the overall number of gametes available 
to others. 
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4.3.5 Summary of Welfare Subsections 
 
This concludes the discussion of welfare. To summarise: when we are considering the 
welfare of other children within the family, our assessments look similar to those for the 
welfare of the child to be born from treatment, such that we must consider whether the 
welfare problems are weighty enough for us to deviate from our standpoint of equality, 
according to which we want to avoid discriminating against certain groups of people. In 
considering the welfare of the parents themselves, however, this thesis presumes that 
treatment is a good thing, and so we are here weighing up desire-related concerns with 
welfare concerns. It is assumed that it is good for the parents to have a child simply because 
they want one, but it may be the case that continuing with treatment will be too risky from a 
medical perspective, such that their desires to be treated are outweighed by other concerns 
for their welfare. Further to this, welfare concerns for patients are related to concerns about 
the efficacy of treatment, as the risks of treatment and pregnancy must be justified by a 
sufficient chance that it will be successful. Finally, given resource scarcity, efficacy concerns 
can have an impact on how many patients get what they desire. This means that one 
patient’s efficacy affects all patients hoping for treatment, rather than just the patient in 
question. 
Similarly to the discussion of child welfare above, there is the issue of how seriously 
we are to take welfare concerns surrounding putative parents. This section has 
acknowledged that their interests must be taken into account. Hence, there needs to be a 
serious reason for us to deny treatment to any patient. 
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So far, we have surveyed the landscape of welfare considerations, paying particular 
attention to child welfare, but also considering the welfare of other members of the family 
and how this might be factored in. It is clear that there are many factors that can affect both 
the welfare of children and the welfare of patients, and that taking these into account may 
give rise to differential treatment between patients. The next section will consider whether 
there are any particular groups of people who may pose greater risks with regard to these 
factors than others. 
 
4.4 Characteristics 
 
This section will consider whether there are certain groups in society, the treatment 
of whose members presents elevated risks with regard to the considerations discussed 
above. In such cases, it may be justifiable to have blanket policies of withholding treatment 
from certain groups. Consideration of these factors can form the basis of gamete allocation 
criteria for clinics. 
 
4.4.1 Age 
 
This subsection will consider whether a patient’s age should have a bearing on the 
consideration they get for treatment. As with the previous subsections, we should be 
concerned to preserve equality between groups unless there are good reasons to allow for 
inequalities. So let us now look at what some of the differences are between patients of 
different ages that may give us reason to treat them differently. 
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Many studies have shown that older18 women receiving fertility treatment are less 
likely to conceive and successfully carry a pregnancy to term (Schwartz and Mayaux, 1982; 
Padilla and Garcia, 1989; Piette et al., 1990; Stovall et al., 1991; van Noord-Zaadstra et al., 
1991; Tan et al., 1992; Scott et al., 1995; Dor et al., 1996; Hull et al., 1996). The Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) accepts this conclusion, stating that ‘[d]elay in 
childbirth is associated with worsening reproductive outcomes’, with ‘more infertility’ first 
on their list (Bewley, Ledger and Nikolaou, 2009, p. 353). It also states that ‘[a]ssisted 
reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilisation (IVF) with the woman’s own fresh 
oocytes, cannot compensate for the effect of reproductive ageing’ (Bewley, Ledger and 
Nikolaou, 2009, p. 353).  The HFEA reports a 32.2% success rate for women under 35, 
decreasing to 20.8% for women aged 38-39, down to only 5.0% for women aged over 43-44 
(HFEA, 2013c). Note that the rate of decline itself also increases with age (Leridon, 2004; 
HFEA, 2008), so that the difference in success rate between the ages of 40 and 45 is much 
greater than the difference in success rate between the ages of 35 and 40. Age is therefore a 
determinant of treatment efficacy. 
The use of donor eggs, however, may circumvent these age-related efficacy concerns, 
with studies tending to find that where donor eggs are used, recipient age no longer has an 
effect on delivery rates (Navot et al., 1994; Sauer, Paulson and Lobo, 1996; Abdalla et al., 
1997; Paulson, Hatch, Lobo and Sauer, 1999; Noyes et al., 2001). This is also consistent with 
the HFEA’s more recent data on donor egg efficacy rates (HFEA, 2008). While there is 
                                                          
18
 This thesis will make use of the terms “older” and “younger” to denote relative ages of patients. It 
should be assumed that “younger” means a patient that does not yet present risks associated with 
older age, but who is old enough that they do not present risk associated with being too young for 
treatment. 
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evidence pointing in both directions regarding this, the majority of evidence suggests that 
donor eggs align success rates for older women with those of younger women, and 
therefore we have insufficient justification for differential treatment between patients of 
different ages in cases where donor eggs are used. The following discussion of age and 
efficacy should therefore be taken to refer only to sperm donation where the gestational 
mother’s own eggs are used. 
 In the case of donor sperm, there may be arguments for age discrimination from a 
resource perspective: as has been established, sperm are a scarce resource, and it may be 
better to allocate them to someone who has a better chance of a successful pregnancy, 
rather than using them in a potentially less effective way on someone with the lower 
chances of success associated with increased age. We might refer to these suboptimally 
effective treatments as gamete “wastage” – this is not to say that the use of these gametes 
does not do some good, only that they could be used to greater effect elsewhere. Even 
though this represents unequal treatment between age groups, it seems to maximise the 
chances that somebody gets what they want from the whole process, and this maximisation 
justifies the deviation from equality. 
The risk of failure also gives rise to a psychological consideration. It may be worse for 
a patient to proceed with treatment, potentially raising their hopes, only to meet with 
disappointment later when the treatment fails, than not to be treated at all. Admittedly, 
however, this must be balanced with the possibility that failed treatment is psychologically 
beneficial where it may make the patient feel like they have done all they could to have a 
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baby19 – so perhaps these psychological considerations cannot weigh in here. At any rate, 
the fact that prioritising based on efficacy will lead to more people having babies gives us a 
reason to treat women with a greater chance of success.  If older women have a reduced 
chance of success, this gives us a reason to favour the treatment of younger women. 
Treatment efficacy necessarily has value in a system whose aim is to provide effective 
treatment. The benefit of prioritising patients based on efficacy is that it will generally 
maximise the number of successful treatments. It is important, however, to note that this is 
not necessarily the case. It seems intuitive to say that if clinical staff always aim to treat 
whoever on the waiting list has the best chance of a successful pregnancy, this will generate 
the largest number of successful births. This, however, is not always true. 
Suppose there are two patients on the waiting list, one who is 23, and another who is 
39. Imagine that we know that we will only ever be able to treat one of these patients (let us 
imagine that gamete donation is to be outlawed tomorrow and this is the last treatment of 
the day). They are exactly alike in every other respect – imagine that they both arrived on 
the waiting list at the same time, or perhaps more realistically, that their records were 
somehow muddled or destroyed and it is unknown who got there first (this serves to remove 
any argument based on one patient’s having waited longer than the other). Clearly, if we are 
in the business of providing effective treatments, then in this instance we should treat the 
23 year old, to maximise the chances of someone getting the treatment they were after. This 
idea of treating younger patients to maximise the number of births was advanced by 
Canada’s Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993). 
                                                          
19 This argument was presented by a member of the ethics committee at one of the meetings 
observed as part of the project’s preliminary “fieldwork”. 
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The situation is not as simple as this, however. Given the strict choice between 
treating one patient or the other, it seems clear that we must treat the one with the best 
outlook for success, all other things being equal. But the reality of the waiting lists is 
somewhat different, as we can reasonably expect more gametes to become available at 
some point or another. This expectation, while it might be positive in that it increases the 
overall likelihood of both patients going away with what they wanted, makes the whole 
situation a little trickier for decision-makers. For if we treat the 23 year old patient, then by 
the time another donor comes along, it may be too late for the 39 year old: she may grow 
too old to be on the waiting list (based on efficacy concerns); and we know that her chances 
of success decrease with age, so even if she does come to be treated, by this time it may be 
too late and it may be unsuccessful where, had we treated her beforehand (i.e. instead of 
the 23 year old), she may have been successful (though obviously we could never know this 
for sure). 
If we treat the 39 year old instead, this lessens the problem somewhat. Certainly it 
could be the case that the next donor takes so long to appear that the 23 year old is similarly 
too old to receive treatment, and the same occurs. But if we have some (reasonable) 
expectation that a sperm donor will appear before that time, we have a complex problem on 
our hands. If we want to maximise the success using one particular gamete, then it is 
obvious that we should just treat the 23 year old. But if we want to maximise the chances of 
success for both patients, it looks like there might be a reason to treat the older woman first. 
After all, she is a more urgent case in that she requires treatment sooner if she is to get it at 
all. 
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Real life waiting lists are not quite like this – they have more than two people, and a 
(perhaps) more reliable inflow of gametes. In reality, then, we may need more information 
about waiting lists. An important empirical question that would impact our ideas about how 
to maximise births is what the age distribution is across waiting lists. Let us simplify this by 
assuming that there are only two categories of patient: young and old. The young patients 
present a better option for treatment efficacy. At first glance, then, we ought to just treat 
them. The problem, though, as illustrated above, is that once we have treated all of them, 
then unless the waiting list is constantly replenished with young patients to claim the next 
sets of gametes, we must then move onto the older patients (unless we are going to exclude 
them entirely – in which case, we should just be honest about this from the outset. Now, by 
the time we have treated all of these young patients, the older patients will, of course, have 
aged. The problem lies in the fact, as mentioned above, that treatment efficacy may diminish 
at a greater rate for the older patients than it does for the younger patients. Hence, the 
difference between, say, age 39 and age 40, is likely to be greater, in terms of treatment 
efficacy, than the difference between age 23 and age 24. Hence, if we know that we are 
going to move on to treating the older patients at some point, we have a reason to treat 
them now, because our strategy for maximising births demands that we account for their 
more rapidly diminishing fertility. 
Let us consider this numerically, using the tables below. Let us say that a 23 year old 
has a fertility score of 20, and a 39 year old has a fertility score of 10. These scores represent 
the chance of treatment being successful – a higher score means a higher chance. Hence, 
this scoring system serves to convert the value of efficacy (and the disvalue of inefficacy) 
into integers. Now, to represent the faster rate of decline for older patients, let us say that 
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for the older patients, their score declines by 2 points a year, whereas for the younger 
patients, it only declines by 1 point a year. Let us say there are 2 young patients and 2 older 
ones on the list, and that it takes a year to treat each patient and move to the next. 
 
 
Table 1 – Effect of Prioritising Younger Patients When Older Patients Will Be Treated 
Afterwards 
 
 
 
Year Patients Total points 
 Young 
patient A 
Young 
patient B 
Old patient A Old patient B  
0 20 20 10 10 60 
1 20 19 8 8 55 
2 20 19 6 6 51 
3 20 19 6 4 49 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Effect of Prioritising Older Patients When Younger Patients Will Be Treated 
Afterwards 
 
 
 
Year Patients Total points 
 Young 
patient A 
Young 
patient B 
Old patient A Old patient B  
0 20 20 10 10 60 
1 19 19 10 8 56 
2 18 18 10 8 54 
3 18 17 10 8 53 
 
 
 
The green bars represent the point at which that patient has been treated. The “total 
points” column on the right represents the total efficacy score of all the patients put 
together – because we cannot treat them all at once, the score diminishes with time, 
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corresponding with the patients’ declining fertility.  The red cell demonstrates the final 
number of points achieved in each scenario – this number corresponds to the total efficacy 
of the four patients put together. Table 1 represents a scenario in which we treat younger 
patients first, and table 2 one in which we treat older patients first. We can see that we have 
a higher overall efficacy score in scenario 2. This is because scenario 2 more quickly deals 
with those patients whose fertility is more rapidly declining, thus avoiding greater point 
losses through time. 
The examples in the tables are simplified, as fertility may decline more or less rapidly 
from patient to patient. The basic idea, however, can be mapped onto real life waiting lists. 
The message is that if there are so few young patients on the list that we will end up treating 
the older ones anyway, then we have a reason to treat the older patients first to maximise 
births. If we have so many young patients on the list that we will never end up treating the 
older ones, we must question why we put those older patients on the list anyway – they are 
effectively excluded. 
The above discussion has simplified matters somewhat. For a start, there will be 
numerous patients, of varying ages, on the list. In the above example it was clear that 
treating the older patients first would maximise the number of successful treatments. But in 
other cases this would not be so. If there are so many older patients that we end up treating 
them to the detriment of younger patients who are potentially very valuable (in terms of 
“efficacy points” that is), then we may be failing to maximise. Effectively what the system 
comes down to is that older patients must only be treated if they would be treated anyway 
(but later), and younger patients must otherwise be prioritised. 
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It may be, then, that the question of whether to prioritise younger patients, or 
whether to prioritise older ones, is dependent on the age distribution on the waiting list, and 
how many people are on the list. This will require both detailed knowledge of the waiting list, 
and for some predictions to be made about how many patients will be treated. Given that 
this may vary throughout time and from clinic to clinic, it may be necessary for staff to 
periodically review their waiting lists, in conjunction with data about how many gametes are 
expected to be available, in order to establish which patients to prioritise. It is worth 
pointing out here that this may speak in favour of having a national waiting list. If the age 
distribution on the waiting list is a factor in determining how prioritisation should work, then 
this may differ from waiting list to waiting list. Having a national waiting list would mean that 
only one calculation about this age distribution would need to be made, and this could be 
done centrally, alleviating the workload overall. The idea of a national waiting list will be 
considered in more detail below (pages 118-120). 
Given the fact that egg donation can be used to circumvent these age-related 
efficacy concerns to the extent that delivery rates for older women are comparable to those 
of younger women, the discussion of age as a relevant criterion for decision-making will only 
apply to cases using donor sperm rather than donor eggs. As was mentioned in case three in 
chapter two, however, there are increased obstetric risks associated with pregnancy at a 
later age (Cnattingius et al., 1992; Jolly et al., 2000; Caplan and Patrizio, 2010), which may 
not be avoided by the use of donor eggs (Sauer, Paulson and Lobo, 1996; Vasireddy and 
Bewley, 2013). These risks threaten not only the woman, but the child. This may also provide 
a reason to discriminate against women who are older in favour of those who are younger, 
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derived from both child welfare considerations, and considerations about the welfare of the 
patient. 
There may thus be both patient and child welfare considerations if we are concerned 
that obstetric issues and pregnancy complications may affect the health of the child. An 
additional consideration is that the older the parent, the younger the age at which the child 
can be expected to experience the death of that parent. If we think that it is worse for 
someone to lose a parent at a younger age, then this too may speak in favour of treating 
younger patients. But this is only true to an extent – there will be an age at which a patient is 
so young that their difficulties in being a parent will outweigh the potential difficulties of 
their child’s loss of a parent. The increased obstetric risks and the potential social difficulties 
are reasons to refuse to treat minors. 
The non-obstetric reasons for disfavouring older patients do not only apply to the 
patients themselves – they may apply to either member of the couple,20 too, whether or not 
that person has a biological or genetic connection with the child. Consider a woman who 
wishes to be treated with donor sperm. Her partner will not be biologically or genetically 
related to the child that will result from this treatment (if it is successful). But we may have 
reason to consider the age of this partner, if the partner’s presence is considered part of the 
                                                          
20 It should be noted that it is not always clear who the patient is in fertility treatment. Consider a 
case of an infertile man going for treatment with his female partner. While he is the one with the 
medical issue, she is the one who will ultimately go to theatre and be inseminated. For simplicity’s 
sake, this chapter will use the word “patient” to refer to the woman hoping to carry a child as the 
result of treatment. 
83 
 
child’s “supportive parenting”, and if this partner’s early death would cause added distress 
for the child when compared with a later death.21 
There seem, then, to be a variety of reasons for which it may be legitimate to 
discriminate against older patients. This discrimination is indirect; people are not being 
discriminated against just because they are older, but because their being older means that 
they have a statistically greater likelihood of presenting problems in the future, with a 
patient’s capacity for raising children and the amount of time they can be expected to 
remain alive being the primary concerns. This latter point would also require us to regard 
those with life-limiting illnesses as worse candidates for treatment. This, however, would 
depend on the nature of the illness and its effect on parenting capacity, whether there were 
someone else who could parent the child in the event of one parent’s death, and the actual 
impact for children of parental death. 
The relationship between child welfare and maternal age is, however, unclear.  
Although there are increased obstetric risks and risks of foetal abnormalities, there is some 
evidence suggesting that children are better off with slightly older mothers (Sutcliffe et al., 
2012). The Sutcliffe et al. study found that children born to older mothers had ‘better 
language, and fewer social and emotional difficulties’ (Sutcliffe et al., 2012, p. 4). It only 
considered children up to the age of 5, however, so the issue of early maternal death is still 
relevant. The Sutcliffe et al. study also considered some health-related issues, finding that 
children born to older mothers had fewer hospital admissions and greater levels of 
                                                          
21 There could be a way to minimise this distress if we think that there are ways to make children less 
attached to their parents. But this might have the side effect of creating social issues. Without 
getting into this debate, then, this chapter will assume that parents should still attempt to be the 
best parents they can. 
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immunisation, whereas the risks we are concerned about when treating older patients are 
chromosomal abnormalities and other health problems at birth. It also ought to be noted 
once more that some of the child welfare risks are associated with egg age rather than 
maternal age, making matters more complicated in that donor eggs virtually eliminate these 
risks. Age-based criteria may need to be sensitive to these nuances. 
There is no cut and dried way to say that congenital conditions are better or worse 
for children than health problems resulting from having younger mothers, such as lower 
immunisation levels, or more hospital admissions (as suggested by the Sutcliffe et al. study). 
Some congenital conditions will be more severe than others, and some hospitalisations will 
be more severe than others. The Sutcliffe et al. study did not record the severity of hospital 
admissions. It may be possible to pool data on the average severity of congenital conditions 
and compare this with the average severity of hospital admissions. This comparison would 
also need to evaluate the dangers of having fewer immunisations, and various other factors. 
This may provide an answer to the question of whether it is older or younger patients who 
pose greater health risks to their children. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis 
to synthesise and evaluate all of this data. For the moment, we must make do with the 
tentative conclusion that congenital conditions speak against the treatment of older women 
using their own eggs (but not for those using donor eggs), and that there may be social 
benefits to having older mothers (up to a certain age at least – there may be a point at which 
these benefits would not manifest themselves). Child welfare considerations thus seem to 
lead to the conclusion that in some cases we should favour older patients, and in other cases, 
younger patients. 
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One objection to the notion of prioritising the young, however, is that it may leave 
the old without opportunities for treatment at all. If a waiting list comprises enough young 
patients, then efficacy considerations may require that all gametes go to the young, leaving 
the old by the wayside. This is true only if we incorrectly assume that the desideratum at 
play in fertility treatment is to have an opportunity for treatment, rather than to take home 
a baby to parent. We could offer treatment to everyone regardless of the likely efficacy of 
the treatment, but this, too, would leave people by the wayside, in that fewer babies would 
be taken home overall. It might look like everyone is being offered something, but in actual 
fact the patients on the waiting list would be worse off overall. This issue of opportunity 
versus efficacy will be revisited in greater detail later on (pages 115-118). 
In summary, the age of patients raises many significant issues. The decline in efficacy 
provides a motivation to treat younger patients instead of older ones, except in cases where 
older patients will be among those treated anyway, in which case, they should be treated 
first so as to best account for the fact that their chances of success decline faster. This will 
ensure the best use of scarce gametes. Obstetric risks associated with age provide further 
reasons to prioritise younger patients. Child welfare considerations are more complicated, as 
this is more to do with the age of the eggs used, so that in cases where donor eggs are being 
used, the problem is circumvented. The problem may still arise in cases where an older 
patient uses her own eggs and donor sperm, however. There is little to suggest any social 
reason not to treat older patients, but otherwise there is much that speaks against their 
treatment if younger patients can be treated instead. 
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4.4.2 Primary and Secondary Infertility 
 
According to the NHS, a person who has fertility problems after they have already 
had a child is regarded as having “secondary infertility” whereas someone who has fertility 
problems and has never had a child is someone with “primary infertility” (National Health 
Service, 2013). If the difference between primary and secondary infertility is not morally 
relevant, then this should not be considered in decision-making, and people with primary 
and secondary infertility should be treated equally. 
As argued on page 39, however, there are different ways of conceiving of equality. 
Treating groups differently may be justified in order to redress the inequality that appears 
when some people can have children and some cannot.22 The starting point was to insist 
that justification is offered for all unequal treatment. But treating primary and secondary 
infertility cases differently may result in more egalitarian distributions, where giving priority 
to those without children already means that more people have a chance to have children at 
some point. 
Unfortunately, cases surrounding primary and secondary fertility can become quite 
complicated. They are most straightforward in cases where the couples either both have no 
children, or have both previously had children together. Slightly more complicated are cases 
in which both members of a couple have children, but have not had children together. More 
complicated still are cases where only one partner has children from a previous relationship. 
A further dimension is which member of the couple is infertile in such cases, and whether it 
                                                          
22 Another way to redress this inequality would be to stop certain people from having children. This 
would be another example of levelling down, though, and again is too much of a welfare sacrifice to 
be allowed. 
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matters whether the partner with children is the one with the fertility problem. Table 3 
shows the sixteen possible combinations of previous parenthood and infertility for any 
couple. The final four, in which both members of the couple are fertile, could apply in cases 
of genetic conditions, or in same-sex couples. 
We should also consider another distinction that can arise in cases where one 
partner has existing children: a person’s relationship with their (or their partner’s) children 
may range from one mirroring “normal” parenthood, with years of close, intimate contact 
and cohabitation, to no parental involvement whatsoever. In these latter cases, it cannot be 
said that the person already has children, in either a social sense, or a genetic sense (as they 
are the partner’s children). So childlessness is not a discrete property – it has various modes, 
and so it is not clear whether or how the parental status of individual members of a couple 
should be accounted for. 
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Table 3 – Combinations of Infertility and Previous Parenthood 
 
 Partner 1 
infertile 
Partner 2 
infertile 
Partner 1 
previous children 
Partner 2 
previous children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combinations 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Yes Yes No No 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Yes No Yes No 
Yes No No Yes 
Yes No No No 
No Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes No 
No Yes No Yes 
No Yes No No 
No No Yes Yes 
No No Yes No 
No No No Yes 
No No No No 
 
 
 
4.4.2.1 A More Accurate Distinction: Parents and Childless People 
 
At this stage, we must shift the terminology slightly, from primary versus secondary 
infertility to childlessness versus having a child. This is because in the case of couples, 
infertility status does not necessarily correspond to parental status, as it may be the fertile 
member of the couple who has no previous children.23 Given that it is effectively the couple 
together who are being treated, the question of whether it is the infertile partner or the 
                                                          
23 A single patient seeking fertility treatment may also be fertile. 
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fertile one who is childless is irrelevant to the ultimate decision not to prioritise a couple 
(one member of which is childless and one of which is not). 
Fortunately, the minimalist consequentialism with which we are working will not be 
sensitive to these different conceptions of parenthood and childlessness. This framework 
asks that we only account for future harms and benefits. Unless it can be shown that 
patients having their first child stand to benefit more than patients having an additional child, 
taking into account a person’s current status as a parent seems to be one of these latter 
considerations. 
 There may be an argument for this, from the perspective of psychological distress. 
Greil et al. note that ‘many studies have treated women with infertility as a monolithic group, 
thus missing important distinctions among women with different types of infertility (primary 
or secondary)’ (Greil et al., 2011, p. 2101). Consequently, there is only a small body of data 
on the psychological differences between these two groups (Epstein and Rosenberg, 2005; 
Greil et al., 2011). These studies, however, supported the  hypothesis that ‘women with 
primary infertility would have higher levels of FSD [fertility-specific distress] than women 
with secondary infertility’ (Greil et al., 2011, p. 2102 and 2109).  
 This gives us a reason to think that there is a greater psychological difference 
between having one’s first child and having subsequent children, and may justify giving 
priority to childless couples. It may also suggest that couples, one member of which is 
childless, should get second priority, with couples, both of whom have children (either 
together or apart) at the bottom in terms of this criterion. 
 This is not to deny Robertson’s point that ‘[the denial of] reproduction and the 
parenting that accompanies it […] is experienced as a great loss, even if one has already had 
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children’ Robertson, 1994, p. 24). All of the above groups might experience their infertility as 
a great loss, as Robertson says. Some groups, however, may experience it as a greater loss 
than others, and parental status seems like a case where this can be accounted for.  
There are still complications, as the studies did not consider the relationship that 
these people had with their children. Greil et al.’s study defined the difference between 
primary and secondary infertility as whether the woman had ‘experienced prior pregnanc[y]’, 
and they combined the initially separate groups of ‘prior pregnancy but no live birth’ and 
‘live birth’ (Greil et al., 2011, p. 2104). This means that any women who had miscarried, or 
women who had had no relationship with the children to whom they had given birth, would 
have been grouped together with women who had ongoing relationships with their children. 
Their study was not sensitive to the parenting experience in this way, so while it offers us a 
justification for distinguishing between women based on their previous parenthood, it does 
not help us to flesh out this concept. 
In this case it would probably be best to consider that the distress caused to the secondarily 
infertile women was due to a lack of parenting experience, rather than not having conceived 
(as Greil et al.’s study might suggest at first glance). Given the scalar nature of parenting 
experiences that are available, this provides a mandate for clinical staff to consider the 
parenting experiences of patients individually, and establish a cut-off point for what counts 
as a suitable degree of parenting experience for the patient to no longer be described as 
“childless”. The conclusion of this subsection is thus that a patient’s parental status can be 
taken into account in deciding whether or not to treat them, such that those who have not 
already experienced parenting should be given priority, all other things being equal, over 
those who have. 
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4.4.3 Same-Sex Couples and Single Patients 
 
The 2008 amendment to the HFE Act suggests that doubts over the preference for 
heterosexual couples over single women and same-sex couples have already been raised. 
While the HFE Act previously asked for the clinic to consider ‘the need of [the] child for a 
father’ (HFEA, 1990, section 13 (5)), the legal requirement is now less specific, detailing 
‘supportive parenting’ (HFE Act, 2008, section 14 (2)) instead. The debate leading up to this 
change, documented in the Hansard, illuminates some of the relevant issues. Evan Harris 
complained about Iain Duncan Smith’s proposal to legislate such that clinics must consider 
“the need for a father and a mother”, describing this move as unjustified: 
 
On the European convention on human rights [sic], the House is advised by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights [...]. In a unanimous report, the Committee stated that 
“Without justification, such distinctions” [...] “may be in breach of the right to respect 
for private life without discrimination”. The report continued: “Similarly, the 
Convention prohibits unjustified discrimination” [...] “between married and 
unmarried parents for the purposes of recognition of parental responsibility, or wider 
family law decisions on access and custody.” (HC Deb 20 May 2008, vol 476, col 172) 
 
The suggestion is that Duncan Smith’s proposal would discriminate against single 
people or same-sex parents, and that this would be an unjustifiable breach of principles (and 
indeed laws) governing equality. Harris argued that a child does not specifically need a father 
in order to enjoy an adequate degree of welfare, nor specifically a mother, but that 
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parenting can be adequately supportive in the absence of either of these. This would make 
room for more non-standard family arrangements, such as families with single mothers, or 
same-sex couples, where a legal requirement to account for the “need for a father” could 
deny treatment to such people. 
The proposal to specify a child’s need for a father and mother was eventually 
defeated, so that the HFE Act as amended reflects the idea that single parents and same-sex 
parents are capable of providing supportive parenting to children. There is evidence to 
support the view that same-sex parents are able to provide such supportive parenting to the 
same degree as heterosexual parents. The body of evidence includes longitudinal studies, 
measuring child welfare outcomes across a range of measures, including school outcomes, 
psychosocial adjustment, peer relations, romantic relationships, sexual functioning, 
delinquency, and substance use (for example Golombok et al., 1997; Golombok,2000; Stacey 
and Biblarz, 2001; Golombok, et al., 2004; Wainright, Russell and Patterson,  2004; Wainright 
and Patterson, 2006;  Golombok and Badger, 2010; and Perrin, 2002). Thus there seems to 
be no reason to discriminate against same-sex parents in gamete allocation. 
The case for single parents is similar with regard to child welfare. Golombok and 
Badger note the evidence suggesting that children’s welfare is compromised when they are 
raised by single mothers, but point out that:  
 
[T]hese outcomes cannot necessarily be generalized to children born to single 
mothers by donor insemination. The situation of these mothers is different from that 
of single mothers who have separated or divorced, or who became pregnant 
unintentionally, in that they are generally financially secure with good social support, 
and the children have not been exposed to parental conflict or family disruption 
(Golombok and Badger, 2010, p. 151). 
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This distinction is crucial to the discussion here, because in the context of gamete allocation, 
the situation of children raised by single mothers generally is largely irrelevant – we should 
only consider the evidence about those who become single mothers through donor 
insemination. Golombok’s series of studies is sensitive to this distinction, and shows that 
children born to single mothers from donor insemination tend to fare as well as those born 
to two-parent families (Golombok et al., 1997; Golombok et al., 2004; Golombok and Badger, 
2010). Golombok and Badger point out the relevance of this finding to the HFE Act. 
From a child welfare perspective, there thus appears to be no reason to distinguish 
between two-parent families and single women. The question of single fathers in this 
context remains unknown and under-researched, with the concept of treating single men 
virtually unmentioned in fertility treatment literature. This may be due to a small number of 
single men seeking, or being accepted for, treatment at fertility clinics. In the absence of 
sufficient evidence that single men becoming fathers as a result of infertility treatment gives 
rise to children with lower welfare, it seems we do not yet have a reason to justify 
differential treatment of single men either. This move is based on the starting presumption 
that differential treatment requires justification, and so the absence of evidence as a form of 
this justification forbids us from discriminating. 
 So far it looks as though single patients should be able to access treatment just as 
easily as couples, given that there seem to be no differences between these groups with 
regard to child welfare. From a patient welfare perspective, however, there may be a crucial 
difference that militates against the treatment of single patients: there is only one of them. 
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 The discussion above (pages 59-59) acknowledged that patient welfare has some 
value, and that there is a prima facie reason to offer treatment to patients for the patient’s 
own sake. If there are two potential parents, then this reason is likely to be strengthened, as 
there are more people on whom to confer benefit. Even if the joy of having a wanted child is 
shared somewhat between couples, it is unlikely that an argument that it is halved could get 
off the ground. Treating couples therefore generates more welfare per treatment, and for 
this reason, couples should be prioritised over single patients, all other things being equal. 
This line of argument may also provide a reason to prioritise patients with a third “parent” 
(for example a donor who will play a role in parenting), if this third person will gain from this 
arrangement without detracting from the benefit of the other parents or the child. This 
consideration may iterate to four parents and beyond, but the diminishing likelihood of 
these arrangements means we need not go into further detail about them.  
 
This chapter has so far considered some values that may give us reasons to 
discriminate between patients and thus depart from our initial standpoint of equality. The 
current section has been a consideration of which groups might legitimately be 
discriminated against, on the basis that membership of such groups generally indicates a 
heightened risk with regard to the aforementioned values. Now, the discussion will turn to 
exactly how these values should be weighed up, and attempt to cash out whether and to 
what extent these values can cause us to deviate from equality, and in which situations our 
standpoint of equality should be maintained in spite of the risk that these values may be 
partly compromised. 
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4.5 Weighing Considerations 
 
Sections 4.1 to 4.4 of this chapter provided a broad brush stroke look at some of the 
ethical issues that can confront clinical staff when deciding who to treat with donor gametes. 
So far, these ethical issues have been taken in isolation from each other, giving little 
indication about how they interact. Each moral consideration was discussed in its own right, 
its value considered under “all other things being equal” conditions. The following section 
will discuss some of the facets of this technical issue, and may provide us with a clearer 
picture of what to do with all of the sometimes conflicting moral demands that seem to all 
be in operation at the same time. 
 
4.5.1 Two Potential Relationships between Moral Considerations 
 
Broadly, there seem to be two main ways of describing this relationship between 
moral considerations of potentially varying significance and weight. The best way to describe 
these is by way of example. Imagine a tournament, where competitors take part in different 
events. For each event, one competitor receives a gold medal, one a silver medal, and 
another a bronze medal. At the end of the tournament, we want to establish a hierarchy to 
determine everyone’s position and declare a winner. 
A lexical ordering model takes the highest-ranked medals (the gold ones) and counts 
them up. If one competitor has more gold medals than anyone else, they are the winner. If 
there is a tie, and there are multiple competitors with the same number of gold medals, then 
we count up the number of silver medals each competitor has, and then bronze until a 
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winner emerges. In this way, medals “trump” other medals lower on the list, and anyone 
holding more medals that are higher up the list than another competitor is ranked higher 
than that competitor, regardless of how many medals from lower down the list that 
competitor has. As Rawls puts it, ‘serial [lexical] ordering avoids, then, having to balance 
principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with 
respect to later ones, and hold without exception’ (Rawls, 1972, p. 43). 
The second method, which we will call the “non-absolute model” (by way of 
contrasting it with the lexical ordering model), however, still assigns some value to medals 
lower down the list, even if another player has more medals of a type higher up the list. So, 
under this kind of model, we might assign a value of 10 points to a gold medal, 5 to a silver 
medal, and 1 to a bronze medal and total up the number of points a competitor has to 
determine the winner. Now, we might expect results to be similar to the results under the 
lexical ordering model. Certainly it is still advantageous to have as many gold medals as 
possible. However, it is theoretically possible, under this model, to win without having any 
gold or silver medals at all, even if another competitor has some. Table 4 below 
demonstrates the lexical ordering model. We start by looking at the gold medals – player 2 
clearly has more than player 1, so player 2 wins on this basis alone. Table 5 below shows 
how we get different winners from the same medals when we use the non-absolute model. 
The bracketed numbers show the total points gained for medals of that type. Unlike in the 
lexical ordering case, the vast number of bronze medals accrued by player 1 are counted, 
and that they ultimately give player 1 a bigger score. 
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Table 4 – The Lexical Ordering Model 
 
Medals Players 
Player 1 Player 2 
Gold 0 50 
Silver 0 10 
Bronze 1,000 0 
 
 
 
Table 5 – The Non-absolute Model 
 
 
Medals Players 
Player 1 Player 2 
Gold 0 50 (500) 
Silver 0 10 (50) 
Bronze 1,000 0 
Total 1,000 550 
 
 
4.5.2 Challenges for the Models 
 
Both of these models can present challenges in certain circumstances. The value of 
the lexical ordering model might be in its simplicity: once we have established what our 
hierarchy of considerations is, we need only consider the values of the most important 
consideration, unless these are equal. If they are equal, we consider our second most 
important consideration. If these are equal, we consider our third most important 
consideration, and so on until we find an inequality in people’s scores, or run out of 
considerations that are relevant to our decision-making. 
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This model, however, seems to fail to account for the weight of all these 
considerations, and in practice, this may not look particularly appealing. These problems are 
best expressed if we move on from medals and apply these models to gamete allocation. 
Consider a simplified example, with patients A and B. The considerations at play are age, and 
history of substance abuse. Patient A has a substance abuse problem and patient B does not, 
but patient A is considerably younger than patient B. Let us assume that the history of 
substance abuse consideration is more important than the age one. Under lexical ordering, 
this means that the substance abuse consideration is “lexically prior” to the age 
consideration. Now, if we are using this model, then as patient B has no substance abuse 
problem, and patient A does (and as having such a problem speaks against treatment), we 
should treat patient B over patient A. 
Substance use and age, however, are not discrete variables. There is more to the 
story than just whether someone can be called a substance user or not. In reality, substance 
use can come in degrees, and so of course can age. Perhaps patient A’s history of substance 
use is that they smoked cannabis ten years previously. Let us also assume that patient B is in 
her mid fifties, such that treating her would be unlikely to succeed. The lexical ordering 
model means that patient A’s rather minor substance abuse history trumps the age 
considerations, even though the age considerations appear rather weighty.  
Treating these considerations as discrete variables, like the lexical ordering model 
does, ignores the range of different values that these considerations can actually have. First, 
it has the potential to ignore the difference between a heroin addict and a one-time 
cannabis user. This problem can be solved, however, by refining terms and splitting them 
into different variables. For example, instead of considering all heroin addicts and one-time 
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cannabis users to be positive substance abusers, we could take these as different variables, 
deciding individually whether someone is a heroin addict or not, then deciding in isolation 
from that whether they have ever used cannabis, and consider their status as heroin addict 
lexically prior to their status as one-time cannabis user in our weighing up process. This 
slightly finer-grained approach helps to deal with the problem of being ignorant to the 
weight of these considerations, as it does not exclude considerations on the basis that they 
are lexically inferior. This may come at some practical cost as it would require more details 
to be recorded and assigned a place in the lexical ordering system. 
We are still presented with the problem, however, that in the lexical ordering model, 
any consideration for which a patient scores more highly than another will trump all the 
considerations further down the list. This means that even if we use our refined system for 
negotiating the heroin/cannabis distinction, if patient A still loses based on one of these 
criteria, then the difference between a young woman and a much older one (in terms of 
treatment outcomes) is totally ignored. It seems that this model, then, can place too much 
emphasis on its lexically prior considerations (gold medals) at the expense of the huge (and 
theoretically infinite) other considerations (like silver and bronze medals). In the lexical 
ordering model, overriding considerations trump others and negate their value entirely, 
whereas in the non-absolute model, the value of considerations lower down the list is 
preserved and accounted for. 
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4.5.3 Ranking and Points 
 
Notice that the non-absolute model works by assigning numerical weighting to the 
medals as a way of demonstrating their relative value, thus allowing us to rank them in order. 
This model is therefore aligned with the ranking system for oocyte allocation proposed by 
Pennings, which is ‘[a] point system which gives credit points to the morally relevant 
features of the prospective recipients’ (Pennings, 2001, p. 57). This can be extended to cover 
sperm allocation. What this means for the moral considerations explored in chapter 4 above 
is that, where it was concluded that a factor (for example, having children already) was 
morally relevant “all other things being equal”, such a factor either adds or subtracts points 
to a patient’s overall “score”, to provide them with a final ranking. 
The conclusions of this thesis will not include a detailed value system that defines the 
appropriate number of points that should be awarded for each moral consideration. Instead, 
this thesis is concerned with the prior task of establishing those moral considerations that 
should be included in such a points system, and whether they would be used to add or 
subtract points to a patient’s score. The lack of statutory guidance on these considerations in 
gamete allocation, as described above (page 3), speaks to the importance of establishing 
which criteria are morally relevant before attempting to determine the extent or weight of 
that moral relevance. Hence, this thesis will propose a ranking system for patients, detailing 
some of the criteria that should be used to rank them, but will not propose the exact 
weightings of these criteria. 
One of Pennings’ justifications of the use of moral considerations in a ranking system 
is the following: ‘it allows us to take into account more than one relevant factor 
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simultaneously in the allocation procedure’ (Pennings, 2001, p. 57). Pennings’ point is 
related to the concern about trumping in the previous paragraph – trumping and lexical 
ordering often force us to ignore factors that may be morally relevant. Furthermore, he 
argues that ‘[a] point system is the ideal solution to prevent arbitrary selection and 
prejudices. The criteria for ranking candidate recipients are determined in advance and 
create an open and verifiable list’ (Pennings, 2007, p. 189). There is thus the added benefit 
of transparency and a diminished possibility of manipulation and personal selection. 
Still, the non-absolute model also presents problems. While it is theoretically 
appealing in that, unlike the lexical ordering model, it assigns some value to all our 
considerations, it is much more difficult to use in practice. This is because much more 
calculation needs to be done. The earlier example assigned numerical values to gold, silver, 
and bronze medals, and then simply added them all up. This was not too onerous a task in 
this context, but was still more time-consuming than simply adding up the gold medals. In 
gamete allocation, there may be a greater number of things to consider, and accounting for 
them all may put inordinate strain on the time of clinical staff in making these decisions. 
Pennings himself is aware of this problem of unwieldiness, noting that ‘[o]ne should be 
careful not to include too many factors in order to obtain a practical system which is not too 
cumbersome for the clinic to maintain and which is transparent for the patients’ (Pennings, 
2005, p. 2992) 
Furthermore, counting up medals is simpler than measuring criteria like substance 
use, or age, or potential for violence, over which there may be less consensus. One more 
issue is that time may be wasted weighing up considerations if we know that one 
consideration weighs very heavily. In terms of the medal example, if player 1 has a million 
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gold medals and player 2 has zero, we may think that it is pointless to count up the other 
medals, given the clear advantage that player 1 already has at this stage of the calculation. 
This may be contingent on information we have about other medals – perhaps there is an 
upper limit, and no player may have more than a million of any medal, in which case player 2 
cannot win. In terms of gamete allocation, a patient may have a long history of abusing 
children, and this may count so heavily against them that we think it unlikely that any other 
patient would be ranked below them. The aim of the following subsection will be to outline 
some proposals that will allow us to use a stripped-down version of the non-absolute model 
that deals with these concerns. 
 
4.5.4 Prioritisation and Exclusion 
 
Pennings describes a three-stage process for selecting patients. Given that this 
project primarily aims to provide tools for tertiary clinical staff to use in their decision-
making, we will ignore Pennings’ comments surrounding the first stage, which is referral for 
treatment, as this occurs before patients arrive at the kinds of clinics described in this 
project. Pennings rightly notes that ‘the crucial player at this point is the general practitioner’ 
(57) and examination of this is beyond the scope of this project.24 The question of which 
barriers confront patients at those early stages of their fertility journey is certainly an 
interesting one, but takes place at a level of decision-making prior to that under discussion 
here. 
                                                          
24 A similar project to the one undertaken in this thesis, discussing this stage and gathering the views 
of GPs, could be of use, and is in fact being planned as a continuation of this work. 
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The second two stages, however, are of interest to us here. They are “admission to 
the waiting list”, and “selection from the waiting list”. For Pennings, certain criteria should 
be used to govern admission to the waiting list, and if a patient fails based on these criteria 
they do not get included at all. Once patients are on the list, other criteria can be used to 
“rank” them and decide who gets treatment first. The approach to patient management in 
this thesis will reflect the ranking system suggested by Pennings. The criteria discussed 
above can be used to prioritise patients over others, challenging the view that patients 
should be treated in the order in which they arrive on the list. This priority system takes 
seriously the notion that there are other morally relevant factors that determine to whom it 
is best to offer treatment. Thus, where this thesis refers to moral factors that “speak for” or 
“speak against” treating a patient (or similar terms), these terms should be taken to mean 
that the factor in question gives us a reason to treat or not to treat (respectively) that 
patient. This reason is not absolute – a factor that speaks against treating a patient does not 
necessarily mean that they will be excluded, as other patients may have factors speaking 
more heavily against them. As a theoretical example, someone may be de-prioritised for 
being a smoker, but they may not be excluded if the other people on the list are convicted 
child abusers. 
At the same time, , there are also patients who we might not want to treat at all, 
irrespective of whether there are others seeking treatment. This was discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis (page 1). An example might be a case where treatment would be 
particularly threatening to a patient’s health. In situations such as these, patients can be 
excluded outright, without reference to who else might be treated instead. In other cases, 
we may exclude patients for practical reasons. There may be little point in continuing to 
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assess and consider a patient for treatment, if we can be reasonably certain that, based on 
the priority system, other patients will be treated ahead of them. This level of certainty will 
depend on how many other patients are on the list. To follow the above example: if there 
are a great number of patients on the list, it may be very unlikely that they are all to be given 
lower priority than someone who is de-prioritised for being a smoker. Hence, this person 
may be “effectively excluded”. 
Given the suitability of the non-absolute model over the lexical ordering model for 
negotiating the use of moral considerations in prioritising patients, most of the conclusions 
about moral considerations in this thesis should be taken as referring to ways of prioritising 
patients rather than reasons to exclude them outright. Exclusions can only occur in two 
circumstances: 
 
a) the moral consideration in question suggests that the patient(s) themselves 
are not expected to benefit from the treatment, and 
b) the moral consideration in question weighs so heavily against the patient that, 
given the profiles of the other patients on the list, the patient is expected 
never to be treated. This is the effective exclusion described above. 
 
In cases of type a), the outcome will be a matter of clinical judgement. For type b), the 
outcome will depend on the suitability of other patients on the list. 
Effective exclusions as described by type b) cases, however, will occur much less 
often if the amount of time that the patient has been waiting is accounted for – if a patient’s 
time waiting is taken as a reason to give them priority, most patients will eventually be 
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treated once this consideration becomes weighty enough. This is true in all cases except 
those involving other considerations that also change with time, such as age. The following 
subsection will now consider waiting time as a moral consideration. 
 
4.5.5 One More Putative Consideration: Time Waiting 
 
So far, this approach more or less mirrors Pennings’ view. We diverge, however, 
where he argues that the time the patient has spent waiting is morally relevant. Taking 
patients’ waiting time into account would mean that patients would no longer be excluded 
by having very low scores, as would happen to (among others) the older patients who are on 
lists with many young patients. This criterion is one that Pennings describes as ‘neutral’ 
(Pennings, 2001, p. 60). Pennings rightly suggests that this cannot be the sole consideration, 
as there are other morally relevant considerations at play also.  A “first come, first served” 
system will thus be inadequate as it fails to account for all of the relevant considerations. 
 Still, Pennings thinks that time spent waiting counts for something. His argument for 
this is twofold. He notes that it is ‘a way equally to distribute the opportunity of trying’. 
(Pennings, 2001, p. 60). The idea of distributing this opportunity equally has already been 
discussed and the problems therein exposed (see pages 115-118). Pennings’ second point is 
the ‘psychological effects of being put on a list’, with reference to ‘powerlessness’, 
‘uncertainty’, and ‘stress’ (Pennings, 2001, p. 60). 
 The psychological burden, however, might be mitigated if there is no expectation 
that patients will eventually receive treatment, and the practice of simply excluding patients 
who are likely to never receive treatment might remove this sense of expectation. At any 
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rate, the burden of being placed on such a list needs to be demonstrated, so the picture is 
thus unclear regarding the psychological issues of being on a waiting list. 
The proposal being made here is that patients do not get extra priority based on how 
long they have been waiting, as this is at best a backward-looking consideration that does 
not fit with the consequentialist framework being adopted here. This means that under the 
model being proposed here, a patient can be excluded if the list includes so many patients 
who score more highly than them in the priority system that they are unlikely to ever receive 
treatment. An example of this would be an older patient on a waiting list populated largely 
by younger patients. 
A more palatable way of conceiving of this denial of the moral relevance of waiting 
time is to recognise that under the priority and exclusion system being proposed, there is 
not really a “waiting list” at all. In reality, patients would be assessed for their suitability 
based on the criteria discussed in chapter four, and allocated points as a result of this 
assessment. They would thus be on a list of sorts, but not a waiting list. The patients with 
the most points would receive treatment, and the number of patients treated would 
correspond to the availability of gametes at that time. With all of the gametes allocated to 
the most suitable patients, those less suitable would not join any list, and be declined 
treatment straight away. We can refer to this as an “effective” or “de facto” exclusion – 
patients are not excluded because they are unsuitable for treatment, but rather because 
other patients who are more suitable are given priority. 
This gives rise to a kind of “temporal unfairness” by which patients may or may not 
receive treatment based on what the composition of the waiting list happens to be like 
when they are referred to the clinic. This may be likened to the postcode lottery, where 
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patients are (dis)advantaged because of where they live. The temporal unfairness issue 
seems insurmountable, however; it seems hugely impractical to maintain temporal fairness 
in a system that is perpetually and unpredictably changing, as in this case where there is no 
way of knowing how many and which donors and recipients will join the list. For this reason, 
we will have to put the temporal unfairness point to one side. 
 
This section has discussed some possible ways of interpreting the moral 
considerations that can arise in gamete allocation scenarios, favouring a non-absolute model 
over a lexical ordering model so as to ensure that morally relevant factors are sufficiently 
accounted for. The non-absolute model suggests that clinical staff should exclude patients, 
the treatment of whom will not be in the patient’s own interests, and then use a priority 
system to decide which of the remaining patients are most suitable for treatment. As many 
of the most suitable patients should be treated as resources allow, with the remaining 
patients being “effectively excluded” due to a combination of their lesser suitability for 
treatment, and the shortage of gametes. 
 
4.6 Weightings 
 
We now turn to the crucial question of how the welfare considerations described in 
section 4.3 are to be weighed up against our commitment to the principle of equality 
described in section 4.2, and how far we are required to secure welfare before this 
interferes impermissibly with equality. First we will consider how the more abstract 
philosophical values weigh together, for example equality and efficacy. For reasons of space 
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and scope, this thesis will not enter into detail about how all of the considerations in section 
4.3 should weigh against each other, for example how a patient’s substance abuse weighs 
against a violent history. The thesis argues that these factors should be afforded some 
weight, but how much weight each should have relative to every other factor would require 
more discussion than there is room for here. 
 
4.6.1 Weightings of Theories 
 
The following two subsections will comment on the existing philosophical debate 
about how some of these commitments to different theories should be weighed up. First, 
we will consider how far child welfare concerns allow us to deviate from equality, and 
second, we will consider how far considerations about treatment efficacy allow us to deviate 
from this. Child welfare, equality, and treatment efficacy are all concepts that have been 
highlighted as important in this chapter. 
 
4.6.1.1 Equality and Child Welfare 
 
Pennings’ discussion of measuring child welfare implicitly considers its status with 
regard to other commitments, one of which is equality. He considers a range of principles to 
guide our conduct with regard to child welfare: the maximum welfare principle, the 
minimum threshold principle, and the reasonable welfare principle. According to Pennings, 
‘[t]he maximum welfare principle implies that one should not knowingly and intentionally 
bring a child into the world in less than ideal circumstances’. Of the person-affectingness 
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problem described above, Pennings suggests that it ‘does not prevent us from comparing 
the quality of life of different children born in different settings’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1146). 
The analysis of the non-identity problem above (pages 51-56) was in agreement with this. 
This means that in gamete allocation, the maximum welfare principle requires us to consider 
all the children that could be created with the donors and recipients that we have available, 
and create the set of children with the highest predicted level of welfare. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this accords most with maximising versions of consequentialism. 
Next is the minimum threshold principle, which suggests that it is permissible to 
create any child as long as some minimum standard of its welfare is met. Pennings suggests 
that the wrongful life standard is ‘one of the most frequently used minimum thresholds’, and 
states that ‘[a]ccording to this principle, the child is only harmed if it is brought into 
existence with a life not worth living’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1148). 
The third and final putative principle that Pennings suggests is the reasonable welfare 
principle. He defines this as “intermediate” relative to the other two principles, and 
formulates it thus: ‘The provision of medical assistance in procreation is acceptable when 
the child born as a result of the treatment will have a reasonably happy life’ (Pennings, 1999, 
p. 1148). 
Strictly speaking, these principles are all interchangeable. We can render the 
maximum welfare and minimum threshold principles the same by stipulating that the 
minimum threshold is maximum welfare. We can similarly render the maximum welfare and 
reasonable welfare principles the same by stipulating that reasonable welfare is maximum 
welfare. The minimum threshold principle and reasonable welfare principles require even 
less manipulation when we consider that the minimum threshold might be considered 
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reasonable. Nevertheless, we can take the maximum welfare, minimum threshold, and 
reasonable welfare principles to (respectively) require maximum welfare, a very low level of 
welfare, and somewhere in between. 
 
4.6.1.1.1 Pennings and Maximising Welfare 
 
Pennings criticises the first two principles and advocates the third. Broadly, his 
criticism of the first principle, maximising welfare, has two parts, one theoretical and one 
practical. The simpler, practical issue is that actually accounting for all of the elements that 
can affect a child’s welfare is too complex: ‘[t]he concrete circumscription of all dimensions 
of the child welfare proves almost impossible’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1147). Given that this 
project aims to have practical applications for clinical staff, we should take this concern 
seriously, and it may be unrealistic to require or expect clinics to take so many factors into 
account. This, however, does not mean that some factors cannot be considered, so there still 
remains some room for making some child welfare assessments. Furthermore, there is a 
legal requirement that clinics do this, so unless we wish to challenge the law, this must be 
done. 
The theoretical problem is that maximising leads to the conclusion that ‘[p]eople who 
are poor, unemployed, handicapped, obese, workaholics, and/or old should all be rejected 
as potential parents since the child they will have would have had a better life had it been 
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born to other parents’25 (Pennings, 1999, p. 1147), and he considers this to be a ‘bias against 
some groups’. While it is not explicit, we can perhaps take Pennings to be appealing to 
considerations of equality as detailed in the previous section. Pennings is rightly resistant to 
courses of action that appear to discriminate against certain groups, but his defence of this 
kind of equality is not absolute: he points out that ‘we need evidence to support the 
differential attribution of welfare to different groups’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1147). While 
Pennings seems to condemn the practice of discriminating against these groups in order to 
maximise child welfare, his final move in this section is to suggest that differential treatment 
among these groups could be justified as long as there is sufficient evidence. Hence, it is not 
clear how far his commitment to equality among these groups stretches. Certainly we can all 
agree that there is no way to justify arbitrary discrimination among these groups, but what is 
on the table here is not arbitrary discrimination – it is discrimination with a view to 
maximising child welfare. At any rate, we can take Pennings as arguing that child welfare is 
not the only important consideration, and that maximisation of child welfare will 
compromise our commitments to equality to too great an extent. 
 
4.6.1.1.2 Pennings and Minimum Welfare 
 
For Pennings, the minimum threshold principle makes the opposite mistake. He 
rejects this view on the basis that it would permit the creation of children ‘whose prospects 
and opportunities are awful’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1148). Pennings suggests that this is 
                                                          
25 Of course, a child born to different parents is in many senses a different child altogether, but this is 
not important here. As we learned from the analysis above (pages 51-56), we can still sensibly make 
comparisons between different potential people in this way. 
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intuitively unappealing, but perhaps the intuitive force of this is diminished once we 
consider that Pennings uses “awful” here in a linguistically unfamiliar way, to mean “low but 
still higher than zero”. Indeed, the awfulness of this situation is very much contingent on 
where we place this minimum threshold, but we can take Pennings to mean that this 
threshold is a very low one. This kind of intuition is one he shares with Parfit, where Parfit 
rejects the ’repugnant conclusion’ (Parfit, 1984, pp. 387-388), arguing that a world 
populated with very many people, all with very low but higher than zero welfare, would be 
extremely undesirable. The rejection of a minimum welfare principle is consistent with the 
maximising approach being taken in this thesis (see pages 35-35): if we can improve child 
welfare at no extra cost to some other value or principle, we ought to do it. 
 
4.6.1.1.3 Pennings and Reasonable Welfare 
 
Pennings thinks that our decisions in these situations should promote a certain level 
of child welfare that is more than minimally above zero, but that above some point, the 
effort for welfare must be limited: 
 
We can reject procreation in alternative settings because the welfare level of the 
existing child is lower than the expected welfare level of another possible child that 
would have been born in (what we consider as) ideal circumstances. The existing 
child is harmed to the extent that it could have had a better life. This is an extremely 
strong standard. When we take the time to scrutinize the consistent application of 
this rule, we will soon find out that this standard would exclude the overwhelming 
majority of the population from procreation (Pennings, 1999, pp. 1146-1147) 
 
 
113 
 
 Importantly, given that Pennings’ discussion takes place within the context of 
fertility treatment, the word ‘population’ here has the narrow definition of referring to the 
population of people seeking fertility treatment. This has implications for the notion that 
‘the overwhelming majority’ of people would be excluded, because in fact if we are using the 
maximum welfare principle to decide amongst patients as Pennings describes, we are still 
treating the same number of patients than if we were using some other principle. The 
difference is who gets treated, not how many are treated. It would thus be wrong to read 
Pennings’ complaint as being that fewer patients would be treated. Rather, his concern is 
the resulting ‘bias against some groups’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1147) that the application of this 
principle would involve. For Pennings, the maximum welfare principle interferes to too great 
an extent with our commitment to secure equal treatment amongst patient groups. 
Unfortunately, Pennings does not give us much information about what is the right 
level of child welfare to seek. Beyond describing it as “reasonable”, he cites a few examples 
of things that could compromise child welfare unjustifiably, such that deviations from our 
principle of equality are permitted: 
 
[A]n individual has a decent welfare level when he has the abilities and opportunities 
to realize those dimensions and goals that in general make human lives valuable. All 
those conditions and defects which obstruct the pursuit of the normal human 
interests should be considered as harm to the person’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1148, 
emphasis added). 
 
 
If we take Pennings’ use of “all” in the preceding quotation seriously, then the child welfare 
standard is quite high, as the set of things that can constitute such an obstruction has many 
members. On the other hand, Pennings probably meant to use “obstruct” as a threshold 
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concept here, such that a condition must affect a child to a certain extent, rather than just 
obstruct it minimally. This is evidenced by his desire to find a middle ground between the 
maximum welfare and minimum threshold principles, and by his implicit endorsement of the 
fact that ‘[i]n reality we only criticise parents when they pursue their own goals although this 
has disastrous consequences for children’ (Pennings, 1999, p. 1148). 
Pennings continues: ‘[t]he deviations which cause the welfare level of the child to fall 
significantly below this baseline comparison state are sufficient reason to refuse treatment’ 
(Pennings, 1999, p. 1148). This claim raises the obvious question of what counts as 
“significantly” below his baseline comparison, and in the absence of this being fleshed out, 
all we can get from this statement is that welfare considerations do not take absolute 
priority over equality ones. 
Pennings’ argument against maximum welfare affords a different status to the 
principle of equality and justice that was our starting point. For Pennings, equality 
considerations serve to temper child welfare considerations. For this thesis, however, the 
commitment to equality is a starting point, but it is not a principle that has weight when 
compared to other considerations. This thesis is considering factors that can justify deviation 
from the equal treatment of patients, but we cannot argue that a factor is morally relevant 
such that it provides justification from deviation up to a certain point and no further – to do 
so would be arbitrary. Either child welfare is morally relevant or it is not, and, like in the case 
of Achilles described above (page 35), we are not justified in considering something “good 
enough” if we could do more at no cost to some other value. Equality is not a candidate for 
such a value. 
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4.6.1.2 – Equality and Efficacy 
 
The debate between Savulescu and Harris considers the relationship between 
equality and treatment efficacy, and their insights will provide a useful foil for considering 
this relationship in gamete allocation. This discussion is with reference to healthcare in 
general, not specifically applying to fertility treatment (though it is mentioned). As Savulescu 
points out, the debate tracks the wider philosophical issue of the value of goodness versus 
the value of fairness, discussed, for example, by Broome (1998). We will now consider this 
problem in more detail. 
Savulescu details an allocation system incorporating what he calls ‘a plateau 
(submaximising) threshold relationship’ (Savulescu, 1998a, p. 235). He contends that “Man 
C”, whose chance of success is 1/1,000,000, has less reason for wanting treatment than 
“Man A”, whose chance of success is 1/50, and that we can thus prioritise Man A on the 
basis of his better prognosis. So far this looks like a purely welfarist picture, but further 
considerations come into the picture that make this framework more egalitarian: Savulescu 
thinks that ‘[a]t some point, the probabilities are so close that any difference is not relevant 
to the old man’s reasons in this situation’ (Savulescu, 1998a, p. 232), and that this intuition is 
borne out when we consider the difference between people with a 1/50 chance and a 1/51 
chance. 
Savulescu sells his theory short here, as there is more to the story than just intuition. 
The irrelevance of reasons between cases with similar (but not equal) chances is based on 
Savulescu’s reasons-based theory of value, where he advocates a ‘threshold view of 
rationality’ (Savulescu, 1998b, 234). This is based on Slote’s satisficing view, which allows 
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that ‘an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough consequences, even 
though better consequences could have been produced in the circumstances’ (Slote and 
Pettit, 1984, p. 140). In Savulescu’s words this means ‘the state of affairs promoted must 
have an expected value which is good enough relative to other available alternatives’ 
(Savulescu, 1998a, p. 228, emphasis added). As with Pennings’ reasonableness criterion 
above (pp. 100-101), this gives rise to the use of thresholds. However, Savulescu’s thresholds 
are not absolute – they are relative to the alternatives. The relative threshold view means 
that ‘reasons are not so fine grained as to be sensitive to small changes in expected value’ 
(Savulescu, 1998a, p. 232). Incorporating thresholds that are relative to available alternatives 
is in effect the same as merely having a coarse-grained view that disregards small differences 
between outcomes. This means that there can be a difference between 1/50 chances and 
1/1,000,000 chances, but not between 1/50 and 1/51. The upshot of this is that patients 
with similar chances of success are not ranked against each other, but patients with vastly 
different chances are. 
Harris’s ideas about allocation are in contrast to this. Savulescu notes that ‘[o]ne 
consequence of [the] utilitarian decision procedure is what Harris calls de facto 
discrimination’ (Savulescu 1998: 215). This is the same as indirect discrimination as described 
above (pages 37-38). While Savulescu’s allocation system may incidentally arrive upon more 
egalitarian treatment decisions than a strict maximising model in that it does not allow for 
fine-grained distinctions between those with similar prognoses, this still does not give 
enough weight to equality to satisfy Harris: 
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I am not claiming that equal opportunities for health care are either intrinsic or 
instrumental goods, they are both and more […]. A denial of equal opportunities is a 
slap in the face; it is an existential rejection disproportionate to the value of the good 
or welfare that the opportunity might have afforded. So it is not the case that the 
opportunity is valuable only for what it is an opportunity to do or to be, nor is it 
merely valuable in itself. […Equal opportunities] are important because the denial of 
them is a rejection of equality and therefore an affront to human dignity (Harris, 
1999, pp. 399-400). 
 
 
 
Harris here claims that the “existential rejection” created by denying equal 
opportunities outweighs the value of the welfare being generated. If such an existential 
rejection always trumps the welfare being distributed, this means that where welfare 
considerations would require deviations from the distribution that respects equality of 
opportunity as Harris asks, they should be ignored. Where welfare considerations happen to 
accord with Harris’s equal opportunities (this could be rare because it would mean that the 
best distribution in terms of welfare happens to be the same as the one that distributes 
opportunities equally), then they can be satisfied, but note that this does not really afford 
any value to welfare at all; in this instance, commitments to welfare are only fulfilled 
because they incidentally coincide with prior commitments to equality. Harris’s insistence on 
equality of opportunity as opposed to equal distribution of the resource puts welfare on an 
even lower pedestal. This is because Harris’s affording equality of opportunity lexically prior 
status allows no room whatsoever for deviation based on considerations like welfare, except 
in unlikely cases where equality of opportunity considerations are equal. This offers us no 
help, as one starting point of this thesis was open-mindedness to the view that some 
considerations could permit deviations from equality. Hence, Harris’s view about the 
absolute importance of equality without regard for any other moral considerations is too 
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much of a hard line for what is being discussed here, as this thesis aims to be more pluralistic 
than this. 
Harris is unabashedly concerned with equal opportunities, apparently at any cost to 
welfare. Savulescu’s theory, on the other hand, is welfarist but pays some incidental heed to 
equality by ignoring small differences in welfare. While Savulescu’s claim is only convincing if 
we are convinced by Slote in the first place, it is more appealing for our purposes here in 
that it at least patronises a pluralistic value theory. While it may not place any theoretical 
value on equality, it is at least pragmatically palatable to those who have an interest in 
securing equality. Hence, we will proceed on the basis that Savulescu’s coarse-grained 
welfarist theory is the right one. 
 
4.7 National Allocation 
 
Pattinson notes that ‘[t]he absence of a body empowered to nationally coordinate 
the system of gamete donation means that approaches to the recruitment of gamete donors 
for treatment and research, and the allocation of donated gametes for treatment, vary 
between clinics’ (Pattinson, 2012, p. 577). He then goes on to describe the national 
allocation system used for organs and blood, and claims that ‘[t]he idea of adopting such a 
system for gamete donation, at least for treatment, has widespread support’ (Pattinson, 
2012, p. 578), though without further description of or evidence for this support. Examples 
of this support, however, might be the HFEA’s ‘Sperm, Egg and Embryo Donation (SEED)’ 
review survey, which reported clinical staff’s ‘suggestions to centralize gamete provision in 
form of a national recruitment program or a central donor bank’ (HFEA, 2004, p.5), or the 
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British Fertility Society (BFS)’s report calling for ‘a national framework of sperm donation 
services […], based on a ‘hub and spoke’ model’ (BFS, 2008). Importantly, this idea was 
advanced as a means of increasing the number of sperm donors, by making the system of 
donor recruitment more efficient. The system could also be used to increase the number of 
egg donors. If this would be the result, it is a strong reason in favour of having such a system, 
as it would confer additional benefit on patients. 
Pattinson’s arguments in favour of a national donation/allocation system are twofold: 
the first is that ‘it could remove  the significant regional variations and inequalities of access 
that currently beset the use of donor gametes in fertility treatment and it could enable 
centralised support for research uses of gametes’. This, he notes, is born from 
considerations of ‘justice, transparency, and equality’ (Pattinson, 2012, p. 593). Indeed, a 
national system may make it easier to implement standardised access criteria for treatment 
with donor gametes, so that whatever is deemed the best model for allocating gametes can 
be used across the country.26 
The second argument is slightly problematic. Pattinson says that ‘the national 
coordination of gamete donation [and allocation] would also enable the implementation of 
other methods of encouraging gamete donation’ (Pattinson, 2012, p. 594). He then goes on 
to describe mirror exchange schemes as outlined by Pennings (discussed above, pages 69-
71). The problem with this suggestion is that while it would indeed speak in favour of a 
national system if it facilitated the mirror scheme (see pages 69-71), it is not clear that the 
national system would make the mirror scheme any more viable, as such a scheme could be 
                                                          
26
 It is worth noting recent moves in Scottish legislation to standardise access criteria for fertility treatment 
(Scottish Government, 2013). 
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employed by individual clinics, as long as they were large enough. Still, the national system 
has in its favour that it may be fairer, more transparent, and less admitting of the personal 
biases about which Pennings is worried, assuming that the same democratic principles as 
espoused in this thesis are used. 
One consideration with regard to the implementation of such a system is the 
Levelling Down Objection. As Pattinson notes, a national system may reduce variation 
between clinics, and this may make the system fairer in the sense of providing more 
egalitarian outcomes. If, however, this comes at a cost, we would need to consider whether 
the benefits in fairness, and in potentially increased numbers of donors, are worth these 
costs, bearing in mind the Levelling Down Objection. This may depend on the nature of these 
costs, and whether they are borne by patients (perhaps financial resources would be 
diverted from elsewhere, ultimately resulting in fewer treatments). 
The ethical status of the national system seems to rest on empirical data about the 
practicalities of implementing it, and what its effects would be. It seems to be something 
that may be worth considering further in light of participants’ views in the empirical study. 
 
4.8 Guidelines and Test Cases 
 
This section will outline the conclusions that this chapter makes with regard to 
allocating gametes. This section will also include some discussion of how these guidelines 
might work in practice, using the cases from chapter two above as examples. 
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4.8.1 Guidelines 
 
While the current system merely asks for certain thresholds to be satisfied before a 
patient is eligible for treatment, there is some room for comparisons between patients, such 
that certain patients should be prioritised over others, for reasons other than just the 
amount of time that they have been waiting  on the list. 
The rationale for this idea of prioritising recipients comes partly from the scarcity of 
gamete donors. Given that the demand for gamete donors can be expected to remain high 
(in spite of the recently increased compensation for donation27), clinics can make stringent 
decisions about who can receive gametes without fear of wasting them, as there will likely 
be somebody else who is more suitable for treatment. This gives rise to the following 
conclusions: 
 
1) There should not be a presumption that patients will simply be treated in the order in 
which they arrive at the clinic or on the waiting list. A priority system should be 
adopted to ensure that as many morally relevant factors as is pragmatically viable are 
taken into account. 
 
Many of the remaining conclusions will relate to this first one, as they will describe 
which factors can legitimately be factored into the priority system. These factors should at 
least take the following into account: 
                                                          
27 As of April 1st 2012, sperm donors can be compensated up to £35 per clinic visit and egg donors 
can be compensated up to £750 per donation cycle. See HFEA (2013e) and (2013f). 
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First, child welfare and its high importance leads to the conclusion that: 
 
2) If any patient, any patient’s partner, or any person who is expected to have a 
significant role in rearing a child born of treatment, is revealed to have a continuing 
problem with substance use (including smoking), alcoholism, violence or domestic 
discord, this should be taken as a reason against further consideration of this patient 
for treatment. 
 
Currently, clinics are only required to “account for” such factors in their child welfare 
assessments, and there is no explicit suggestion that the presence of such factors should 
operate as a factor that completely excludes potential recipients (an “excluder”). It may be 
the case that clinics are risk-averse with regard to child welfare in practice (this could be 
either for their own sake, for the child’s, or for that of the patient) and so do regard these 
factors as excluders. This seemed like an important empirical issue to explore in the 
interviews. 
 These conclusions go further than the current HFEA Code of Practice. The ‘substance 
use’ criterion should be taken to also include smoking behaviour. There are good reasons for 
clinical staff to acknowledge that parents who are expected to smoke in the vicinity of 
children have the potential to cause harm to those children just as parents who use other 
substances do. Excessive use of alcohol or illegal drugs may be more likely to lead to 
additional neglect, but the direct harm caused by smoking should not be ignored. 
As a coverall for other potential scenarios that may affect child welfare, the following 
conclusion is made: 
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3) Any other factors that call into question (supported by evidence) the expected 
welfare of children affected by treatment, including the potential recipient’s ability to 
parent the child, should be seriously considered as reasons against treatment unless 
they can adequately demonstrate that such factors do not present a risk to child 
welfare. 
 
Similar child welfare issues bear on cases where parents risk passing on heritable 
diseases to their children, leading to the following conclusion: 
 
4) Patients who can reproduce without donor gametes, but who can only do so at the 
risk of passing on diseases, should be given some priority on this basis. 
 
This is based on the idea from Savulescu that, other things being equal, clinicians can take 
wider societal concerns into account. 
 Given the scarcity of resources, it makes sense to treat those who have the most to 
gain from treatment with regard to efficacy, and the least to lose with regard to their own 
welfare. 
 
5) Patients should be prioritised based on the chance of the treatment being successful, 
and the risks to their health of undergoing treatment, with those with higher chances 
and lower risks the higher priority. 
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 Clinics should not prioritise patients solely on the basis of their age, but age is a 
marker for other issues. Given that, in the case of sperm, these resources can be used with 
varying chances of success depending on the age of the patient, and that obstetric risks rise 
as patients get older it is recommended, as an application of recommendation 5), that: 
 
6) Younger patients should take priority over older ones, except in cases where there 
are so few younger patients that older patients are expected to be treated anyway. In 
such cases, the older patients should take priority. 
 
The exact application of this rule will depend on the number and age of the patients on the 
waiting list. The concept of exceptions for when “older patients are expected to be treated 
anyway” gives rise to one of the ramifications of this guideline: that there may be situations 
in which older patients, given the prioritisation of younger patients, are not expected to be 
treated anyway. It is true that in such cases, these patients are effectively excluded, and so 
in cases where there is genuinely no expectation that they will receive treatment, they 
should be told this straight away, rather than put on a list where they will never reach the 
top. 
Finally, while the wider commitments of health services (public and private) to 
equality and fairness might suggest that patients should not be refused treatment on the 
basis of arbitrary factors, conditional and known donation actually benefits everybody by 
removing competition from the waiting list. This gives rise to the next recommendation: 
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6) Gametes can be allocated on the basis of conditions set by the gamete donors, 
including conditions based on the protected characteristics in the Equality Act. 
 
Further to this, and as a result of the further advantages that can be gained with a mirror 
exchange scheme, the following is recommended: 
 
7) Patients who can recruit donors to donate to them, or to the general pool, should be 
given some priority. 
 
Given the possibility of increased psychological distress amongst those who are 
childless, the following recommendation is made: 
 
8) Parental status should be accounted for in prioritising patients, so that patients who 
have had less experience of parenting are prioritised over those who have had more 
experience of parenting. 
 
It is not having children per se that is important here, so this conclusion is sensitive to 
the good of the parenting experience (as opposed to, say, just having a genetically-related 
child but having no relationship with them). 
There is a lack of evidence to justify distinguishing between patients based on their 
membership of same-sex couples. This gives rise to: 
 
9) Patients should not be prioritised or de-prioritised based on their sexual orientation. 
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Next, given the commitments to maximising the value of scarce resources, the 
following conclusion is made on the basis that it will generate more welfare per treatment: 
 
10) Staff should give priority to parenting arrangements involving greater numbers of 
parents. 
 
Finally, the following is suggested as a possibility for increasing the number of gamete 
donors, and as a way of making the system fairer: 
 
11) A national allocation system should be considered (and is a candidate for further 
exploration in interviews). 
 
4.8.2 Test Cases 
 
Let us now consider what bearing these conclusions would have on the hypothetical 
cases presented in the prologue to this chapter. The solution to case one, Bob and Betty, is 
probably obvious. The history of violent discord between this couple and the fact that Bob 
has an alcohol problem would each count as an excluder on their own, derived from child 
welfare considerations. 
Case two, Jim and Alice, is more complicated. This is because they are a couple who 
do not need donor gametes in order to reproduce. Certainly they need assistance, but this 
does not need to be in the form of the donor egg that Jim and Alice would prefer over PGD. 
Treatment with an egg from Alice and sperm from Jim could be achieved, but this is not an 
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option because of the potential for the child to have Huntington’s disease, and our 
commitment to ensure the best outcome. While we need to give some weight to the fact 
that they would prefer treatment with a donor egg to PGD, the fact that this would be a use 
of gametes that could go to someone else when they could use Alice’s eggs and have PGD 
rules this out – the scarcity of gametes overrides individual considerations about Jim and 
Alice’s preferences in this instance, as the welfare of others must also be considered. Thus, 
given that there is another option available to Jim and Alice that will allow them to have a 
child without HD, they should not be treated with donor gametes if somebody else could be 
treated instead. 
The situation for Jane and Albert in case three is similar. Even though waiting much 
longer may compromise their ability to ever have children together, both the risk of gamete 
wastage through ineffective treatment and the increased obstetric risks speak for treating 
someone with a better chance of success. 
The discussion of known donors has shown that Tess and Emily, of case four, should 
be given some priority, given the benefit that this creates. For the same reasons, the 
anonymous donor ought to be able to make stipulations. Finally, with little evidence to 
support the idea that matching physical characteristics confers any benefit on a child or that 
failing to match causes welfare issues, it seems that Rajkumar and Gulab should have the 
gametes they prefer, if they are available. 
This concludes the philosophical analysis of gamete allocation ethics. The remainder 
of this project will comprise a description of the methods for the empirical work, a 
description of the results of the empirical work, and finally a discussion of these results in 
light of this philosophical discussion. This will culminate in a final list of conclusions about 
128 
 
ethical gamete allocation, based on and shaped by the themes identified in the existing 
philosophical literature and in the empirical study. 
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5. METHOD USED FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This section will outline the protocol for the empirical element of the project, 
beginning with a description of the compilation of the publicly available access criteria for 
treatment, and then providing a detailed description of the qualitative study. One of the 
aims of the project was to determine how fertility clinic staff actually use and interpret 
statute and guidelines in practice. As a preliminary way of achieving this, publicly available 
information was sought from the HFEA website, and from individual clinics’ websites, and a 
database of selection criteria compiled (see pages 160-188). 
 
5.2 The Qualitative Study 
 
5.2.1 Rationale 
 
Following this, an empirical study was undertaken (see pages 17-30 for the detailed 
rationale for this). It was necessary to communicate directly with clinical staff for two 
reasons. First, given that the first aim of the project was to ascertain what allocation criteria 
are actually used in practice (pages 18-19 for aims and objectives), it was necessary to 
explore how practitioners interpreted the relevant regulation and guidance. For this reason, 
merely consulting the documentation itself would be insufficient. Second, the project aimed 
to gain an understanding of the potentially complex ethical reasoning used by fertility clinic 
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staff, to establish how and why decisions are made about gamete allocation. This speaks to 
the first aim of the project (to establish how gametes are allocated) but also to the second: 
how gametes ought to be allocated, in that an account of the ethical views of clinical staff 
may help to establish what allocation practice should be. 
These aims gave rise to the need for a study that could paint a picture of the 
experiences of relevant informants, including staff members of fertility clinics, but also other 
relevant professionals, such as philosophers, policy-makers, and representatives of patient 
groups. Qualitative methods facilitate access to an understanding of the nuances and depths 
of participants’ experiences and ethical opinions, ‘in a depth which addresses the rich 
context that is the substance of their meanings’ (Jones, 1985, p. 46)28. This depth comes at 
the cost of breadth: the small sample sizes, and the non-random sampling methods, in each 
of the three data collection phases (described in detail below) mean that the results cannot 
be generalised to any larger population. They will, however, serve to provide a useful 
snapshot of some of the views of professionals whose roles are relevant to the research aims.  
This will help to ensure that the final conclusions made in this project are not purely abstract 
(Ives and Draper 2009), but have some relevance to real-world practitioners, especially given 
the workshop phase, where ‘stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and 
analysis’ (Widdershoven et al. 2009, p. 236). This helps to achieve the project’s second aim 
of determining how to allocate gametes, as it will mean that the conclusions have, to some 
extent, undergone the scrutiny of the kinds of people they will affect. 
 
                                                          
28 Jones is referring to interviews here, but the point applies to qualitative methods generally. 
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5.2.2 Overview 
 
Figure 1 – Relationship between Theory and Data 
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Figure 1 above shows the data collection phases and how they occurred alongside 
philosophical theory. The arrows show which stages of the project influenced which. The 
preliminary philosophical analysis influenced the design of the first data collection phase. 
The results of this phase were then used to modify the conclusions of this theory, resulting in 
empirically-informed revised theory. This revised theory itself influenced phase 1 data 
collection, where later interviews probed concepts that previous participants had raised. 
Once phase one data collection was complete, the themes that had been identified 
by both the philosophical analysis and the data were made into a set of philosophical 
conclusions, which were presented at the workshop at phase 2. Emerging themes and 
discussion were then used to revise the conclusions further. Where these discussions 
seemed incomplete, participants were invited to participate in phase three interviews, so 
that further elements of these concepts could be explored in greater depth. The data from 
phase three was then used to fine-tune the philosophical conclusions, resulting in the final 
set of conclusions shown in chapter seven. 
 
5.3 Philosophical Stance and Method 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis to generate a set of philosophically robust yet 
practically useful conclusions for clinical staff provides a reason for designing a study that 
will generate tangible, useful data. This makes the critical theory paradigm, as described by 
Guba and Lincoln, an appropriate approach because the thesis partly needs to provide ‘the 
critique and transformation of the […] structures that constrain and exploit humankind’ 
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(Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 113) in relation to gamete donation. The overarching notion of 
aiming at change and reform make this an appropriate paradigm for the project. 
The epistemological position to be adopted in this study, however, is one that falls 
slightly further to one side of Guba and Lincoln’s spectrum, nearer to the 
positivist/postpositivist position. More specifically, a brand of positivism known as “weak 
verification”, put forth by Ayer, is employed in the study. Ayer’s verification suggests that 
propositions can only be true if they are at least conceptually verifiable. This means that we 
need to be able to conceive of a situation in which the statement under scrutiny could be 
verified as true, but not that we need to be in a position to carry this out. Ayer presents the 
following example to demonstrate this principle of conceptual verification:  
 
No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look at the 
farther side of the moon, so that I am unable to decide the matter by actual 
observation. But I do know what observations would decide it for me, as is 
theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them. And therefore I say 
that the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice, and is accordingly 
significant (Ayer, 2001, p. 36). 
 
 
For the purposes of the empirical study, it is thus taken that propositions about what 
clinicians both do in practice and about how they feel about such practice are verifiable. 
Happily, they are verifiable in practice as well as in principle, as long as it is accepted that 
participants’ reports are mostly reliable. 
Verification can take two forms, strong and weak. Both are discussed by Ayer. He 
distinguishes them thus: ‘the question that must be asked about any putative statement of 
fact is not, Would any observations make its truth or falsehood logically certain? [strong 
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verification], but simply, Would any observations be relevant to the determination of its truth 
or falsehood?’29 (Ayer, 2001, p. 38) This means that we arrive at truth in a probabilistic 
fashion, such that if evidence can be mounted in support of a proposition, this gives us a 
reason (albeit a reason that could be outweighed by countervailing evidence) for believing it. 
Soames paraphrases Ayer’s view thus: ‘a statement that can play a role in explaining or 
predicting observations must be meaningful’ (Soames, 2003, p. 284). 
The chosen method in the study will not allow for generalisations to be made to 
wider populations of fertility clinic staff, but this epistemological stance can still apply to the 
study population, and still reflects (and is crucial to) the manner in which data was analysed 
in the project. Weak verification only asks for evidence to support conclusions, rather than 
for evidence that creates certainty about conclusions.30 This allows room for interpretation, 
such that if there is uncertainty about data (for example, what a participant’s statement is 
meant to mean), we can still make inferences and come to conclusions as long as that data 
goes some of the way towards a certain conclusion. 
 The purpose of taking this particular epistemological stance is to maximise the data’s 
usefulness in practice. An approach to knowledge like this, which ‘assume[s] an objective 
external reality upon which inquiry can converge’, and ‘enables the investigator to 
determine “how things really are” and “how things really work”’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 
111) will allow us to make bolder claims from the data about what staff do and what they 
believe, and gives a better foundation from which to create conclusions that can affect how 
things are and how things work in the future, compared with more relativist or constructivist 
                                                          
29 Ayer introduces some further complications to this principle but they should not trouble us here. 
30 Indeed, the principle of weak verification is compatible with the denial of the possibility of 
certainty. 
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paradigms that take a more fluid and skeptical approach to what can be known (see for 
example Dunn and Ives, (2009)). Of course, as with any claim, there always exists the 
possibility that the study’s data is in some way inaccurate. The probabilistic approach to 
knowledge adopted here acknowledges this possibility, but nevertheless this positivistic 
position allows us to assume the truth of the data in order to develop useful conclusions. 
 
5.4 Study Execution 
 
Phase one was an interview phase undertaken with staff at fertility clinics, the 
purpose of which was to determine how legal and clinical guidance was interpreted in 
practice, and the ethical opinions of practitioners about this practice. Asking practitioners 
directly offered deeper insight into the complexities of and reasoning behind their practices 
and opinions. 
Phase two was a workshop involving practitioners, academics, policy-makers, 
representatives of patient groups, and other relevant professionals. The purpose of this was 
to present preliminary findings to professionals. These findings comprised an ethical 
discussion which took phase one data into account. This process sought these professionals’ 
input on the acceptability and practicality of the philosophical conclusions, so that these 
conclusions could be revised and strengthened for greater philosophical rigour, but also 
impact and practical use. 
Phase three data collection appears as a cut-out in figure 1 to show that its 
occurrence was contingent on whether it was deemed necessary based on the analysis of 
phase one and phase two data. This was a final interview phase to discuss particular relevant 
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issues in greater detail, either with individuals who had attended previous data collection 
phases and who appeared to be able to offer greater insight, or with individuals who had not 
been able to attend previous phases but whose input was considered to add value to the 
project and its findings. This helped to strengthen conclusions relating to areas of discussion 
at the workshop that had been identified as requiring further empirical input. 
  
5.4.1 Sampling and Recruitment 
 
5.4.1.1 Phase One 
 
5.4.1.1.1 Sampling 
 
This interview phase made use of purposive sampling for maximum variation so that a 
broad range of clinics could be represented, in the spirit of the project’s aims with regard to 
the quotation from Mill above (page 19). Clinics were selected from those on the HFEA 
website, which lists all of the HFEA-licensed clinics. Sampling was based on finding clinics 
that, between them, had all of the following characteristics: 
 
 Located in England 
 Located in Wales 
 Located in Scotland 
 Located in Northern Ireland 
 Treats same-sex couples 
 Does not treat same sex couples 
 Offers NHS-funded treatment 
 Does not offer NHS-funded treatment (private) 
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 Allows “known donor” donation 
 Does not allow “known donor” donation 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, information about some of the above criteria was not readily available 
publicly, not being published on the HFEA website, nor on clinics’ individual websites. Given 
the increased difficulty in obtaining information about whether a clinic would offer 
treatment to same-sex couples, it was decided that this criterion should no longer form part 
of the sampling process, and that the interviews themselves may reveal information about 
clinical practice in these cases. 
Fifteen clinics were originally selected so that each interview could be undertaken at 
a different clinic, ranging across the criteria above (excluding the criteria about same-sex 
couples). Some clinics, however, declined to take part, and so alternative clinics needed to 
be approached. Because of this, and given the small number of clinics that, according to the 
HFEA website, did not allow known donation, it was not possible to recruit a clinic from this 
category. 
In addition, Research and Development (R&D) permissions were required for each 
NHS clinic (because each clinic was in a different Trust – a consequence of gaining the 
desired geographical spread), and management permissions were required for private clinics. 
In some cases this process was so lengthy that alternative clinics were approached in order 
to expedite the process of recruitment and data collection, to ensure that the project would 
finish on time. This meant that there was an element of chance involved in selection, where 
clinics that were more willing to take part and/or had more efficient R&D processes were 
more likely to be involved in the study. It also meant that for the sake of ease and 
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convenience, multiple interviews were sometimes undertaken at the same clinic (up to a 
maximum of three from each clinic), where the original intention was to interview fifteen 
participants from fifteen different clinics. This results in less diversity of clinics, but different 
perspectives on the same clinic were gained. Seven of these permissions were ultimately 
gained in total, in order to interview at seven different clinics – there were two clinics for 
which the process was begun but abandoned. Table 6 below shows the total number of 
clinics approached, their locations, the services offered at each (with regard to the criteria 
described on the previous page, and whether the R&D process was begun at the relevant 
Trust for that clinic. 
 
Table 6 – Clinics Approached for the Study 
 
 
Number Name Location Services Offered Status 
Offers 
NHS-
funded 
treatment 
Treats 
same-
sex 
couples 
Accepts 
known 
donors 
 
1 
Birmingham 
Women’s 
Hospital 
 
Birmingham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D 
permissions 
attained 
 
2 
London 
Women’s 
Clinic 
 
London 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
3 
Glasgow 
Centre for 
Reproductive 
Medicine 
 
Glasgow 
 
X 
 
? 
 
 
Management 
permissions 
attained 
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4 
Regional Fertility Centre  
Belfast 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
R&D permissions begun 
but not attained 
 
5 
Leicester Fertility Centre  
Leicester 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
R&D permissions 
attained 
6 The Bridge Centre London  ?  Approached 
7 IVF Wales Cardiff  ?  R&D permissions 
attained 
 
8 
Edinburgh Assisted 
Conception Unit 
 
Edinburgh 
 
 
 
? 
 
X 
 
Approached 
9 Origin Fertility Care Belfast X ?  Approached 
10 Bourn Hall Clinic Cambridge  ?  Management 
permissions attained 
11 Bath Fertility Centre Bath  ?  R&D permissions begun 
but not attained 
 
12 
Centre for Reproductive 
and Genetic Health 
 
Camden, London 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
13 
Aberdeen Fertility Centre  
Aberdeen 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
R&D permissions 
attained 
 
14 
Glasgow Royal Infirmary  
Glasgow 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
R&D permissions 
attained 
 
 
15 
Centre for Reproduction 
and Gynaecology Wales 
 
 
Llantrisant 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
X 
 
 
Approached 
16 Brentwood Essex ? ?  Approached 
 
17 
Herts and Essex Fertility 
Centre 
 
Cheshunt (near 
Enfield) 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
18 Oxford Fertility Unit Oxford  ?  Approached 
 
19 
Midland Fertility Services Aldridge, West 
Midlands 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
20 
Peninsular Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
 
Exeter 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
21 
Newcastle Fertility Centre 
at Life 
 
Newcastle 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
22 
The Leeds Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
 
Leeds 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
23 Arrowe Park Fertility Clinic Wirral  ?  Approached 
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24 Ninewells Hospital Dundee  ?  Approached 
25 Ayrshire Fertility Unit Kilmarnock  ?  Approached 
26 Manchester Fertility 
Services Ltd 
 
Manchester 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
 
27 
The James Cook University 
Hospital 
 
Middlesbrough 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
Approached 
28 Reproductive Medicine 
Clinic 
Bristol  
 
 
? 
 
X 
 
Approached 
 
 
 
A limited snowballing approach (Bryman, 2012, p.202) to recruitment was also used. 
When being invited to the study, staff members were encouraged to pass on recruitment 
information to relevant colleagues. This means that clinics as a whole may have engaged in 
self-selection of individual participants within them. 
 
5.4.1.1.2 Inclusion Criteria 
 
The inclusion criteria for participation in phase one were: donor coordinators and 
those whose occupational role gave them significant influence in the gamete allocation 
process, including those who had such influence over admission to waiting lists. This could 
include the directors of the clinics or other clinical staff. These people were considered to be 
the group with the greatest knowledge and first-hand experience of how allocation decisions 
are made. 
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5.4.1.1.3 Exclusion Criteria 
 
Only those who were unwilling to participate, those with whom a suitable time for 
interview could not be arranged, or those working at clinics where R&D permissions could 
not be obtained, were excluded from participation in the study. 
 
5.4.1.1.4 Recruitment 
 
Initial contact was made with potential participants by post (Appendices 1, 2, and 3). 
Separate letters were sent to directors of clinics and to donor coordinators – those 
responsible for managing donors. These individuals were invited to assist with the snowball 
sampling described above (page 140). If no response was received after two weeks, they 
were sent a reminder letter (see Appendix 6) by post. If there was no reply to this, they were 
not contacted again. 
 
5.4.1.2 Phase Two 
 
5.4.1.2.1 Sampling 
 
Participants were purposively sampled to ensure that the workshop included 
representatives of fields, disciplines, and organisations that would give the analysis the 
benefit of the scrutiny of philosophers, bioethicists, sociologists, healthcare practitioners, 
policy-makers, and those representing stakeholder/patient groups (see the Limitations 
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section on pages 256-260 for a discussion of why individual patients were not included). We 
aimed to recruit approximately thirty participants to the workshop. The number of 
participants was constrained by the available budget (the study paid for participants’ travel 
expenses), but it was also judged that thirty participants would suffice to include the desired 
range of disciplinary and professional perspectives, and to explore the philosophical 
conclusions and the theory from which they were derived, so that they could be modified 
and refined in the way that Beauchamp and Childress suggest (as was discussed on page 27 
above). 
 
5.4.1.2.2 Inclusion Criteria 
 
Inclusion criteria were broader for phase two than for phase one. Eligibility was 
limited to anyone with a professional (not necessarily clinical) role connected to the 
allocation of gametes in practice, or as a concept, from the perspective of policy, or 
representatives relevant stakeholder organisations, in particular support groups for patients. 
This included those involved in forming policy, and academics. In addition, all participants 
from phase one were invited to participate in phase two (eight of whom attended) as a form 
of respondent validation where phase one participants were able to comment on the 
presentation of the themes that had arisen in the interviews. The purpose of this was to 
‘seek confirmation that the researcher’s findings and impressions [were] congruent with the 
views of those on whom the research was conducted’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 391). This confers 
some credibility on the results, as it provided these participants with the opportunity to 
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challenge the interpretation of the data if they thought their views were being 
misrepresented. 
 
5.4.1.2.3 Exclusion Criteria 
 
Nobody fitting the above description was excluded, except for those who chose not 
to participate, or were unable to participate for practical reasons. 
 
5.4.1.2.4 Recruitment 
 
Participants who had left contact details at phase one and agreed to further contact 
at phase two were contacted in the manner that they had expressed preference for (for 
example email, phone, or text message). Other potential participants were invited by post 
(see Appendices 8 and 9). If no response was received after two weeks, they were sent a 
reminder letter (see Appendix 6) by post. If there was no reply to this, they were not 
contacted again. 
 
5.4.1.3 Phase Three 
 
5.4.1.3.1 Sampling 
 
 This data collection phase made use of purposive and theoretical sampling. One of 
the participants was somebody who was unable to attend the workshop. This participant 
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was purposively sampled because they were a representative of a patient group. They were 
considered to potentially have interesting and relevant opinions, and to be able to add to 
the patient representation among the participant group. The other two participants had 
participated in the workshop, and were theoretically sampled on the basis that their views 
were of particular interest, or presented particular challenges that required further detailed 
exploration. 
 
5.4.1.3.2 Inclusion Criteria 
 
 Inclusion criteria for this phase were narrow. Following the workshop, the research 
team met and discussed their preliminary impressions of the data. Participants were 
selected on the basis that they would add more detail and rigour to the arguments that the 
research team thought, on the basis of this meeting, were emerging in the data as being 
important. 
 
5.4.1.3.3 Exclusion Criteria 
 
Nobody fitting the above description was excluded, except for those who chose not 
to participate, or were unable to participate for practical reasons.  
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5.4.1.3.4 Recruitment 
 
 Participants in phase three were all contacted by email, as they had all agreed to this 
method of contact after having been approached previously with regard to participation in 
other phases. 
 
5.4.2 Data Collection 
 
5.4.2.1 Phase One 
 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviews were semi-
structured to allow participants to speak about practices or concerns that they themselves 
found relevant and interesting, but simultaneously to allow the interviewer to ensure that 
the interview considered each of the research questions in enough depth (Taylor 2005: 40). 
A topic guide (Appendix 7) was used, which included a list of prompts and was divided into 
three sections, so that the interviewer could ensure that all the relevant subjects were 
covered. The topic guide assumed that the interviews would last approximately one hour. 
The topic guide included questions designed to address key topics that the study 
aimed to explore. In particular, the topic guide was constructed so that where possible, the 
interview sections began with simple information-gathering questions, leaving more 
sensitive questions until later as a means of easing the participant into the interview and 
allowing them to relax (Fontana and Frey, 1994, p. 371; Taylor, 2005, p. 45). The first 
question on the topic guide was ‘how does the clinic decide who to put on the waiting list for 
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donated gametes?’, whereas the last was a more specific question that asked for an opinion: 
‘what do you think about the idea of a national waiting list for donors and recipients?’ All 
questions on the topic guide were very open ended, allowing participants to interpret and 
answer the questions in whatever way they felt to be most appropriate. The loose structure 
of the interviews allowed the interviewing researcher to probe areas of interest that the 
participant had mentioned, but ensured that participants could steer the interview towards 
issues they felt pertinent. Allowing the participant to raise issues themselves is consistent 
with the approach to empirical bioethics proposed by Borry et al. being used in this thesis (as 
discussed above on page 28), which suggests that one of the principal purposes of the data is 
to help identify moral problems. 
The interviews were structured in a way that would reflect the theory-driven nature 
of the relationship between theory and data, as described above (pages 24-30). The 
questions posed by the interviewer were theoretically underpinned in two ways. First, the 
preliminary review of literature and philosophical work gave rise to certain theoretical areas 
of interest that the research team felt it pertinent to explore. A particular example of this is 
the theme of child welfare. The statutory obligations for those providing fertility treatment 
place great emphasis on securing child welfare, and as such there is a wealth of philosophical 
literature about this concept. As a result, this question was sometimes directly posed to 
interview participants if they had not mentioned it already. This was also true of other issues 
that had arisen in the theoretical, pre-empirical part of the project. 
Second, an iterative theoretical approach was used in some cases to generate 
interview questions. Where concepts arose from the data as being pertinent and interesting, 
these were sometimes used as prompts in later interviews. Bryman defines a prompt as 
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occurring ‘when the interviewer suggests a possible answer to a question’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 
224). This helped to generate rich data with regard to the concepts that had arisen in earlier 
interviews, and in establishing whether those earlier views would be held by many other 
participants, or whether they would be outliers. As an example, as the issue of age cut-offs 
became increasingly prevalent in earlier interviews, participants in later interviews were 
sometimes asked about this issue specifically. These prompts, however, were used only after 
each participant had been given the chance to identify concepts that they themselves found 
salient. 
The iterative approach thus applied not only between the three data collection 
phases (as exemplified in figure 1 above), but also within the first phase, where interview 
questions were altered in light of previously collected data from the same phase. This 
iterative approach also created the added practical advantage of allowing the later 
interviews to take place concurrently with the analysis of earlier ones. 
 
5.4.2.2 Phase Two 
 
The purpose of the workshop was to generate feedback and critical comment on the 
preliminary philosophical conclusions of the project, so that they could be revisited, 
modified, and strengthened. The workshop31 began with a warm up exercise, during which 
participants were asked to rank some hypothetical gamete allocation cases in the order in 
which they felt they should be treated. This exercise served a number of purposes. To begin 
                                                          
31 The workshop programme and warm up exercise are contained in the workshop summary 
document (Appendix 18). 
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with, it helped familiarise participants with the kinds of issues that would arise throughout 
the day. Second, the results of it were also used later to elucidate the differences between 
how participants would prioritise patients, and how the philosophical analysis presented 
above argued that they should be prioritised. These differences are considered in the 
discussion of the results (pages 256-318). 
The workshop then featured a presentation32 of the study’s initial results, to gauge 
the feedback of the participants to the preliminary philosophical conclusions (in line with 
objective v) above (page 18)). In accordance with the Millian idea above (page 19) of 
including a variety of voices to the debate, this was followed by three presentations from 
invited speakers, who had been sent a summary of the main presentation and invited to 
respond from a specific perspective, with one participant speaking as a philosopher and 
HFEA member, another speaking as a patient group representative, and another speaking as 
a policy-maker. The audience was invited to ask questions and raise concerns throughout 
the event, and they participated in facilitated breakout group sessions in order to interact in 
smaller numbers and discuss certain elements of the debate in greater detail. These were 
similar to focus groups, giving participants the opportunity to speak in a different 
environment that they may have found more comfortable than the larger group discussions. 
This is consistent with Morgan’s idea, considered by Bryman, that small groups like this are 
appropriate ‘when topics are controversial or complex and when gleaning participants’ 
personal accounts is a major goal’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 507). These discussions were led by 
facilitators either from the research team or the same department as the research team, so 
that they could make use of probing and prompting (Bryman, 2012, pp. 223-224) in order to 
                                                          
32 Slides from this presentation are appended (Appendix 19). 
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stimulate discussion. The facilitators met prior to the meeting so that less informed 
members could be briefed about the project and so that an agreed strategy could be 
outlined and followed to give some unanimity to the groups. These breakout groups were 
semi-structured to strike a balance between allowing participants to lead the debate (Taylor, 
2005, p. 40) and ensuring that discussion remained relevant (McCracken, 1988, p. 22) with 
facilitators and participants guided by prompt slips33 containing four questions for the 
participants to focus on. 
Each breakout group was asked to focus its attentions on a particular question in the 
first instance, to avoid each group focusing on the same issue and neglecting others. 
All of the presentations and discussions were audio recorded. This includes the 
breakout groups, which were each recorded individually. These audio data were then all 
transcribed verbatim, so that they could undergo thematic analysis to identify critical or 
supporting comments on the preliminary suggestions for allocation criteria. 
 
5.4.2.3 Phase Three 
 
The questions for the two participants who had attended the workshop at phase two 
were constructed largely on the basis of comments that they had made at the workshop. 
Similar to the reason for having breakout groups in the workshop, this allowed participants 
to go into greater detail and complexity in their criticisms and comments of specific issues 
relating to gamete allocation. In this way, the data collection at phase three also took the 
iterative approach, using data from previous phases to inform data collection in later phases. 
                                                          
33 See Appendix 20. 
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It was deemed necessary to provide a platform that would allow further elaboration than 
the workshop would allow, so interview questions for the third participant were slightly 
more general given that (s)he had not participated in the study previously. The questions 
were still directed at topics that had arisen from the data, with a view to refining and 
modifying the philosophical conclusions that had been drawn relating to those topics. The 
interviews in phase three were thus more theoretically oriented than phase one interviews – 
a brief set of questions was drawn up for each interview, with questions and comments 
written specifically for each participant (see Appendix 19). These interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed as with phases one and two. This is with the exception of one 
participant, who requested to be emailed a list of questions to which (s)he provided a 
written response. For the sake of convenience, this phase will still be referred to as an 
interview phase. 
 
5.4.3 Analysis 
 
5.4.3.1 Phase One 
 
Transcripts were coded using NVivo software. Qualitative analysis software ‘serves to 
facilitate an accurate and transparent data analysis process whilst also providing a quick and 
simple way of counting who said what and when, which in turn, provides a reliable, general 
picture of the data’ (Welsh, 2002, p. 3). We might modify this slightly to “accounting for” for 
a more accurate picture, as there was no “counting” as such in the analysis undertaken here. 
This is more in line with the goals of this study in establishing concepts themselves rather 
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than how many people subscribe or agree to those concepts. As McCracken puts it, ‘[t]he 
purpose of the qualitative interview is not to discover how many, and what kinds of, people 
share a certain characteristic. It is to gain access to the cultural categories and assumptions 
according to which one culture construes the world’ (McCracken, 1988, p. 17). We are 
therefore not interested in counting. 
The data underwent thematic analysis closely mapping the process described by 
Braun and Clarke. Braun and Clarke suggest that their method is aligned with ‘constructionist 
paradigms’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 78). While this may seem slightly at odds with the 
positivistic outlook being adopted in this thesis, the element of ‘theoretical freedom’ (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p. 78) that this provides actually facilitated an important goal of the 
project. This was to allow the data to provide themes not previously identified, 
independently of theory, so that participants’ own views on which moral issues in gamete 
allocation are salient could be represented. The emphasis on a primary purpose of data as 
being theme identification reflects the fact that this project follows Borry et al. in terms of its 
use of empirical data, as discussed above (page 28). Here, the data helped to identify, shape, 
and assess the moral questions at hand. 
This method of analysis included the following steps: familiarisation with the data 
through transcription, re-reading and annotation of transcripts with initial ideas; generation 
of codes and themes; and finally, generation of visual thematic maps to demonstrate the 
relationships between themes. 
The thematic analysis did not include hypotheses or presuppositions about what the 
participants’ views would be about each theme, nor which themes they would introduce or 
focus on. It was, however, partly driven by the philosophical discussion undertaken in 
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chapter four, which meant that the identification of codes was guided by the themes that 
had been identified by the philosophical analysis, both directly in terms of the thematic 
analysis, and indirectly as the topic guide was influenced by the philosophical analysis. This 
means that the data analysis took a combined approach, in part using directed analysis in 
that theory-driven themes were identified, and in part using conventional analysis in that 
space was given for themes to arise from the data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
Participants’ responses were categorised to fit within the broader ethical categories 
defined in the philosophy chapter. For example, if a participant suggested that a certain 
practice was “unfair” because it favoured one type of person over another, this might have 
been categorised as a consideration relating to equality as defined in the philosophy chapter. 
In this way, the philosophical theory provided a pre-existing ethical framework in which 
participants’ views could be placed. This relates to Frith’s claim that ‘ethical theory is a body 
of knowledge that can be brought to bear on different issues and used as an analytic tool’ 
(Frith, 2012, p. 202). 
The method of integrating the data with the philosophical analysis was to identify 
themes and categories, and then consider each of them in terms of their coherence with the 
theories and conclusions laid out in the philosophical analysis. This process of searching for 
coherence between data and theory, and modifying either if necessary to achieve coherence, 
follows the reflexive balancing approach described by Ives (2013).  In some cases, the 
principles offered by participants were slightly ambiguous, and could be interpreted such 
that they achieved sufficient coherence with the philosophical analysis. In other cases, 
principles were rejected by virtue of being unable to achieve this coherence. Finally, in cases 
where there was high dissonance between the general participant view and the 
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philosophical analysis, the philosophical conclusions were supplemented or altered in order 
to account for these views. Normally, this was for the pragmatic reason that any conclusion 
likely to face a high level of opposition may have little practical value (as per the discussion 
of Huxtable on page 25 above). The conclusions of this integrative process formed the 
preliminary conclusions that were presented at the workshop in phase two. 
Participants sometimes seemed surprised by some of the questions in the interview. 
While the topic guide was provided for participants to read in advance, the invitation to do 
so did not make sufficiently clear that it would be useful for them to consider the questions 
in advance. Owing to this, analysis of data in these instances took on a more hermeneutic 
flavour than was originally intended, as it was not always clear what the participants’ 
justifications were. This meant that sometimes it was necessary to make an interpretive 
judgement about what the ethical underpinning of a participant’s view might be, as they 
were sometimes unable to articulate this themselves or consider the subject at this more 
abstract level. This aligns the analysis with the “interpretive reading” approach to qualitative 
analysis described by Mason: ‘An interpretive reading will involve you in constructing or 
documenting a version of what you think the data mean or represent, or what you think you 
can infer from them. […Y]ou will be involved in reading through or beyond the data in some 
way’ (Mason, 1996, p. 149). This fits with the epistemological approach being taken here, 
where data is seen as providing support for conclusions in a probabilistic manner (pages 132-
135). 
Two of the coded transcripts were independently checked by members of the 
supervisory team in order to check that all theoretically relevant themes were being 
identified. Additionally, the research team met and discussed the themes emerging from the 
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data as this analysis progressed. Once again, as interviews took place concurrently with 
these discussions, the process of interviews and analysis was iterative, with the analysis of 
some interviews affecting what might be explored in others. The data analysis was thus both 
theoretically- and data-driven. 
 
5.4.3.2 Phase Two 
 
Phase two data analysis was similar to that for phase one, though with some 
differences. It was much more theory-driven than that of phase one. Themes and important 
issues were by this stage already established, both by the philosophical analysis and by the 
analysis of data at phase one. By this stage the aim was not to introduce or identify new 
themes, but to focus on fine-tuning particular concepts, so the process of coding took a 
more directed approach. An example of this is child welfare. Child welfare had already 
emerged as a theme, both from the philosophical analysis (which identified this as important 
in part due to the legal requirement to consider child welfare in the HFE Act), and from the 
interviews at phase one. Phase two considered this concept in greater detail, discussing the 
moral weighting of this concept, for example whether child welfare should be considered 
“paramount” and whether paramountcy meant it was a trumping consideration, or just a 
heavily weighted one. In this way, the themes that arose in phase two were interrogated for 
agreement with the earlier philosophical conclusions, and where possible, interpreted in 
ways that made them cohere with these conclusions. Analysis for phase two was thus 
focussed on developing and examining the content and meaning of themes that had already 
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been identified. This is consistent with the aims of phase two as strengthening and 
scrutinising the initial philosophical recommendations that were presented at this stage. 
 
5.4.3.3 Phase Three 
 
Phase three analysis was again not concerned with identifying any new themes, and 
was thus purely theory-driven. This phase aimed to discuss previously-identified themes and 
concepts in further detail if it was felt that participants would have something to add. This 
means that the analysis for this phase followed a similar process as described for phase one, 
but omitted the preliminary theme-identifying stage, and only included the reflexive 
balancing part in which data and theory were modified for coherence. 
 
5.4.4 Consent 
 
5.4.4.1 Phase One 
 
Participants were given information sheets (Appendix 4) at least 24 hours prior to 
interview, and were given the opportunity to ask any questions about the interview or the 
study before beginning the interview. All participants gave written consent (Appendix 5) to 
take part, following this consent interview with the researcher. On giving their consent to 
phase one, participants were also invited to consent to being contacted about phases two 
and three. It was made clear on the consent form that consenting to earlier phases did not 
commit them to consenting in later phases. 
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5.4.4.2 Phase Two 
 
Participants were given information sheets (Appendix 11) at least 24 hours prior to 
the workshop, and were given the opportunity to ask any questions about the workshop or 
the study prior to arrival. All participants gave written consent (see Appendix 12) on arrival 
at the workshop venue. On giving their consent to phase two, participants were also invited 
to consent to being contacted about phase three.  
 
5.4.4.3 Phase Three 
 
Participants were given information sheets (Appendix 13) at least 24 hours prior to 
interview, and were given the opportunity to ask any questions about the interview or the 
study before beginning the interview. All participants then gave written consent (see 
Appendix 14).  
 
5.4.5 Ethical review and local R&D 
 
A favourable opinion (reference 11/WM/0099) for the study was obtained from a 
Research Ethics Committee in the West Midlands. R&D permissions were also obtained from 
each of the Trusts governing the clinics at which interviews took place. Management 
permissions were obtained from private clinics. Evidence of the favourable opinion and of 
these approvals can be found appended to this thesis (Appendices 20 and 21). 
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This concludes the description of the empirical study, and the justification of the 
methodology used. 
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6. RESULTS 
 
6.1 Tables of Publicly-Available Access Criteria 
 
 The tables below contain publicly-available information on access criteria for fertility 
treatment in the UK, collected to meet objective i) described on page 18. These data relate 
to actual access criteria at individual clinics, which may differ from funding criteria as 
stipulated by the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) that manages funding for that clinic. 
All data is from the HFEA, except where otherwise specified in brackets. Bracketed numbers 
refer to interview participants. A “?” means the data could not be found in the public 
domain. In some cases there is apparently conflicting data, though this may be due to 
different, unspecified definitions. For example, where a clinic website contradicts 
information from the HFEA, this may be because one source refers to NHS funding and the 
other to self-funding criteria. Data was collected up to and including July 2012. The first table 
shows specific access criteria, and the second table shows additional comments for some of 
the clinics. 
The tables show that information on the treatment of same-sex couples and single 
patients, and information on conditional donation, was not accessible online in most cases. 
Another point to note from the table is that the criteria on the HFEA website did not refer 
exclusively to treatment with donor gametes, only treatment generally. For example, while 
some clinics had general upper age limits, some had different age limits for treatment with 
donor gametes, but the HFEA’s published data was not sensitive to differences such as these. 
The database thus only provides an approximation of criteria for donor gamete treatment in 
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different clinics. It still, however, serves to show that access criteria for fertility treatment 
are variable from clinic to clinic (the so-called “postcode lottery”). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the exercise of compiling this database: 1) some 
information about clinical selection criteria is not readily available online. For example, 
information about whether clinics will treat same-sex couples was almost always unavailable 
from clinic websites. 2) In some cases, the information on the HFEA website contradicted the 
information given on the clinic’s own website. This occurred most often with regard to the 
upper age limit for treatment. The clinic websites should probably be considered more likely 
to be accurate, as these tend to be operated by the clinics themselves, who will probably be 
more aware of their own criteria than the HFEA website, which has to maintain a database 
of nearly two hundred clinics and satellite centres. 
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Table 7 – Clinics’ Access Criteria 
Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulation
s 
BMI 
limit 
Aberdeen Fertility Centre Aberdeen Over 44 Y (3 & 5) Y (3, 4 & 5) Y Y Y (HFEA 
& 3, 4, 
& 5) 
Y (5) 35 
Andrology Solutions Central 
London 
None ? ? N Y Y ? None 
Assisted Conception Unit 
Leigh Infirmary 
Leigh, 
Lancashire 
None ? ? Y N N ? 35 
Assisted Conception Unit 
Queen Mary's Hospital 
London 
SW15 
None ? ? Y N N ? None 
Assisted Conception Unit, 
King's College Hospital 
SE5 9RS 40-42 Y (only women?) (clinic 
site) 
Y Y Y Y ? 30 (35 
for self-
funding
) 
Assisted Reproduction and 
Gynaecology Centre 
London W1G 
6LP 
Over 44 ? ? N Y N ? None 
Ayrshire Fertility Unit Kilmarnock None ? ? Y N Y ? 35 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulation
s 
BMI 
limit 
Barts and The London 
Centre for Reproductive 
Medicine 
London 
EC1A 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 19 - 30 
Bath Fertility Centre Bath Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ?  30 for 
NHS 
funding 
Berkshire Independent 
Hospital 
Reading  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Beski Women's Care Ltd NW5  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Birmingham Heartlands 
Hospital 
Birmingham  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Birmingham Women's 
Hospital 
Birmingham Over 44; over 45 for 
own eggs (7); over 
50 for donor eggs (6 
& 7) 
Y (1, 6, & 7) but 
not if male (6) 
Y(6 & 7) Y Y Y (HFEA 
& 1, 6, & 
7) 
Y (1 & 6) 35 for 
self-
funding 
patient
s 
needin
g IVF or 
ICSI. 30 
for NHS 
funded 
patient
s 
accordi
ng to 
PCT 
criteria' 
- HFEA 
BMI Chelsfield Park ACU Orpington, 
Kent 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y N ? 37 
(NHS) 
BMI Priory Hospital Edgbaston, 
Birmingham 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
(NHS) 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
BMI The Beaumont 
Hospital 
Bolton  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BMI The Chaucer Hospital Canterbury, 
Kent 
40-42 ? ? Y Y Y ? 19-29 
for 
NHS, 
34 for 
private 
BMI The Hampshire Clinic Basingstoke N ? ? N Y N ? 19-35 
BMI The Saxon Clinic Milton 
Keynes 
? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
Bourn Hall Cambridges-
hire 
Over 44; (43 own 
eggs and 50 donor 
eggs according to 9 
(HFEA stipulation?);  
over 50 for donor 
eggs (10) 
Yes (8 & 9) but 
not men (10) 
Yes (8) Y Y Y Y (8) 30 
Bourn Hall Colchester  Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Bradford Teaching 
Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Bradford  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Brentwood Fertility Centre Essex 43-44 ? ? N Y Y ? Yes 
accordi
ng to 
HFEA 
site 
(but 
doesn't 
say 
what) 
Bridge Centre London Over 44 ? ? Y ? ? ? Depen
ds on 
individ
ual 
cases' 
Brighton Fertility 
Associates 
Brighton ? ? ? Y Y Y ? ? 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulat
ions 
BMI 
limit 
Bristol Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Bristol Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 35 but 
usually 
30 for 
NHS-
funded 
patients 
Burton Hospitals NHS Trust Burton Upon 
Trent 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? NHS 
Patients 
- As per 
commis
sioning 
Primary 
Care 
Trust 
criteria 
Private 
patients 
- BMI 
limit of 
35' 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Calderdale Royal Infirmary Halifax 45 (clinic site) ? ? ? Y (clinic 
site) 
Y ? ? 
Cambridge IVF Cambridge Over 44 Y (clinic site) Y (clinic site) N Y ? ? N 
Cambridge University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Cambridge ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
CARE Boston Lincs ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
CARE Leicester Leicester ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
CARE Manchester Manchester Over 44 Y (female only?) 
(clinic site) 
Y (clinic site) N Y Y ? N 
CARE Mansfield Notts ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
CARE Northampton Northampto
n 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 35 
CARE Nottingham Nottingham Over 44 Y (female only?) 
(clinic site) 
Y Y Y Y ? 35 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipul
ations 
BMI 
limit 
CARE Peterborough Peterboroug
h 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
CARE Sheffield Sheffield Over 44 Y (female only?) 
(clinic site) 
Y Y Y Y ? Betwee
n 19 and 
30 for 
NHS, up 
to 35 for 
Private 
Patients 
Central Middlesex Hospital Park Royal, 
NW London 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Centre for Reproduction & 
Gynaecology Wales 
(CRGW) 
Llantrisant None ? ? Y Y N ? None 
Centre for Reproductive 
and Genetic Health 
Camden, 
London 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 19-30 
Centre for Reproductive 
Medicine 
Coventry Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipul
ations 
BMI 
limit 
Centre for Reproductive 
Medicine and Fertility 
Sheffield Over 44 Y (clinic site) Y (clinic site)  Y Y Y ? 19 - 29 
for NHS 
patients
. 19-35 
for self-
funded 
patients 
Chapel Cottage Hampshire ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Chelsea & Westminster 
Hospital 
SW10 46+  for self-funded. 
Suggests they follow 
NICE guideline for 
NHS-funded (clinic 
site) 
? ? Y Y ? ? 35 - 
clinic 
site 
Chichester Nuffield 
Hospital 
Chichester ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Chiltern Hospital Fertility 
Services Unit 
Bucks Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
Complete Fertility Centre 
Southampton 
Southampto
n 
40-42 Y Y Y Y Y ? 36 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipul
ations 
BMI 
limit 
Conceive International  ? Y (clinic site) Y ? ? ? ? ? 
Concept Fertility Mitcham, 
Surrey 
? ? ? ? Y ? ? ? 
Cornwall Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Truro 23-39 (clinic site) ? ? Y ? ? ? 19-29.9 
(clinic 
site) 
Cotswold Fertility Centre ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Cotswold Fertility Unit 
(Cheltenham) 
Cheltenham ? ? Y Y Y ? ? ? 
Countess of Chester 
Hospital 
Chester Over 44 Y - lesbians (clinic 
site) 
Y (clinic site) Y Y N ? 30 for 
NHS, 35 
self-
funded 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulat
ions 
BMI 
limit 
County Durham ACU Bishop 
Auckland 
? ? ? Y ? ? ? ? 
Craigavon Area Hospital Craigavon N ? ? Y N N ? 35 
CREATE Centre for 
Reproduction and 
Advanced Technology 
SW20 8NJ Over 44 Y (but emphasis 
on sperm so 
presumably just 
women (clinic 
site) 
Y Y Y Y ? 35 
Create Health Clinic W1G 6AJ         
CRM London NW8 7JL Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 35 
Dr Amanda Tozer London ? ? ? ? ? Y ? ? 
Dumfries and Galloway 
Royal Infirmary 
Dumfries N ? ? Y N N ? N 
Ealing Hospital NHS Trust UB1 3HW? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Edinburgh Assisted 
Conception Unit 
Edinburgh Over 44 ? ? Y Y N ? 32 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulat
ions 
BMI 
limit 
Epsom and St Helier NHS 
Trust 
Surrey ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Fertility Unit Barking, 
Havering and Redbridge 
Hospitals Trust 
Romford, 
Essex 
38-39 ? ? Y N N ? 18-30 
Gateshead Fertility Unit Tyne & Wear 43-44 ? ? Y Y N ? Preferab
ly below 
35 
Glasgow Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Glasgow Over 44; over 55 for 
donor eggs (11 & 
12); over 45 for own 
eggs (12) 
Y (11) Y (11) No Y Y Y (12) None 
Glasgow Nuffield Hospital Glasgow 43-44 ? ? N Y Y ? 35 
Glasgow Royal Infirmary Glasgow Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y  35 
Good Hope Hospital NHS 
Trust 
Sutton 
Coldfield, 
Birmingham 
23-40 ? ? Y N Y ? 30 or 
below 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Guys Hospital SE1 9RT Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
(HFEA 
site); 
35 
(clinic 
site) 
Hartlepool General 
Hospital 
TS24 9AH Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 29 
Herts and Essex Fertility 
Centre 
Cheshunt (nr 
Enfield) 
Over 44 ? ? Yes Y Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulat
ions 
BMI 
limit 
IVF Wales Cardiff Over 44 - HFEA; IVF, 
ICSI, or DI cycle 
should start before 
patient's 40th 
birthday (clinic site) 
Y (clinic site) Y (clinic site) Y Yes - 
HFEA 
Y ? Lower 
BMI 
limit of 
19 - 
upper 
BMI 
range of 
30 for 
NHS 
patients 
as set by 
the 
Welsh 
Health 
Specialis
ed 
Services 
Commit
tee 
James Cook University 
Hospital 
Middlesbrou
gh 
Over 44 Y Y Y Y Y Y (clinic 
site) 
30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulat
ions 
BMI 
limit 
Leeds Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Leeds Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 35 
Leicester Fertility Centre Leicester No limit (HFEA) BUT 
clinic website says 
women must be 49 
or under for donor 
eggs 
Y (2) (and on 
clinic site it says 
lesbians) 
Y (clinic site) Y Y Y (2) N (2) NHS 
patients 
- 
Depend
s on PCT 
funding 
criteria 
Upper 
limit 30 
Lower 
limit 19' 
London Women's Clinic London Over 44 - HFEA Y (clinic site) Y (clinic site) Y Y Y  Depend
s on 
individu
al cases' 
Manchester Fertility 
Services 
Manchester None Y (clinic site) Y (clinic site) Y Y Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Midland Fertility Services Aldridge, 
West 
Midlands 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? Approx
imately 
30' 
Newcastle Fertility Centre 
at Life 
Newcastle Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 
Ninewells Hospital Dundee 40-42 ? ? Y Y Y ? 35 
Origin Fertility Care Belfast No limit (HFEA) ? ? N Y Y ? 33 
Oxford Fertility Unit Oxford Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? N 
Peninsular Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Exeter Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? 19 to 
30 
Regional Fertility Centre Belfast Over 44 - HFEA 
(website says 
female must be 
under 40 for NHS) 
?  'There must be 
a medical cause 
of infertility' for 
NHS funding 
(clinic site) 
?  'There must be 
a medical cause of 
infertility' for NHS 
funding (clinic 
site) 
Y Y Y ? None 
The Agora Gynaecology 
and Fertility Centre 
Hove Over 44 Y (clinic website) Y (clinic site) Y Y Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipul
ations 
BMI limit 
Hewitt Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Liverpool Over 44 (HFEA site) 
(must be before 
40th birthday 
according to clinic 
site) 
? ? Y Y Y ? According 
to PCT 
criteria. 
Available 
on 
request' - 
HFEA; 
between 
19 and 29 
or NHS 
funding 
(clinic 
site) 
Hexham General Hospital Northumberl
and 
N ? ? Y Y Y ? 30 for 
NHS 
funding 
Homerton Fertility Centre E9 6SR Over 44 Y Y Y Y Y ? 30 
Hull IVF Unit Hull Over 44 HFEA  Y (clinic site) Y Y Y  35 (30 for 
NHS) 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipul
ations 
BMI limit 
IVF Hammersmith W12 0HS Over 44 HFEA site Y (clinic site) ? Y Y Y ? N 
IVF Scotland Edinburgh N Y (clinic site) Y N Y Y ? N 
Lanarkshire Acute Hospital 
NHS Trust 
Airdrie ? ? ? Y N ? ? ? 
Lister Fertility Clinic SW1W 8RH Over 44 - HFEA site 
(but clinic site says 
up to 50) 'We also 
treat older women 
up to the age of 50' 
http://www.ivf.org.u
k/egg-donation/ 
? ? N Y Y ? 30 
London Female and Male 
Fertility Centre 
N6 4DJ Over 44 ? ? N Y Y ? 30 
London Fertility Centre W1B 1QJ Over 44 ? Y (clinic site) Y Y Y ? 35 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Know
n 
donor
s 
Donor 
stipula
tions 
BMI 
limit 
London Women's Clinic, 
Cardiff 
Cardiff Over 44 ? (but maybe as 
they offer 
booklets about 
lesbian parenting 
and gay dads?) 
? N Y Y  35 
and >35 
on 
individu
al basis 
London Women's Clinic, 
Darlington 
Durham N ? (as above with 
leaflets) 
? N Y Y ? preferab
ly below 
30' 
London Women's Clinic, 
Swansea 
Swansea Over 44 ? (as above with 
leaflets) 
? N Y N ? 35 
Luton And Dunstable NHS 
Trust Hospital 
Luton ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
NewLife Fertility Centre Epsom, 
Surrey 
N ? ? N Y N ? N 
North Middlesex University 
Hospital (Reproductive 
Medicines Unit) 
Edmonton, 
London 
N ? ? Y N Y ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Know
n 
donor
s 
Donor 
stipula
tions 
BMI 
limit 
Nuffield Health Woking 
Hospital 
Woking Over 44 ? ? Y Y N ? 34.9 
NURTURE Nottingham Over 44 ? ? Y Y N ? N 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipula
tions 
BMI limit 
Portsmouth Fertility Centre Portsmouth 43-44 (document 
says younger 
though) 
Y (but only if "sub 
fertile") 
Y (but only if 
subfertile) 
Y Y N ? BMI 19-30 
for NHS 
patients 
having IVF 
as per SHA 
criteria; will 
see and 
advise 
regarding 
lifestyle 
those 
outside this 
range, and 
can treat 
privately 
when BMI 
greater 
than 30 if 
appropriat
e to clinical 
needs.' 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipula
tions 
BMI limit 
Princess Of Wales Hospital 
(ABM University Health 
Board) 
Bridgend ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Queen Mary's Hospital Kent 43-44 ? ? Y Y N ? 35 
Queens Medical Centre 
Fertility Unit 
Nottingham 43-44 ? ? Y Y Y ? N 
Reproductive Genetics 
Institute 
London W1G 
7BX 
Over 44 ? ? (though clinic 
site refers to 
"couples") 
N Y N ? N 
Reproductive Medicine 
Clinic, Bristol 
Bristol N ? ? Y N N ? 30 
Reproductive Medicine 
Unit 
London, 
NW1 2BU 
38-39 ? ? (though clinic 
site refers to 
"couples") 
Y N N ? N 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipula
tions 
BMI limit 
Royal Derby Hospital Derby N ? ? Y Y N ? To access 
NHS-
funded 
treatment: 
upper limit 
of 30 for 
females 
and 35 for 
males 
Salisbury Fertility Centre Salisbury 43-44 ? ? (though clinic 
site refers to 
"couples") 
Y Y N Y 
(clinic 
site) 
? 
Shirley Oaks Hospital Croydon 43-44 ? ? N Y N ? N 
Shropshire and Mid-Wales 
Fertility Centre 
Shrewsbury, 
Shropshire 
Over 44 ? ? (though clinic 
site refers to 
"couples") 
Y Y Y ? 30 or lower 
South East Fertility Clinic Tunbridge 
Wells, Kent 
Over 44 Y (lesbians only?) 
(clinic site) 
Y (clinic site) Y Y Y ? N 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
South West Centre for 
Reproductive Medicine 
Plymouth Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? NHS 
funding 
- 29.9 
Other - 
35 
Spire Bristol Hospital Bristol ? ? ? ? ? ? ? No 
donor 
eggs, 
only 
sperm 
St Jude's Women's Hospital Wolverhamp
ton 
Over 44 (site says 
Over 52 for egg 
recipients) 
(http://www.stjudec
linic.com/eggdonati
on-recipient.htm) 
Y but possibly 
only female (clinic 
site) 
? Y Y N ? 30 
St Mary's Hospital Manchester 38-39 ? ? (though clinic 
site refers to 
"couples") 
N Y Y ? 19-30 
Sunderland Fertility Centre Sunderland 40-42 ? ? Y Y N ? 30 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Sussex Downs Fertility 
Centre 
Eastbourne, 
East Sussex 
Over 44 ? ? Y Y N ? 30 
Swansea Reproduction 
Unit 
Swansea 40-42 ? ? Y N N ? 30 
Torbay Hospital Torquay N ? ? Y N N ? N 
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Name Location Age limit Same sex couples Single women NHS-
funded 
patients 
Private 
patients 
Known 
donors 
Donor 
stipulati
ons 
BMI 
limit 
Wessex Fertility Limited Southampto
n 
Over 44 Y but possibly 
lesbians only 
(clinic site) 
Y (clinic site) Y Y Y ? 35 
West Middlesex University 
Hospital 
Isleworth, 
Middlesex 
N ? ? Y N N ? 40 
Whittington Hospital 
Fertility Unit 
London, N19 
5NF 
N ? ? Y N N ? 19-30 
Winterbourne Hospital Dorchester Over 44 ? ? Y Y Y ? No 
limit 
for 
private 
patient
s. For 
NHS - 
specific 
to PCT 
Women's Unit, Cwm Taff 
NHS Trust 
Llantrisant, 
Rhondda 
Cynon Taff, 
Wales 
N ? ? Y N N ? 30 
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Table 8 – Additional Comments on Clinics’ Access Criteria 
 
 
Name Additional Comments 
Assisted Conception Unit Leigh Infirmary Unclear which donor services available 
Assisted Conception Unit Queen Mary's Hospital Unclear which donor services available 
Berkshire Independent Hospital Seems to only offer gynaecological care, may not be suitable 
Beski Women's Care Ltd No info available 
Birmingham Heartlands Hospital No info available 
BMI The Beaumont Hospital Site suggests DI and egg donation occur at clinic but no further 
info 
BMI The Saxon Clinic Site suggests no fertility treatment here 
Bourn Hall Partner clinic of Bourn Hall, Cambridgeshire. Extent to which 
policies linked to those of Cambridge clinic unclear 
Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust No info available 
Bridge Centre We do not apply any selection criteria to the patients we treat' 
(clinic site) 
Brighton Fertility Associates Information unavailable on HFEA site, link to clinic's site broken 
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Name Additional Comments 
CARE Leicester Consultations, daily monitoring and injection training are 
available at CARE Leicester with patients travelling to CARE 
Nottingham only for egg collection and embryo transfer.' 
Central Middlesex Hospital May only offer gynaecological services 
Create Health Clinic Same as clinic above for all 
Epsom and St Helier NHS Trust Unclear whether offers treatment or only workup 
Good Hope Hospital NHS Trust No children from previous relationships 
Guys Hospital No previous parenting experience by either partner. No previous 
NHS funded treatment (and/or no more than two previous cycles 
of treatment) (clinic site) 
IVF Wales Must both be non-smoking; '•For couples – there are no children 
(biological or adopted) living with the couple and one of the 
partners has never had a biological or adopted child. For single 
women – that the woman has never had a biological or adopted 
child.' (IVF or ICSI); '•Post code in Wales' (DI) 
Ninewells Hospital No children living in the home; unexplained infertility of at least 4 
years' duration (Tayside), 3 years for Forth Valley (clinic site) 
  
  
 1
88
 
Name Additional Comments 
Origin Fertility Care In addition, there are further eligibility criteria in Northern 
Ireland; for example, priority is currently given to couples without 
children (whether in their current, or in previous relationships).' - 
(clinic site) 
Hewitt Centre for Reproductive Medicine Neither partner must have any living children, from either the 
current or previous ; Sub-fertility must not be the direct result of 
a sterilisation procedure in either partner (this does not include 
conditions where sterilisation occurs as a result of another 
medical problem). Couples who have undertaken a reversal of 
their sterilisation procedure are not eligible for treatment. 
London Women's Clinic, Cardiff May treat same-sex couples as offers booklets about lesbian 
parenting and gay fathers (clinic site) 
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6.2 The Qualitative Study 
 
The interviews and workshop generated data both about the criteria that are used to 
decide how to allocate gametes (for example, age limits and body mass index (BMI) 
restrictions), and the decision-making processes that are used (for example deferring to 
directors of clinics, or the use of ethics committees). Given that the aim of the study was to 
determine the basis on which staff allocate gametes between patients, the data presented in 
this chapter focus on the allocation criteria rather than the decision-making processes. This 
latter part of the data was explored in an undergraduate dissertation project undertaken by 
Helen Cartwright, and supervised by myself. The data are presented to reflect the way in 
which themes arose in the interviews, beginning with basic criteria and then exploring the 
ethical underpinnings of those criteria. Where appropriate, the relevance of these themes to 
the broader ethical issues presented in the philosophy chapter (for example, welfare) will be 
highlighted. 
In phase one, the shortest interview was 43 minutes, and the longest was 1 hour and 
8 minutes. The median interview time was 56 minutes. In phase three, only two interviews 
took place, the shorter being 39 minutes, and the longer 48 minutes.  
 
6.2.1 Participants – Phase One 
 
Eighteen interviews were undertaken, because after fifteen, interviews had not yet 
taken place with participants at a clinic in Wales. Given that the R&D process had been 
completed for a clinic in Wales, extra interviews were not inconvenient to undertake, and 
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this allowed for a better geographical spread of clinics. These interviews took place in seven 
different fertility clinics, rather than the fifteen that were originally planned. Three of the 
clinics were located in Scotland, three in England, and one in Wales; the difficulty of 
obtaining timely Research and Development permissions in some Trusts meant that it 
proved too impractical to include a clinic in Northern Ireland. Five of the clinics were NHS 
and two were private.34 One of the private clinics was in England and the other in Scotland. 
Furthermore, one of the clinics in Northern Ireland raised a concern about incomplete 
anonymisation given the few fertility clinics in Northern Ireland. For this reason, the analysis 
plan changed so that participants would no longer be identified by geographic region. 
Ultimately, however, this Northern Irish clinic was not included in the study, as Research and 
Development permissions could not be obtained within a suitable timeframe. 
Not all clinics had particular members of staff with clearly defined roles for allocating 
gametes, like “egg donor co-ordinator” or “sperm donor co-ordinator”. The participant 
group comprised the following categories of staff: 
 
Three egg donor co-ordinators 
Three nursing staff members 
Two sperm donor co-ordinators 
Two medical directors 
                                                          
34 In reality, the situation is more complicated than there being discrete NHS and private clinics. 
Much of the time, privately-operated clinics will treat (a certain number of) NHS patients, and NHS-
operated clinics (i.e. ones managed by NHS Trusts) will treat self-funded (i.e. private) patients too. 
For the sake of simplicity, the thesis will continue to speak of “NHS” and “private” clinics, and this 
should be taken as a distinction between clinics operated by NHS Trusts and other clinics, rather than 
saying anything about where the funding of individual treatments comes from. 
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Two counsellors 
Two gynaecologists 
One embryologist 
One clinical midwife 
Two other clinical staff 
 
Fourteen of the staff were female, and four were male. 
 
6.2.2 Participants – Phase Two 
 
There were twenty participants at the workshop, plus seven facilitators. As well as 
eleven fertility clinic staff members (eight of whom had participated in phase one), the 
participant group comprised representatives of the following organisations: the HFEA (two 
participants), the National Gamete Donation Trust (NGDT), Progress Educational Trust, the 
Donor Conception Network (DCN), and the British Medical Association Ethics Committee. 
The final three participants were academics from bioethics and social science backgrounds. 
Seventeen of the participants were female, and nine were male. 
 
6.2.3 Participants – Phase Three 
 
There were three participants in this phase, out of three who were invited. Two were 
participants from the workshop, and one was a participant who had been invited to the 
workshop but had been unable to come. The small number of participants in this phase is 
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explained by its theoretical nature – only those who had been hand-picked as having 
potentially detailed and important points on particular matters were included, so that ‘[t]he 
process of data collection [was] controlled by the emerging theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
p. 45). Two of these participants were interviewed by telephone, with each telephone 
interview lasting approximately half an hour.  
 
6.3 Themes 
 
 The philosophical analysis selected allocation criteria that were salient in the legal 
literature, the philosophical literature, and in the fieldwork undertaken at the beginning of 
this project. This analysis was in part influenced by practice and informed the topic guide 
exploring practice. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that many of the themes that arose 
from the data mirrored those that were discussed in chapter four. Some of the participants’ 
views, however, were quite different to the conclusions in the philosophical analysis: there 
was disagreement about how age and parental status should be accounted for, and some 
opposition to a priority system in general with strong support for waiting time to influence 
selection, as well as opposition to a national waiting list (especially amongst phase one 
participants). As a visual complement to this chapter, mind maps detailing themes and their 
justifications are provided below. The mind map for gamete allocation criteria and that for 
the national waiting list are shown below. A mind map for themes relating to known donors 
was considered, but there were not enough themes arising relating to this concept for a 
mind map to be necessary. 
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Figure 2 – Mind Map (Allocation Criteria) 
 
Figure 3 – Mind Map (National Allocation System) 
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 Themes arising included age, body mass index, substance use, time on waiting list, 
parental status, refusing to treat patients, welfare, violence, same-sex couples, single 
patients, patient choice (both that of donors and of recipients, including some discussion of 
matching), known donors, the national waiting list, and the prioritisation system. These 
findings will now be presented before discussion in the following chapter. As a brief note on 
style: shorter quotations will be embedded within paragraphs, whereas longer ones will be 
separated from the main text body. 
 
6.3.1 Age 
  
 Most of the participants mentioned age as a criterion for being allocated gametes. In 
most of these cases, they raised this theme themselves without being prompted. Some 
participants reported that their clinics imposed an upper age limit, and this often differed 
according to whether the patient was using donor eggs or was self-funding: 
 
45 for, uh their own eggs, and well it’s 44 now actually, and and 50, 50 for donor 
gametes is generally, most people find that’s acceptable (participant 06, phase one) 
 
 I think there is an age limit for funded treatment (participant 01, phase one) 
 
 One justification for applying an age limit was the importance of protecting the 
welfare of any child resulting from treatment, with some participants expressing a concern 
that treatment of older women could result in children with poorer health: 
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[Y]ou just don’t see people being pregnant over the age of really realistically 43 [.…I]n 
your back of your mind you’re wondering what will happen in, you know when they 
are actually pregnant when they get to their antenatal appointments the likelihood of 
getting a good outcome is slim, you know? I send them away thinking “gosh I hope 
that baby’s not Down’s” (participant 07, phase one) 
 
 
 [T]he pregnancy in a woman of age 42 has got associated risks, with uh 
chromosomal abnormalities (participant 03, phase one)  
 
 
 It is worth noting that these particular welfare of the child concerns would only apply 
to situations in which a patient’s own egg is used, as conditions like Down’s syndrome and 
other chromosomal abnormalities are linked to the age of the egg rather than the age of the 
recipient. An older patient using her own eggs with donor sperm, however, would still face 
these risks. 
 Another participant noted the potential stigma attached to being an older parent, or 
being a child with (an) older parent(s). Ultimately, however, the participant thought that the 
decision whether to risk suffering a degree of stigmatisation was the patients’ decision to 
make, so this did not ultimately factor into the clinic’s decision about whether or not to treat: 
 
Uh, I think if you’re fit and well and you go through all the pros and cons of these 
things, by and large you should be allowed to do as long as it’s not illegal, you should 
be allowed to do what you want to do [I: ok] um. That’s my personal view, [I: sure], 
um. There’s the yuck factor of course, you know you’re, you’re 55 and picking up a, a 
kid at the school gates, and everyone thinks you’re the gran, when in fact you’re the 
mother [I: yeah], there’s that but you know society’s changing (participant 11, phase 
one) 
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In the more general discussion of child welfare that will occur later in this chapter, we will 
see that there was some discomfort in general about the idea of such social factors being 
taken into account. 
 Some of the participants considered yet another reasons for age restrictions:  
 
[T]here are natural pregnancies 48, possibly 47 48, so I think 50 is a, a good time to 
stop. […I]t’s the natural age for your fertility, years of fertility ending anyway’ 
(participant 06, phase one) 
 
 
This suggests that for this participant, one justification for an upper age limit is to mirror 
‘natural’35 reproduction rather than to ensure a minimum chance of treatment success. 
 
 Another justification offered for an upper age limit was the increased risks associated 
with pregnancy at older ages: ‘[A]s good as we all look these days, you’re still 42 years old 
your organs are still 42 years old, so a pregnancy can be slightly more challenging than if 
you’re 32 years old’ (participant 03, phase one). 
 
 Another reason cited for the age limit was the efficacy of treatment:  
 
[T]he age limit has to be linked to the efficacy of the treatment (participant 03, phase 
one) 
 
 
                                                          
35 This might involve “unnatural” processes but still aims at making fertility treatment as close as 
possible to reproduction outside the clinic. 
197 
 
I think it’s more to do with, um, thinking how the patient’s likely to respond if they 
respond better within those [I: right] those kind of age limits (participant 14, phase 
one) 
 
 
Participant 03 suggested that providing treatments with a low chance of success could be a 
‘waste of time’, but did not elaborate on this or say anything about whose time it would be 
wasting: 
 
[W]e put guidelines in place for age, BMI, and they are based you’ll find evidence as 
to why you should stop at 42 or 40 or 38, you you will find evidence wherever you go, 
it’s what’s your threshold is is 10% a good outcome for a, um, a patient trying to 
become pregnant? Is 20% that’s 10% is it a waste of time? (participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
 One participant felt that the reason for the age limit for NHS funding was to alleviate 
pressure on the waiting list, and was concerned about the balance between fairness and 
treatment efficacy: 
 
The older ones have got less chance of conceiving, but if you treat all the older ones 
the younger ones’ll be older by the time they come through [...] so do you target the 
younger ones with the better success a better chance? [...] for years we treated the 
same patients again and again, [...] they just kept going, [...] using up all these cycles 
[...] and the younger ones were gonna be too old by the time they came through. So 
they brought in the blanket this is the age and the waiting list. They tried, like sort of 
took quite a bit off the waiting list but there isn’t a fair system (participant 12, phase 
one) 
 
 
Part of the problem for this participant seemed to be that treating older patients first would 
be unfair on younger patients. 
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 Participants in the workshop did not appear to object to using age as a criterion for 
prioritising or de-prioritising patients, except where they were uncomfortable with 
prioritising patients in general. The age criterion was not a common topic at the workshop, 
in spite of the fact that it was mentioned specifically in the presentation as something that 
was a justifiable basis for prioritisation. In the discussion following the main presentation, 
the presenter commented ‘if the waiting list is so short that you would eventually end up 
treating [all the patients] anyway, then you want to kind of hurry through the older patients’.  
Participant 07 (who participated in phases one and two) responded ‘older patients, that’s 
right’, and perhaps this can be interpreted as acquiescence to a prioritisation system that 
takes age into account for efficacy reasons. 
 In some cases, interview participants suggested that an older patient could actually 
be advantaged by her age: 
 
 When they’re near the upper age limit we’ll always try and find them a donor sooner  
 [I: ok] so they might jump the queue […] because they’re, otherwise they would not  
 get treated at all (participant 09, phase one) 
 
 
The justification for this seemed to be that providing someone with an opportunity to have a 
child was more important than keeping a strictly “first come, first served” waiting list. This 
idea was echoed almost exactly by another participant: 
 
 Participant 10 (phase one):  We won’t automatically put somebody like that at the 
top of at the top of the waiting list, uh but we would 
perhaps if, if faced with a similar situation somebody a 
similar length of time on the waiting list, 32 is is 49 we 
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might give preference to the 49 year old because she 
only has one opportunity left. 
 Interviewer:    Yep. Ok. Um, so can you say a bit about what the kind 
of uh rationale for that is? 
 Participant 10:   Well purely the fact that um, that she wouldn’t have 
time or the opportunity to have further treatment. 
 
 
This participant also said that a patient would not be allowed to queue-jump in this way until 
they were already at a point where they would receive treatment in the next 6 months. This 
was the most detailed prioritisation “system” mentioned by any participant. 
The prioritisation of older patients was not universally reported or endorsed. 
Participants suggested that this would justifiably cause annoyance to those patients who 
were disadvantaged by it: ‘I think it’s very unfair if you’ve come to me, put your name on the 
waiting list, and you’ve been waiting for 12 months, 16 months, and then somebody else has 
come on the list and gets treatment before you’ (participant 13, phase one). As the reason 
given for being uncomfortable with prioritisation was to do with fairness, the participant was 
pressed by the interviewer with the suggestion that being fair to patients on the waiting list 
in this sense might compromise fairness in another sense if older women were denied the 
opportunity to ever have children. The response was: 
 
I would have to say to her that unfortunately because we’ve got the clinic policy, 
because I’ve got a long waiting list I’ve a lot of people who’ve been waiting before, 
the only way she could come to the top of the list was to recruit a donor who would 
donate to somebody else and she could move to the top (participant 13, phase one) 
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As the question is about whether the policy is correct, it may be inconsistent to hold 
the view that a policy against prioritisation is justified in terms of fairness and 
simultaneously say that any unfairness the policy causes is justified simply because it is 
policy. This inconsistency demonstrates the complexity of the problems at play here, and the 
deference to policy may be a strategy for managing these problems. 
The response also suggests that fast-tracking can occur if someone brings in their 
own donor. This will be discussed under the “known donors” heading below (pages 242-248). 
 Some other participants were similarly unhappy about the idea of prioritising for 
older age: 
  
 Um, no, that wouldn’t be fair. Sometimes you know circumstances are really um, hard, 
you know perhaps they’ve met late in life, they’ve had a miscarriage, and there’s a lot 
of extenuating circumstances, um, but we can’t move people up, up the list, ... 
sometimes it’s really very hard to, to sit ...  with someone and say, I’m sorry but I can’t, 
I cannot move you up the list, um, I know your age I know the history, but um 
everyone else is, everyone else has a history behind them, and feels it just as 
important, so I don’t think they should be moved up the list because of their age 
(participant 04, phase one) 
 
 
This participant also cited fairness as an argument against prioritisation, suggesting that 
while someone may have a case in favour of their treatment because of older age, other 
patients had their own histories and cases for treatment too, such that age should not be 
taken into account. 
 A different participant was less against the idea of prioritisation, but seemed 
somewhat conflicted about it. Initially the participant felt that older patients could be 
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blamed for waiting too long before seeking medical assistance with fertility and thus should 
not be fast-tracked, as this could be unfair on those beneath them on the list: 
 
[W]hy should someone who’s already waited two years be bumped because they 
didn’t go to their GP sooner? Because, people do, some people put off amazing 
amounts of time before going to the doctor, so really why should they be fast-tracked? 
Um, but if you had a cancer you’d be fast-tracked. […] It’s a difficult unless they’ve 
just met the man, but you know they’ve put off, and I think part of that is because the 
way you read or listen to the news, you think clinics can do everything, um, and we 
can put off all of this and uh, then they’ll put it right for us if it doesn’t work in the 
next few years (participant 05, phase one) 
 
 
When the participant then went on to give reasons for why patients might wait too long, 
however, this seemed to shift the responsibility away from the patient: ‘I think their 
expectations are wrong. Uh, misled, but again, not really their fault. Uh because the news 
would make you think that it doesn’t matter how old you are’ (participant 05, phase one). 
The participant seems to think that considering a patient’s responsibility for their 
circumstances was important, but was unclear as to how this would work. 
 Participant 06 (phase one) did not seem to like the idea of fast-tracking a gamete 
recipient because of her age, but would consider it if based on the age of the surrogate 
being used: 
 
 Participant 06: [C]urrently I wouldn’t be looking at fast-tracking anybody, and I 
haven’t done previously [I: right] for those reasons. Not for age 
anyway. 
 Interviewer:   Ok. So there are other reasons that you might fast-track 
someone. 
202 
 
 Participant 06:  Um, now they did have somebody that we fast-tracked, um, we 
considered fast-tracking somebody whose mother was going to 
be, she was going to have donor eggs and whose mother was 
going to be the surrogate, but the mother was be too old to be 
a surrogate if we left it too long. This particular patient never 
came through for treatment in the end anyway. 
 
 
 Participant 11 (phase one) was against the idea of prioritising as (s)he thought it was 
unfair on those lower down the list. 
 
[Y]ou’re disadvantaging the person who was above you. Directly above you. But in 
fact, every woman above you you’re disadvantaging ‘cos you’ve been fast-tracked. 
Um, but that’s, so no we don’t have a fast-track policy. As in as in we won’t fast-track. 
[…] I don’t think it’s fairer. That’s fine, ‘cos somebody’s been disadvantaged, there’s 
the maleficence side of things (participant 11, phase one) 
 
 
The participant’s mention of ‘maleficence’ could be a reference to Beauchamp and 
Childress’s four principles of biomedical ethics, and the participant’s interpretation of 
maleficence is broad enough to include disadvantaging someone by making them wait 
longer for treatment. 
 A participant from another clinic also noted an example of someone getting special 
treatment for being older, though in this case they were not necessarily prioritised over 
other patients, but rather given an opportunity for treatment even though they had gone 
over the age limit: 
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[T]he age criteria, yes we have gone up gone above it very slightly, so we have given 
somebody who’d hit their 46th birthday, who’d been on my waiting list, a shot at 
treatment [I: right] with agreement from the director. […W]hat can you say to 
somebody who has waited and gone over that magic 46th birthday? (participant 07, 
phase one).36 
 
 
 In summary, age was a prominent theme in interview discussions of gamete 
allocation criteria, but participants’ views on what the upper age limits should be, and on the 
precise role age should play in allocation decisions, were mixed. Whilst all participants 
seemed comfortable with a policy of an upper age limit, there was variation in the cut off 
age used, and also a variety of different opinions in how flexible those age limits should be.  
Some participants were happy with the practice of fast-tracking older patients, justifying this 
judgement on the basis that older patients would miss out on the opportunity to have 
children at all unless they were fast-tracked. None of the participants mentioned a lower age 
limit at any point, and although the HFEA Code of Practice states that ‘[g]ametes for the 
treatment of others should not be taken from anyone under the age of 18’ (HFEA, 2009, 
section 5.33), there is no reference in the legislation to a lower age cut off for gamete 
recipients, though lack of capacity to consent, and not yet having reached puberty, would be 
legal and physical (respectively) barriers to treatment of the very young. All of the clinics had 
a specified upper age limit for treatment. Where participants made the distinction, the 
upper age limit for the use of donor eggs was usually higher than for treatments using the 
                                                          
36 It is not clear whether this patient was being treated using donor gametes or not. The participant’s 
mention of ‘that magic 46th birthday’, combined with her statement that the cut off for treatment 
with donor eggs is 50, suggests that this treatment was with the patient’s own eggs, though she may 
still have been using donor sperm. 
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recipient’s own eggs, which reflects the fact that the likelihood of success is based in part on 
the age of the egg rather than the age of the recipient. In terms of the workshop, age was 
not the focus of much discussion, and nobody took issue with upper age limits themselves, 
though some concern was expressed about the idea of prioritising patients in general, 
whether that be for age or any other reason. 
 
6.3.2 Body Mass Index (BMI) 
 
Many participants reported a clearly defined BMI range into which patients needed 
to fall in order to be considered for treatment. Where this was raised, it was usually raised 
by participants themselves. This was not discussed in the philosophical analysis, but 
participants linked it with efficacy: ‘BMI is based on success rates’ (participant 07, phase one). 
This means that the philosophical analysis may still provide direction on this matter, and that 
it should be added to the list of considerations. 
Two phase one interview participants (08 and 11) noted that there were only BMI 
requirements for patients seeking NHS-funded treatment (both of these clinics treated self-
funded patients too). This was likely due to the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE)37 guideline, which states that ‘(w)omen should be informed that female body mass 
index should ideally be in the range 19–30’ (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2004, 
                                                          
37 The acronym “NICE” will be used to cover all incarnations of the organization, and will not 
distinguish between the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence, or the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 
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paragraph 1.10.7.1).38 The BMI requirement was very similar to the age requirement, both in 
terms of the justifications offered (relating to treatment efficacy and patient welfare), and 
staff members’ attitudes towards flexibility in this requirement, where they would only 
waive the requirement to be within a certain range if it was a borderline case, and if it 
represented the patient’s last chance for treatment. 
The following quotations show that some participants seemed to think that 
treatment efficacy was an important reason for having BMI restrictions. 
 
[L]ooking at the, the kind of higher, uh body mass index, it’s been research that has 
shown that um, having body mass index greater than 35 um, affects how you’re likely 
to respond to treatment. You’re not likely to respond so well, it’s a bit more, um, 
difficult when we’re doing, the, um, scanning, and it’s also a bit more difficult on the 
day that you’re having eggs retrieved as well, um, it can affect I know it’s, it’s slightly 
different when it’s donor eggs, um, because the embryos are going back but it can 
affect the kind of pregnancy side of things as well (participant 14, phase one) 
 
 
Risks to patients themselves were also noted here where participant 07 mentions ‘safety in 
pregnancy’ and ‘medical health’: 
 
BMI is based on success rates, and also NHS funding, which might be an issue for the 
patients, they might not want to self-fund treatment, so if they can’t afford to don’t 
wish to are only seeking NHS funding, they have to go with the NHS guidelines, which 
are obviously stricter than the general clinic guidelines, but they’re based on success 
rates for fertility treatment, um, and that is, a partly there is an element of safety in 
pregnancy, but it’s more about success rates for treatment, and there is the things to 
                                                          
38
 The 2004 guideline is cited here because these participants were interviewed before the 2013 
guideline was published. 
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do with obviously medical health and having an anaesthetic they’re all sort of filtered 
in to the sort of guidelines that we have (participant 07, phase one) 
 
 
I think it’s more for the surgery side of things, I’d imagine rather than trying to 
promote a healthy family and things like that, I think it’s more for the anaesthetist 
type kind of things (participant 08, phase one) 
 
 
As the discussion went on, however, participant 08 (phase one) suggested that perhaps 
social factors should be taken into account: 
 
Interviewer:    [D]o you think there should be an element of promoting 
healthy families? 
Participant 08 (phase one):  I think probably it needs to move that way, but then at 
the end of the day I don’t know whether is that the 
responsibility of the clinic? […] Well I think you’re going 
into the realms then of saying to a patient “oh you can’t 
have treatment because you don’t exercise”, I don’t 
know if that’s morally correct. [I]f two very overlarge 
people could just get pregnant naturally without our 
interventioning [sic], they could probably have a healthy 
baby 
 
 
Here we see a tension between the participant’s idea that social factors should be 
considered, and his/her reluctance to refuse treatment on this basis. (S)he also considers the 
fact that overweight people could reproduce without fertility treatment, reflecting the idea 
voiced by participant 06, in relation to age, that fertility treatment should mirror 
reproduction outside the clinic. 
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 This participant suggested that patients would be advised to lose weight in order to 
improve their chances of successful treatment. (S)he thought that it was good to be flexible 
with the BMI restrictions, especially if a patient was about to become too old to receive 
treatment: 
 
If their weight was sort of above the 40 BMI then you’ve got to be medically you’ve 
got to be, but if it’s sort of within 35-40, people out there get pregnant anyway at 
high BMI, so I don’t see why I can say no we can’t treat you, and be unrealistic about 
getting their weight down, but obviously I discuss it with other people yes we have 
BMI limits but if it’s somebody’s last chance, and they’re not gonna lose that weight 
before they come out  of the criteria for age, then we have to be a bit flexible about it 
(participant 06, phase one) 
 
 
Here we see an interesting relationship between the age cut off and other criteria: where 
the age limit is strictly applied, it provides a motivation, for some participants, for allowing 
treatments that are sub-optimal according to other criteria. 
 Finally, one participant noted that there was scope for flexibility seemingly regardless 
of BMI:  
 
[T]here is the odd patient who has been successful and whose weight is very high um, 
so, occasionally there, there have been agreements to let patients whose BMI has 
been outside the criteria proceed, but not with fresh treatment, only with frozen 
treatments (participant 07, phase one) 
 
 
 
The significance of flexibility being allowed only for ‘frozen treatments’ seems to be to do 
with the availability of gametes. The participant said ‘we have recently allowed a patient 
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whose BMI we wouldn’t like to have treatment, but only because, because she has frozen 
embryos, because it’s very clear that she had received treatment in the past’ (participant 07, 
phase one), and so treating a patient who falls outside of the BMI restrictions in these cases 
does not disadvantage anyone else. In most cases this would likely be with the patient’s own 
gametes. 
 Overall, then, participants thought that BMI restrictions were mostly related to 
treatment efficacy, but there was also an emphasis on patient welfare. There was a minor 
suggestion that creating “unhealthy” families was an issue, but this seemed to be trumped 
by a general reluctance to tell someone that they are too overweight to have a family. 
 
6.3.3 Substance Use 
 
 Another recurring theme in discussion of allocation criteria was substance use and 
abuse. It was again usually the participants that raised this criterion. Participants’ attitudes 
towards the use of different substances varied. Some thought that anyone known to be 
using ‘recreational drugs’39 (participant 14, phase one) would not be offered fertility 
treatment: 
 
[I]f people were, were using recreational drugs and had told us about it then again we 
would be looking for them to have stopped that before they were going through any 
treatment. […] And they would be checking with their GP to see if that had happened 
and there would be some checks done on that (participant 14, phase one) 
                                                          
39 It is assumed that participants’ use of the word ‘drugs’ means illegal drugs, and is separate from 
alcohol and smoking. 
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[W]e write to the GP to try and get as much information if patients are on um, if 
indicated they are referred for drug addictions and this is locally, and they have to be 
clean of urine for one year before they will be accepted (participant 15, phase one) 
 
Other participants reported that drug use might not exclude a patient, but it would be a spur 
to investigate that patient further. Consequently, being a substance user did not lead to 
automatic exclusion from treatment, but might lead to more intensive scrutiny by clinic staff. 
 
[I]f any one member of staff feels there’s a real reason to call into question treatment, 
they can call a meeting and ask for it all to be discussed. The final decision might not 
go their way. But at least it’s been broadened it’s been examined. To take things to 
that length we would ask for GPs’ input, perhaps even depending if there’d been 
violence past social work input, if there’d been drugs in the past you know we’d ask 
for more input [I: yep] before we made any dramatic final decisions, either to treat 
them or to not treat them (participant 05, phase one) 
 
 
I think if the doctors had seen the patients and I don’t know they’ve got they were 
both heroin addicts or something and they had declared it or it’s picked up, it gets 
sent to the ethics committee for discussion and they would decide. You’d like to think 
that you’d say “oh no, you can’t” you can’t I don’t think you, you like, you can’t speak 
to the patients and say “you’re both alcoholics, we’re not gonna treat you we can’t 
give you a baby” ‘cos you don’t know what goes on in their lives, I don’t know you’d 
ever know the facts to be able to make that decision (participant 05, phase one) 
 
 
 
[W]e acknowledge that people do take drugs but in fact even someone being a 
habitual drug user doesn’t necessarily mean that you feel that they have a welfare of 
the child issue (participant 07, phase one) 
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 Excessive alcohol use was noted by some participants as something that could give 
cause for concern, but was never described as an exclusion criterion, and a strict definition 
of “excessive” was not offered. Instead there was again a notion that each case would be 
considered individually, with some participants mentioning that GPs would be consulted. If 
there were serious alcohol problems reported (such as alcoholism), this would give cause for 
concern: 
 
I don’t think the smoking and the drinking would be so much of a problem, unless it 
had been reported to us it was, it was excessive, or you know if somebody was um, 
arriving in to have a scan in the morning and they were, they were finding out that 
you know they weren’t, they weren’t quite compos mentis40 (participant 14, phase 
one) 
 
 
The majority of participants, however, felt that welfare of the child was the main reason for 
being concerned about substance use, though they did not elaborate on whether the 
concerns were to do with children’s physical or psychological welfare, or both: 
 
[T]hey may be on drugs. Uh, various issues which would make it not in the welfare of 
the child to be, uh, of the a child born to them (participant 09, phase one) 
 
 
 
Similar to drug abuse but certainly alcoholism um would also be a significant welfare 
of the child concern (participant 10, phase one) 
 
 
                                                          
40 “Compos mentis” in this context can reasonably be taken to mean not under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol, rather than anything to do with having capacity. 
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 [A]lcohol abuse drug abuse so anything like that that may impact upon lifestyle and 
having children (participant 13, phase one) 
 
 
Participants only occasionally cited pregnancy complications and medical issues (sometimes 
relating to treatment efficacy) as the reason for concern about substance use, and in some 
cases this was linked to child welfare anyway: 
 
[I]f the recipients are smoking um, then there is the risk to their own health that you 
want to reduce as much as possible. And you can’t force people to give up smoking. 
But there’s also you know issues surrounding um, children, you want to make them 
aware, you know, that it’s, it’s, you shouldn’t really be smoking round about children, 
and you know there might well be a link to asthma in childhood, um, being exposed to, 
to smoke, so you want to make them aware of that. If they um, were drinking to 
excess then obviously that could affect them carrying a baby. Um, so you would want 
to make them aware of that and that would be an issue in that regard, not only 
regard that they smoked and they drank it was the fact that you know how could it 
affect their outcome and how could it affect the welfare of the child in the future? 
(participant 14, phase one) 
 
 
I would say smoking does affect health, isn’t it and if the patients can’t help 
themselves, why should somebody else help them? That’s one. Smoking does affect 
fertility. Yeah. And if they don’t want to stop it and help themselves, um, why should 
you fund a treatment which will be less accessible41, because of their smoking? 
(participant 16, phase one) 
 
 
                                                          
41
 Participant 16 may have meant “effective” instead of “accessible”.  
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While many participants acknowledged the welfare of the child-, patient health-, and 
treatment efficacy-related reasons counting against treatment, this was not considered to 
be reason enough for automatic exclusion. 
 Smoking had a similar status, but also occasionally represented an exception, as 
some participants noted that smoking would automatically exclude someone from receiving 
NHS-funded treatment: 
 
I think if they’re coming um, through the NHS, um I think there might be I think 
they’re, they’re not allowed to smoke (participant 08, phase one) 
 
 
 
It’s really the NHS-funded patients that are disqualified because of that (participant 
10, phase one) 
 
 
 
Participant 16 (phase one):  Um, say like, if you are a smoker, you’re not eligible for 
treatment. And we might not have come to know about 
it when they were put on the waiting list. 
Interviewer:    Ok. And is that all treatments or just NHS-funded 
treatment or? 
Participant 16:   Yeah NHS treatment. 
 
 
Like the BMI restrictions, this again may come from NICE guidelines, which state that 
‘[c]ouples should be informed that maternal and paternal smoking can adversely affect the 
success rates of assisted reproduction procedures’ (NICE, 2004, paragraph 1.10.6.2). 
NICE guidelines speak against drugs as well as against alcohol: ‘A number of 
prescription, over-the-counter and recreational drugs interfere with male and female 
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fertility, and therefore a specific enquiry about these should be made to people who are 
concerned about their fertility and appropriate advice should be offered’ (NICE, 2004, 
paragraph 1.1.9.1). This might suggest that smoking was more of a disqualifier than these 
drugs, as smoking could be a barrier to receiving NHS funding in cases, where in the case of 
drugs, only advice is suggested. Given the participants’ emphasis on NHS funding here, it is 
worth noting that being a non-smoker is in some instances only a condition for meeting 
funding criteria, rather than receiving treatment per se – a smoker could still self-fund and 
receive treatment. However, if smoking presents concerns for the welfare of the child, 
consistency and equality dictate that this should apply to patients regardless of their funding. 
Many participants were keen to stress that welfare of the child concerns relating to 
substance use cut across not just NHS- and self-funded patients, but also patients looking for 
treatment with donor gametes and those able to use their own gametes, and that there 
were no differences between their clinic’s treatment of these two groups in this regard. 
Hence, while such lifestyles could potentially create a barrier for patients looking to receive 
treatment, this would not be specific to treatment with donor gametes. These concerns 
could apply both to the patient seeking treatment, and to that patient’s partner. Treatment 
efficacy concerns could also apply to the partner, for example in cases where smoking or 
drug use could damage sperm. 
In summary, substance use was often linked to welfare of the child concerns, but 
participants did not tend to elaborate on what kind of welfare they thought would be at risk 
(physical or psychological). Some participants were concerned about the effect that 
substance abuse would have on treatment efficacy.  
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6.3.4 Time Waiting 
 
 Support for waiting time to be considered as a factor in any gamete allocation system 
was unanimous amongst phase one interview participants. While most workshop 
participants did not address this question directly, and none of the phase three participants 
did, those in the workshop that did held the same view as the phase one participants. This 
means that there is peculiarly little to report on this theme from the data. This concept often 
arose from the participants themselves, particularly in cases where the waiting list was a 
simple “first come, first served” system. Whenever this concept arose, participants 
supported the idea that it should be included as a factor in prioritisation: ‘Waiting time is a 
legitimate basis’ (participant 19, phase two). Those opposed to prioritisation based on other 
criteria tended to be in favour of this being used as the only relevant factor for allocation: 
‘Whatever comes down I will just decide first in that order. I never put one to the top of the 
pile and think “oh I’ll do this one or that one”, never. As they come down I just decide, I just 
see everyone exactly the same’ (participant 08, phase one). This general opposition to 
prioritisation based on other factors will be reported further in section 6.3.13 below. 
 
6.3.5 Parental Status 
 
Another general theme to arise was parental status, sometimes from participants 
and sometimes after prompting, and the extent to which already having children could count 
against treatment.  Central to these discussions were participants’ individual views on how 
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“parenthood” is defined, and their perceptions of what the fundamental “goods” of 
parenthood are. 
 One participant was adamant that previous children were only morally relevant if 
they were the children of both members of the couple.  For this participant, even if a couple 
had a child living with them who was born from either member’s previous relationship, this 
would not count against treatment: 
 
Their own child. And as a couple together, the child. If for example my partner has 
had children before is fairly irrelevant to me. It’s either their own child, children 
before, or them as a couple. But not the male partner’s previous children it’s 
irrelevant. And that’s quite often the situation if there is previous children, um where 
it will be the male partner’s previous children. Second most common scenario would 
be that they as a couple together would have had one child perhaps before. I think 
maybe the female urge to have children is perhaps a bit stronger. I would give 
preference to that. Or that they want to have children together (participant 10, phase 
one) 
 
 
This suggests a view that a woman should be given greater weight than a man, all other 
things being equal. This would mean that in cases where clinic staff are choosing between 
treating a couple where the man has previous children, or a couple where the woman has 
previous children, they should treat the first couple. It is also worth noting that this 
participant seems to be suggesting that the existing child’s age or place of residence (i.e. 
whether the child lived with the couple or was an adult that had moved away) is irrelevant. 
 It is not clear whether this participant meant that the child needed to be genetically 
related to them, or whether a child born from gamete donation would count as ‘their own 
child’. If genetic relatedness is the driving factor here, then not having a genetically-related 
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child would be an irrelevant prioritising factor for gamete donation since this treatment 
would not alter their position of being without a child of their own. 
 At the workshop, one participant suggested that patients could be allocated different 
numbers of prioritisation “points” based on how many members of the couple had previous 
children. So, in cases where there were no children, they would get the highest number of 
points. In cases where one member has a child and the other does not, they would get fewer 
points. In cases where they both had children, but not necessarily together as it were, fewer 
points still. While the participant did not say anything about residential status or how to 
conceive of parenthood per se, his/her ideas represent a system for implementing the 
consideration of previous parenthood into gamete allocation decision-making. 
 Like participant 10 above, participant 03 went into some detail about how 
parenthood was defined: 
 
[F]or couples that don’t have their own genetic child, to be denied at least one go at 
NHS-funded treatment is quite harsh. The way it is at the moment the no child in the 
home, it’s just ludicrous, because you have people say no well but, they’ll go and stay 
with their mother for half the time and, so then where is the child resident? […W]e’ve 
had an example a chap that’s had, frozen sperm, prior to chemotherapy but is now 
sterile, because of the chemotherapy, we’ve frozen the sample so we can use it for 
treatment but they have to self-fund it. Because they have a child. That’s quite harsh. 
Because in fact he’s sterile (participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
This participant felt that there were difficulties in assessing what was meant by a child ‘in the 
home’, and that some of the results of this criterion, for example refusing treatment to a 
sterile person, rendered this criterion ‘ludicrous’. 
 Some participants felt that a genetic connection would not be enough to count as 
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parenthood, citing sperm donors as an example: 
 
I think we have to keep that quite separate. You, you’re thinking of a sperm donor 
that then goes on to have their own family (participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
 
[B]y the letter of the law [the sperm donor] hasn’t fathered a child (participant 05, 
phase one) 
 
 
There was some agreement at the workshop that it would be ‘completely iniquitous’ 
(participant 26, phase two) to discount patients whose child had died. When pressed, some 
participants agreed that this suggested that the parenting experience was more important 
than biological processes like pregnancy or giving birth. 
One participant stressed that previous parenthood was only a factor if age was too: 
 
 [With younger patients] we wouldn’t even look at the children [.…] I think if 2 couples, 
both old age. So if they’re both equal in terms of age [I: yeah] but the one has children 
other one hasn’t we will give preference to the one who didn’t have, has [I: ok] not 
had children (participant 10, phase one) 
 
 
The fact that previous children are only considered if a patient is above a certain age makes 
this model similar to that detailed by participant 06 above in relation to BMI restrictions 
being loosened if a patient is older. This might suggest that these participants felt that there 
was something morally significant about allowing someone the chance to have children 
before it is too late. 
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 Another participant described the situation in similar terms: [I]f we don’t fast-track 
[an older patient] she may not get a chance to have a baby at all (participant 09, phase one); 
(s)he then went on to say that such a patient would not be entitled to such fast-tracking if 
they already had children:  
 
[I]f she’s come so, she’s already got 3 or 4 children, and she’s only doing it because 
she’s found a younger, new husband, I will not fast-track at all [.…H]er need to have 
another child is not as high as that of somebody who hasn’t got any children 
(participant 09, phase one) 
 
 
It is not clear what the significance of the husband’s being ‘younger’ here is, or whether any 
previous children of his would be taken into account. The ‘somebody’ in the next sentence 
thus seems like it applies to the next patient on the waiting list, suggesting that for this 
participant, it may only be women’s parenthood that is accounted for. 
 Participant 08 did not seem to think that such fast-tracking applied at all:  
 
I won’t prioritise them that. I mean it might I don’t know I don’t even I think even if 
we had a sperm shortage I still don’t think we’d think oh well they’ve had children, oh 
we’ll put them to the bottom of the pile, that would just never happen (participant 08, 
phase one) 
 
 
With regard to NHS-funded treatment, previous parenthood seemed to present more 
of an obstacle to receiving treatment. Whilst NICE guidelines do not address ‘social criteria 
for treatment (for example, whether it is single women or same-sex couples who are seeking 
treatment, or whether either partner in a couple already has children)’ (NICE, 2004, section 2, 
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p. 34), the recommendations from the Expert Advisory Group on Infertility Services in 
Scotland (EAGISS) do address such criteria, stating as a criterion for eligibility for assisted 
conception ‘No child living with the couple in their home’ (EAGISS, 1999, p. 5). One 
participant did not see this as relevant: 
 
[I]f it’s a partnership that’s got together, and one of the partners has children by a 
previous relationship then, some, primary care trusts won’t fund that.’ [… M]y 
thought, that would occur to me, why won’t you let if a couple already have a child by 
a previous marriage why won’t you pay for them to have another one? Because the 
health service is short of money and you’ve already got one. So we’d prefer to put the 
money into some that’s the way I would see it, into something, more important 
(participant 01, phase one) 
 
 
When asked what might be more important, the participant’s response was: 
 
I don’t know. Treatments for uh, and things that can’t be avoided that are not a 
choice. I think. […] Cancer treatments, X-ray things that are. If you want a child and 
you can’t have one, it’s your choice whether you try for IVF or whether you pay for it 
or it’s funded. If you get cancer, you’ve gotta have the treatment [I: yeah], no choice, 
that kind of, that’s the way my mind sees it (participant 01, phase one) 
 
 
Some participants reported that there was a guideline stating that patients could only be 
treated if they had no children living with them in their home, with one participant 
(apparently using “slightly” without irony) describing this requirement as ‘the slightly 
contentious one’ (participant 03, phase one).  
 Overall, the participants accepted the idea of treating patients who already had 
children, but importantly they were more reluctant in the case of donated eggs (due to the 
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scarcity). 
 Some participants felt that previous parenthood should not be accounted for in 
allocation decisions, and this was often grounded in the idea that all patients should be 
treated equally in this regard because they all share a desire for treatment:  
 
I don’t think it matters if you’ve got one or two kids, if you want one more that’s my 
experience (participant 02, phase one) 
 
 
 
I have to respect their wishes, because I’m, um, you, if you saw that someone had a 
child, you can’t say well they’ve got a child, ah well we’ll take this one behind them 
that hasn’t got a child, you can’t do that [I: ok], ‘cos everyone’s on that waiting list for 
different reasons, maybe a second relationship, it may be that having a second child is 
just as important if not more important than having a first child, or what however 
many children (participant 04, phase one) 
 
 
 
I don’t make any judgement about whether somebody has one child or 10 children, 
um, it’s it’s done on their desire. And I don’t think it’s right to judge whether we 
should allow patients to potentially have one, two or more children (participant 06, 
phase one) 
 
One participant raised some specific concerns about the ‘child in the home’ requirement, 
one of which was that this could encourage people to leave their children in order to receive 
treatment: 
 
[I]f she’s had a 17 year old and he’s away, there’s no child in the home so they get 
treatment. If she’s had a child and given it away to her ex-partner, there’s no child in 
the home. If they’ve come over from Poland and they’ve left the children behind, 
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there’s no child in the home, and that definitely seems wrong to me that you’ve left 
your child somewhere (participant 05, phase one) 
 
 
This suggests that this requirement might unintentionally generate tension with clinics’ 
welfare of the child obligations. Alongside his/her concerns about the fairness of this 
guideline, however, the participant acknowledged that there was a resource scarcity 
element to it too: [T]here are some of the guidelines that I know are unfair but I also know 
there’s not the money to treat all these people (participant 05, phase one). 
 Another participant thought it should not be the case that a couple whose child had 
left home could receive treatment when others with a child in the home could not. (S)he 
stated that given funding restrictions (s)he would prefer a broader conception of previous 
parenthood that would exclude from treatment those who already have children; resident, 
genetically related, or otherwise: 
 
[I]f you have a, a couple has a child living with them, no matter how the child came 
about, if that’s a criteria, even if child has left the home [...] I would not want to offer 
them, ‘cos they have enjoyed bringing up a child. […]So they’ve had that experience. ... 
It’s better to give that opportunity to someone else who’s never had that experience 
(participant 15, phase one) 
 
 
This participant thought it would be better if the excluding factor were something like 
“having previously raised children”, which would be more exclusive than the existing ‘no 
child in the home’ criterion. It should be noted that conceiving of the parenthood criterion as 
“having already raised children” would need slight modification, as it suggests a full 
parenting cycle, where one can say that the parenting experience has been completed. It 
222 
 
would thus need to be slightly amended, to reflect a present tense “is already raising 
children”. 
The workshop participants had a similarly broad range of views about whether 
previous parenthood should be taken into account at all, or if it should, how it should be 
conceived of. Some participants felt that it was legitimate to discriminate on these grounds 
as a way of negotiating the problem of finite resources. One participant raised the point that 
someone with previous children was making a more informed decision about whether they 
wanted to have another one than someone deciding about whether to have a first child, as 
the latter may have an idealised understanding of what parenthood is like. If the degree of 
information a patient has is to be considered in weighing up which patients should be more 
likely to receive treatment, then patients with children have a pro tanto advantage over 
patients without them. 
A related link was created between previous parenthood and child welfare when a 
participant noted that many welfare of the child assessments consider the status of a 
patient’s existing children (for example, if there has been involvement from social services), 
and that in this sense, previous parenthood could be used to assess the potential welfare of 
a future child. 
Another point raised by a participant at the workshop was whether it is preferable to 
be an only child or to grow up with siblings, and that it might be better to give a family 
another child rather than to create yet another family with only one child. As with 
participant 05 above, this frames the question of previous parenthood in terms of child 
welfare (both for the existing child and for the as yet unborn child) rather than in terms of 
patients’ interests. It would provide a reason to favour those who already have children, 
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over those who do not. Hence, the participants’ comments show that even if we can account 
for previous parenthood, it is not clear whether it should count in favour of or against 
prioritisation. 
Another important and perhaps more factual point that arose in the workshop is that 
a patient who has already had children using donor gametes could have more children with 
the same donor’s gametes without necessarily depriving someone else of the opportunity to 
start a family or to have additional children. There is a limit to how many families can be 
created from one donor (ten) but not on the number of children within those families. 
Adding more children to an existing family therefore neither precludes another patient from 
using this same donor to add children to their family, nor does it preclude new patients from 
using this donor up to the maximum permitted. Accordingly, and particularly in relation to 
sperm, it can be new donors, rather than gametes, that are in short supply. This is not strictly 
accurate, as even if this sperm is “assigned”42 to a recipient, it may not actually be used. At 
any rate, when this happens the donor is partially “used up” in the sense that they can only 
be assigned ten times. The problem of donors being assigned to recipients and their sperm 
never actually used is a question of logistics and communication between clinics, and these 
inefficiencies in the system may be a separate question from the ones being considered in 
this thesis. 
 In summary, there were mixed feelings between participants, both in the interviews 
and at the workshop, about how previous parenthood should be interpreted, or whether 
this should be used at all in deciding which patients should receive treatment. Participants 
                                                          
42 Given the HFEA’s upper limit of ten families per donor, sperm can be assigned to a maximum of ten 
different recipients. Such an assignation is sometimes referred to as a “pregnancy slot”. 
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tended to be unhappy with the idea that a child’s residential status should be taken into 
account, especially given the possibility of this conflicting with another child’s welfare (if it 
results in parents abandoning children, for example). Some participants felt that previous 
parenthood should not be accounted for at all. 
 
6.3.6 Refusing to Treat 
 
The philosophical analysis explored the suggestion that welfare of the child concerns 
could mean that clinics should take into account what may happen if they refuse to treat 
patients, rather than just what may happens when they do treat patients. This was usually 
raised by the researcher, though one participant raised this issue during a discussion of why 
clinics would treat lesbian couples or single women. The participant felt that situations 
where such people were refused could be problematic if they went on to attempt to 
conceive without the help of a clinic. The participant asked ‘is that in the best interests of 
anybody, not least the bloke who’s been duped into being a sperm donor? […] I’d feel very 
bad for the bloke’ (participant 11). So, the participant considered that there was potential for 
patients to deceive others if they perceived this to be their only option for conception. While 
the participant said that ‘we don’t have a responsibility for it’ and ‘I feel no compunction to 
stop them doing it if they want to do that’, his/her view was unclear overall, because upon 
being asked ‘is that a kind of contributing factor in the in the sort of desire if you like to treat 
lesbian couples, to avoid that kind of thing from happening these kind of private 
arrangements?’, the participant’s response was ‘I would say that probably is a factor in it’. 
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The participant added that there is another reason to treat such couples: ‘[T]here’s 
also the safety factor, you go sleep with [have sex with] somebody, you might get Chlamydia, 
you might give him Chlamydia’. The participant’s concerns were thus twofold in such cases: 
first, it is not ideal to conceive a child with an unwilling or unknowing man, and second, 
there are health risks associated with casual sexual encounters. After some probing, (s)he 
stated that this also applied to heritable diseases: ‘[I]f it’s an inheritable thing, oh quite 
definitely yeah, and they’re driven by that they don’t want to pass on Huntington’s or 
whatever, yeah absolutely of course that would be a motivation’ (participant 11, phase one). 
The notion that clinics ought to consider what patients will do if the clinic refuses to 
treat them was raised at the workshop by a member of the research team. The idea was met 
with disapproval, on the basis that this responsibility lay with patients, not clinics: ‘Patients 
have got to take responsibility for their own actions’ (participant 22, phase two). 
In summary, only one participant in the interviews thought that clinics should 
consider what might happen as a result of their refusal to treat somebody. This participant 
drew on the problem of genetic diseases, but also the possibility of people making private 
arrangements to conceive that could result in disease or unwanted (by some parties) 
pregnancy. Workshop participants disagreed that clinics should take this into account, given 
the disadvantage to other patients, and because they believed that clinical responsibility did 
not stretch to encompass everything that a patient might do when turned away.  
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6.3.7 Welfare 
 
The welfare of the child was a consideration with respect to age, BMI, and substance 
abuse. It was, however, also a concern in its own right, in both interview phases and in the 
workshop, including how the welfare of children weighed against the welfare of others. 
Concern for the welfare of the child was a common theme, occurring repeatedly in all 
interviews in various contexts, and usually this was raised by the participants themselves. 
This is unsurprising given its prominence in the HFE Act, which gives clinics a legal obligation 
to make the welfare of the child a consideration in all treatment decisions. There was thus 
widespread support for child welfare to be considered, with one interview participant 
stating that ‘procreators owe a duty to the future child to be reasonably assured any such 
child will have a minimally decent life. I do not think there are insuperable problems in 
estimating whether any future child will have a life so bad that it should not be conceived’ 
(participant 32, phase three). 
There was, however, disagreement about how to account for child welfare. Some 
participants described the welfare of children as “paramount”, which goes further than the 
HFE Act and echoes the Children Act 1989. The latter specifies how court decisions about the 
upbringing of children should be decided: ‘the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration’ (Children Act, 1989, section 1 (1) (a)). Some participants, however, saw their 
primary concern being the welfare of the gamete recipients: 
 
[E]mbryo transfers and egg collections could be complicated by pelvic infection, 
septicaemia and they could end up in death, if a fulminating infection so if you are 
intervening, and putting a person’s life at risk, to get the best benefit then you have 
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to make sure that the circumstances are justifiable [. …] I cannot stand and defend 
myself, having authorised intervention when I knew that the risks are gonna be higher’ 
(participant 18, phase one) 
 
 
 Some hinted that already-existing people (namely patients themselves) were more 
important than those not yet born or conceived: 
 
[Our specialist obstetricians] also advised us we shouldn’t, you know after 40, blood 
pressure, fibroid, variety of things all plenty of things, postpartum haemorrhage, all 
that increases so that, that is a bigger concern for us. I think although in the back of 
mind we have ‘older mother how is she going to cope and how much time is she going 
to get?’ You’re not going to see them, you know once they’re out from here, although 
that concern is there we’re not facing it if you like. So, the welfare of the mother 
during pregnancy, it’s a bigger concern. In the short term (participant 15, phase one) 
 
 
The addition of ‘in the short term’, however, makes it unclear as to whether this participant 
thought that issues in the near future were more important than long-term child welfare 
issues. This may support the idea their obligations to future and existing children are not 
clear to staff. 
Perhaps contrary to this, participants did not tend to prioritise existing children over 
potential children. When asked which of the two was more important, one participant 
commented: ‘I would put importance on both of them. I don’t spend my life thinking which 
one’s more important than the other’ (participant 05, phase one). 
Given the prominence of welfare of the child considerations both in the legislation 
and in the interviews, it was a subject that was raised at the workshop, both in my own 
presentation and in discussion groups. Participants were specifically asked about their views 
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on paramountcy, in order to clarify what weight it should be given.  Some participants were 
clear in their view that paramountcy meant that welfare of the child considerations should 
be dealt with first, and that once they had been satisfied to a certain (not necessarily 
maximal) extent, other considerations could come into play. This would suggest that welfare 
of the child considerations are lexically prior to other considerations. 
Some workshop participants were concerned that the welfare of the child stipulation 
in the HFE Act was being used wrongly. Participant 19 suggested that welfare of the child 
should only be used to avoid the births of children with severe disabilities or diseases, and 
should not be used to justify judgements about things like which people would make better 
parents. The participant disagreed that welfare of the child should be considered paramount 
in the above way, stating that ‘the logical conclusion is unacceptable’ (participant 19, phase 
two). 
This participant argued that patients presenting with other child welfare issues 
should be treated anyway, and that social services could be contacted later. Many of the 
other participants appeared to disagree with this, with one describing it as ‘totally 
irresponsible’ (participant 26, phase two). Either these participants felt that such patients 
should be excluded outright, or that social services should be contacted earlier to prevent 
the problem rather than clearing up the mess afterwards. 
Participant 26’s concerns about the use of welfare of the child considerations were, 
however, echoed by some, who felt that even if there was evidence to suggest that welfare 
of the child is better secured by some parents rather than others, we may not want to 
prioritise treatment on that basis. The most popular illustration used in relation to this 
argument was the patients’ financial situation. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that the 
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financial status of parents could have an impact on a child’s welfare, most participants 
thought that this should not be taken into account when allocating gametes. At the 
workshop, participant 30’s comment summarises this view: ‘[T]here’s lots of statistically 
significant features of parents, which may have a big impact statistically on kids’ welfare, but 
would nonetheless be morally repugnant reasons to prioritise people.’ Clearly, for the 
participants who took this line, other considerations competed with child welfare for 
paramountcy. 
A related concern voiced by one workshop participant was that child welfare as an 
argument against treatment is used in a way that is ‘highly selective’ (participant 29). This 
participant commented that:  
 
[W]e’re going to check lesbians while in fact all the evidence indicates that lesbians 
are no problem whatsoever, but we never check into the sexual history of all the child 
abuse of the parents, while in fact we know that there is at least a very high risk that 
they are going to abuse their own children [.…W]hy are we looking at a certain 
number of things? Because we do not like them. […I]f you’re concerned that welfare 
of the child is indeed paramount then explain to me why these people should have 
treatment (participant 29, phase two) 
 
 
The participant’s overall point here was that welfare of the child considerations are invoked 
in some cases and not in others, and that this distinction does not reflect the actual body of 
evidence about what factors can affect child welfare, but rather reflects the personal 
preferences of clinical staff. 
Hence, the discussions on child welfare created widespread disagreement, both in 
the interviews and at the workshop. There was disagreement about how welfare of the child 
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principle should be implemented in general, and disagreement on its bearing in relation to 
gamete allocation. The data collected presented little evidence that participants thought 
that already-existing people should be prioritised over those yet to exist, and participants 
also seemed to think that the welfare of children born of treatment, and the welfare of 
those affected by the birth, were on equal footing. 
 
6.3.8 Violence 
 
 Some participants discussed whether a patient’s history of violence could count 
against their having treatment. Participants tended to raise this themselves. One interview 
participant cited a case where a patient who had been previously imprisoned for assaulting a 
child, was given treatment:  
 
[W]e have the welfare of the child of any potential child you know if somebody’s already 
had a history of that, and the people that that spoke against it were very clear that, um, 
that they felt that he’d done it once and he could do it again [….I]t was a reasoned 
discussion, as opposed to well I just don’t believe that’s right, um, on any level. They were 
involved in all the discussion and they could make a reasoned argument […] so I think 
there is a difference from an outright “no” (participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
In this case there was disagreement in the clinic about whether this patient should be 
treated. The participant’s final statement appears to suggest that an automatic exclusion is 
not the best way to deal with things, and that each case must be assessed individually. 
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 Another participant at the same clinic referred to ‘the exclusion criteria of violence’ 
and when asked ‘why do they exclude people based on these things that you’ve mentioned?’ 
the response was: 
 
Welfare of the child […W]e have to take in account, as we’re asked to by the HFEA, 
the welfare of the child and of any existing children, so you really want to know that if 
you’re going to these great lengths to help a couple have a child, that that child will 
have a relatively healthy and safe upbringing. To take things to that length we would 
ask for GPs’ input, perhaps even depending if there’d been violence past social work 
input, if there’d been drugs in the past you know we’d ask for more input [I: yep] 
before we made any dramatic final decisions, either to treat them or to not treat 
them (participant 05, phase one)  
 
It looks as though for these participants, violence requires concrete evidence if it is to act as 
an excluder. 
 At another clinic, a participant mentioned violence but did not go so far as to say how 
it operated in terms of excluding or counting against patients: 
 
There’s things that are looked at but, but not I mean, you know you’ve got to be 
realistic about how people live their lives and it isn’t our job per se to intrude on them 
beyond ensuring that they’re, uh to the best of our ability, that they’re not likely to 
abuse the you know, abuse their children. […] And that they’re not violent and they’re 
not in a discordant you know, or their children or their wife or anything else like that 
so once you’ve covered that, that’s, that’s as far as it goes (participant 07, phase one) 
 
 
The participant mentioned, then, that the clinic would try to ensure that people were not 
likely to abuse the child. 
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 One participant from a private clinic noted that a criminal record for domestic 
violence (they did not specify whether in the partner or the patient themselves) would 
definitely exclude a patient: 
 
 Domestic violence, um, I think if someone has, if there’s if there’s significant violence 
that causes somebody to have a criminal record I think that would be a definitely a, 
um, disqualifying factor but I think that’s probably unlikely, I’m more talking about 
um, domestic violence and, and um issues of safety of previous children under their 
care perhaps (participant 10, phase one) 
 
  
While there seemed to be a difference between clinics about how seriously they took 
histories of violence, it was at least clear from most participants that concern about violence 
was predominantly a welfare of the child issue, summed up neatly by participant 02: [W]e 
don’t want to provide another football to get kicked round the family home (participant 02, 
phase one) 
Violence, then, was something that staff generally took quite seriously In terms of 
what steps should be taken to discover violence, some participants, questioned how 
appropriate it was to “intrude” into the lives of patients to try to discover histories of 
violence. 
 
6.3.9 Same-Sex Couples and Single Patients 
 
 There was some uncertainty and perhaps disagreement regarding funding for single 
women. This was sometimes raised by the participants, and sometimes by the interviewer. 
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None of the participants reported that their clinic would exclude a patient on the basis that 
they have come in for treatment as a single woman:  
 
[S]ingle women or same-sex, they’re, why should they not be treated? There has to be 
a very good reason not to treat (participant 05, phase one) 
 
[L]ive and let live [laughs], the if you’re a single woman or if you’re a lesbian woman 
and you want a baby, speak to [name], our counsellor, about the implications of these 
things, and yes we will treat you because the alternative is you go and find somebody 
on a Friday night and shag them and you don’t know what you’re gonna get and 
everything else, you know, so we’ll treat you, yeah [note that this response is related 
to the comment above about clinics taking into account the consequences of their 
refusal to treat] (participant 11, phase one) 
 
 
 One participant noted a practical difficulty, in that sperm matching was problematic 
in cases of single women and same-sex couples:  
 
[T]hey’re treated um, exactly the same, but in point of view of my donor sperm and 
everything, um, if anything they’re more tricky to um, assign donor sperm because 
with the um, and the same-sex couples ‘cos with heterosexual couples I try and match 
the um, man’s characteristics, um, whereas with the same-sex couple and single 
women, it’s more difficult to assign, because I’m not really sure what they’re after, or 
[I: mmm] not not maybe sure if they know so that’s why it’s good to give them two 
choices to consider and think about height, eyes, and hair and so I find that more 
difficult to assign than the heterosexual couples (participant 08, phase one) 
 
 
 In terms of funding, one participant commented: [S]ingle women, they’re kinda. I 
don’t think they do get treated on the NHS (participant 12, phase one). While this clinic might 
not have a policy of excluding single patients, they might still be excluded from NHS funding 
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(if this participant is correct about the situation), much like in the case of smoking detailed 
above. This will depend on local eligibility criteria, and how they interpret infertility (some 
Trusts interpret infertility as failing to conceive after having regular unprotected sex for a 
certain time period, which may exclude single women – see (University Hospitals of Leicester 
NHS Trust, 2011)), because as has previously been mentioned, the NICE guidelines do not 
comment on social factors such as these. It is interesting to note that this participant was 
not certain about the funding situation for single women – this suggests that some staff may 
be uncertain about what the criteria for funding are. 
 A slightly different funding issue was mentioned by another phase one participant at 
a different clinic: 
 
 Interviewer:   [A]re you saying that single women can’t get NHS funding here? 
Participant 14:  Uh, that, I think they now can get NHS funding. I can’t tell you 
for definite if we’ve had anybody through yet, um but I think 
they can get NHS funding. 
Interviewer:   Oh ok, right. 
Participant 14:  Um. But I think they still need to pay for their donor sperm 
 
 
According to this participant, it may be the case that while these patients can get NHS-
funded treatment, they still need to pay for donor sperm, which women in couples may not 
need to do. 
 Another participant presented a different view: 
 
Under NHS funding, single women are not eligible [I: right], and the same would apply to 
gamete donation. Um. And, because I’m a pure NHS employee, I haven’t really given a 
thought to it. Because I’ve always worked within that constraint that single women are 
not eligible (participant 15, phase one) 
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 Another participant suggested that there could be a welfare of the child issue at play 
in treating single women: 
 
Of course I mean you have to look at the stable relationship as one factor, uh if it’s a 
single woman seeking treatment is the child growing or going to grow up in an 
environment that is, because the child, the Code of Practice, as it evolved, one of the 
things that the child should grow in a satisfactory environment including the, the 
need for a father figure in the environment, I mean that was one of the issues, that 
was in one of the code of conduct, sorry Code of Practice uh documents (participant 
18, phase one) 
 
The participant should perhaps be taken as referring to the historical context of the 
legislation, given the 2008 amendment to the HFE Act that removed the requirement to 
consider a child’s need for a father, or indeed the fact that the NICE guidelines explicitly 
state that they are not intended to make any comment on single women. Still, this quotation 
also demonstrates the staff’s uncertainty, and that their interpretation of statutory criteria 
and funding criteria by both clinics and individuals within those clinics can present hurdles 
for patients. 
 Most participants considered the treatment of same-sex couples in much the same 
light as they did the treatment of single women, or of anyone else: 
 
[S]ame-sex couples, not an issue. They would be treated the same as any other couple 
(participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
 
Again if they’re covered for welfare of the child, no problems (participant 13, phase 
one) 
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 It’s the same. Just the same for everybody going through (participant 01, phase one) 
 
 
 
I’m not aware of any clinic that discriminates people because they are same-sex or 
single. I thought all clinics [inaudible]. To the best of my knowledge I think most 
almost every clinic in this country treats everybody (participant 09, phase one) 
 
It is unclear whether participants who referred to “same-sex couples”, meant only same-sex 
female couples. One participant commented that his/her clinic excluded same-sex male 
couples: 
 
[W]e have something we call a welfare of the child assessment, so unless there is a 
problem there, we would allow them access, um, the exception to that at this stage in 
our clinic is um same-sex male couples. […I]t’s our policy not to treat them 
(participant 10, phase one) 
 
 
While this participant initially separated the exclusion of same-sex male couples from the 
welfare of the child assessment, his explanation of this exclusion was very much rooted in 
welfare of the child considerations:  
 
I feel that the presence of a mother is absolutely essential. The presence of a father is 
not that essential it’s preferable, but I don’t feel it’s essential, […] so, our policy clinic, 
uh our clinic policy is not to treat same-sex male couples. […T]his is not a practical 
problem as in difficulty obtaining. There obviously there would be difficulty like in any 
donor egg treatment there’s always difficulty in obtaining eggs, or and obtaining 
surrogates, but that is not the reason why we decline the treatment to them. It is 
more an uh ethical concern than a practical concern (participant 10, phase one) 
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A participant at another clinic shared a similar view about the effect on child welfare, though 
it was not merely restricted to same-sex male couples: 
 
[W]hat we accept in this society as a norm, there is a mother and a father. And both 
have their place in child’s upbringing. Children I feel, they need their mother more 
when they’re young, I think. But paternal influence is equally important. And I don’t 
quite know how these children cope with, I don’t know what happens to them when 
they go to school. How do they face that? How the other children react to them 
(participant 15, phase one) 
 
The participant acknowledged that patients could receive treatment with donor gametes as 
same-sex couples, but expressed concern that a child needs both a mother and a father in 
order to have a normal upbringing and avoid social stigma. 
 This theme barely arose at the workshop, in spite of being included in the main 
presentation. The participants in the interviews often considered same-sex couples and 
single patients together, and one workshop participant commented that these groups 
should be treated as distinct groups in discussions about gamete allocation because the 
concerns surrounding each group are different. While the discussion in the philosophical 
analysis ultimately concluded that child welfare worries were not sufficiently supported by 
the evidence for either group, it was argued in the philosophical analysis that patient welfare 
is an issue that divides single patients and same-sex couples. We thus have both theoretical 
and data-led reasons to distinguish between these groups. 
In summary, there were varying opinions about providing treatment to single 
patients and same-sex couples. There were some minority concerns that children need both 
maternal and paternal influences in its early life, and as such it seemed like such participants 
would favour heterosexual couples, who could provide both of these influences. 
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6.3.10 Patient Choice 
 
Patient choice was a common theme. Where the philosophical analysis considered 
this predominantly from the perspective of the gamete donors, the study participants 
tended to focus on gamete recipients (for simplicity’s sake, we will characterise both 
recipients and donors as patients). This was usually raised by the participants. Many 
participants emphasised the importance of allowing patients to make their own decisions, 
and suggested that the role of clinical staff was to advise and inform, not to dictate what 
patients should do. For one participant, there was a greater emphasis on choice when 
recipients were paying for their own treatment: 
 
[I]f we said “you should definitely only have 1 back because you’re 23 and blah blah 
blah”, people would just be like “I’m paying money here so how can you tell me what I 
should do?” [I: yeah] whereas if you take a sort of more rounded approach to it you 
can usually get people to understand the reasoning why you’re saying it and it’s for 
their own good and not because you’re being mean (participant 13, phase one) 
 
 
This participant’s notion of a ‘rounded approach’ to advising patients is something that came 
up in multiple interviews. For some participants, there seemed to be a tension between 
giving patients the freedom to choose, and the participant’s desire to steer patients away 
from choices that they thought were ill-advised/imprudent. Such a choice was characterised 
by this participant as one with a low chance of a successful outcome: 
 
[I]t’s very sad, some people get really angry if you don’t treat them, and make 
complaints against the clinic, when really you know you’re saying that your chances 
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are so low, you know this is hence the reason why we’re, you know perhaps we’re not 
treating you, but donated gametes, that’s sort of really the last stop, and if it’s their 
turn, if it’s their time to come through, although their chance is maybe low, again 
who are we to say “no, we’re not gonna give you that chance to go ahead with an 
egg donor”? Because maybe it’s that you know a donated egg’ll make all the 
difference (participant 04, phase one) 
 
 
The above quotation suggests that in some cases a patient would be refused because of a 
low chance of a positive outcome, but also that it is not the place of staff to refuse people. 
This further demonstrates the tension between allowing a patient to choose for themselves, 
and the staff member’s desire for the patient to make a certain choice. Participant 13 said ‘I 
don’t think it’s good to tell people what to do, but you kind of hope’, and this seemed to be 
the overall response to such tensions: staff would make recommendations to patients, but 
usually they would ultimately defer to the patients’ choices. It is not clear whether there was 
a distinction between self-funded or NHS-funded patients in this respect. 
 Other participants were less concerned about patients making choices that may not 
be in their best interests, and seemed happier to defer to patient choice without feeling this 
tension. Participant 01 felt that giving patients the choice was the priority, regardless of 
whether these resulted in interventions with very low chances of success: ‘The fact that 2% 
it’s not really a good odds, if they want to basically what I’m thinking is if they want to waste 
their money, it’s their choice. […I]t’s up to up to every individual what they do with their own 
earnings’ (participant 01, phase one). 
 On a similar note, however, another participant had the opposing view that it would 
be wrong to take money from patients if their chances were low: ‘I don’t agree with some 
that go on and treat people again and again and again, taking their money’ (participant 05) 
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 One participant raised a practical concern with regard to gamete recipients making 
choices about who their donor would be:  
 
[W]e have 2 red-headed donors, and we can’t, they’re not very popular [I: right], and 
so there might be wastage from them but that’s, that’s, you know we’ve taken them 
on, they’re good donors, nice people, but that’s patients don’t choose them. You could 
say that’s wastage (participant 12, phase one) 
 
 
Overall, then, while some staff may have felt slightly uncomfortable (both for reasons of 
treatment efficacy and for practical reasons) and attempted to suggest patients take a 
particular course of action, the choice was usually in the hands of the patient. 
 This was often the case for gamete donors also: ‘[C]ertain, stipulations are fine, um, if 
they say no same-sex couples, um, no Italians, no Indians whatever. Little stipulations like 
that you can cope with’ (participant 01, phase one). This participant was happy to allow 
donors to make some stipulations about who could receive their gametes, but expressed 
concerns that sometimes this made matching too complicated:  
 
But when you get onto got to be married got to have a university degree got to,  and 
it’s a little bit too much so, in a way if you get too much leeway. But because donors 
are so hard to come by, it’s basically you gratefully accept what you can get to be 
honest (participant 01, phase one) 
 
While the participant suggested that donors were allowed too much freedom to make 
stipulations, (s)he noted that it was necessary to allow this due to the shortage of donors. 
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In contrast to this, participant 02 (phase one) stated that their clinic would not accept 
donors’ stipulations, but rather take donors in for counselling until they no longer wanted to 
make such stipulations about the use of their gametes. The participant offered several 
reasons for this. One issue was that this could have an effect on the child born of treatment. 
The participant gave an example of a donor who had been refused after requesting that his 
sperm did not go to a lesbian couple: ‘I wanted him to think very carefully about what the 
effect would be on any potential children who were born, who read that, um, if they 
themselves particularly did turn out to be gay’ (participant 02, phase one) For this participant 
there were welfare of the child concerns associated with accepting donor stipulations. 
 Another concern that this participant voiced was that it might be practically difficult 
to honour the stipulations, and cited the consequences of a mistake as a serious problem: 
‘[T]he potential for it going wrong, the potential for it sort of what if we did let slip. Um, oh 
shit we’ve let a lesbian couple use this, what do we do about it then?’ (participant 02, phase 
one). 
  
6.3.10.1 Matching 
 
 Related to the concept of patient choice is that of patient matching, which is the 
process in which clinical staff attempt to allocate gametes to patients who have similar 
characteristics to the donor. The matching of gamete recipients to donors with regard to 
characteristics such as ethnicity and hair/eye colour was sometimes the very first thing that 
participants mentioned when asked about how gametes were allocated in their clinic In 
some cases, interview participants suggested that this occurred at the request of the 
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recipients. For example, the comment that red-headed donors are ‘not very popular’ 
(participant 12, phase one), and thus do not get used up even when they are readily 
available. There are, however, examples to the contrary in the data: ‘They have to state on 
the well they state on the form what they are and I just take yeah the presumption that they 
will want the same or as close as possible’ (participant 08, phase one). This participant 
suggested, though, that this was not mandatory, and that recipients could choose if they 
wanted: ‘[A]s long as it was written all on a form I would assign the characteristics they 
wanted’. This means that matching was presumed but not compulsory. 
 
 To summarise this section on patient choice, attitudes towards recipient choice were 
quite different to attitudes towards donor choice. While some participants had some qualms 
about allowing unfettered patient choice for fear of their making decisions with poor 
chances of a successful outcome, they felt in general that it was important to respect what 
the patient wanted. There were mixed views about donors making stipulations, however, 
and this was sometimes rooted in child welfare, but sometimes in practical views regarding 
the management of these stipulations within the clinic. With regard to matching, there was 
sometimes a presumption that recipients would want gametes from people with similar 
characteristics to them, but it seemed like patients could request otherwise if they desired. 
 
6.3.11 Known Donors 
 
 During each interview, participants were asked about their views on the use of 
known donors. The following is typical of the responses:  
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[I]t would save them a long wait. We do do that, we do have some cases like that, um, 
fine, not a problem […]No problem with it I think the more that could do that, um, 
would be, probably a good thing. I can’t see any reason, anything that’s wrong with it 
(participant 01, phase one) 
 
One participant drew a distinction between the limitations placed by known donors on who 
receives their gametes and other stipulations about recipients: 
 
[I]t’s ok to say “I just want my family, my my friend to just use this donor sperm.” I 
think there’s a very sort of clear distinction between that, um I think there’s a big 
difference from someone saying “oh I’ll I only I don’t want same sex couples using my 
sperm” (participant 08, phase one) 
 
This distinction was echoed at the workshop and the nature of the relationship was given as 
a justification. There was some concern that donors excluding certain groups of recipients 
could cause offence, particularly to the child who is born, and that this thus represented a 
welfare of the child concern. 
 The workshop also suggested that a distinction should be made between donors who 
are known to a patient and donate to that patient (i.e. directly to them or their partner), and 
donors that are known to a patient and who donate on behalf of that patient to another 
patient on the list, so that the patient they know benefits. This benefit may take the form of 
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either by receiving gametes from another donor straight away, or by being moved higher up 
the list. 
 Another participant felt that allowing known donors could only provide benefits, with 
no disadvantages to anyone: ‘[y]ou know so it is a it is a bit of a win-win if they, if they’re on 
the waiting list and they don’t recruit somebody, then you’re stood where you are, but if 
they’ve recruited the donor you actually move up’ (participant 03, phase one). 
 Some participants, however, highlighted potential problems with known donation, 
one of which was to do with social stigma and perception: 
 
[T]here is something perceptual in, in a sister helping a sister, that feels different to a 
brother being a sperm donor. [I]t is to do with the way that you get sperm, as 
opposed to the way that you get eggs. […] I could understand that somebody would 
quite happily say my sister donated an egg to me, and I think people would, you know 
that you can’t just you know the egg doesn’t magically get fertilised in some ways, 
whereas it comes down to the sperm donation where it is, you know it is possible isn’t 
it, to get pregnant (participant 07, phase one) 
 
 
The participant seemed to be suggesting that there is a difference between the social 
perception of a woman using donor sperm from a family member, and the social perception 
of a woman using a donor egg from a family member. This may stem from the fact that 
“donor sperm” (of a sort) could be attained outside a clinic through sex (perhaps with 
connotations of incest if it were a blood relative, or with connotations of one’s brother 
having sex with one’s partner), whereas this could not be the case for donor eggs. Such a 
situation is unlikely but perhaps symbolically compelling for this participant. 
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Participant 02 (phase one) raised the issue of how known donation would affect 
families, with the question: ‘what’s the family dynamics gonna be if it’s within the family?’, 
though this only slightly hints at what a potential problem might be.  
Another participant asked more or less the same question with regard to non-familial 
known donation: ‘they need to be well informed about the possible long term psychological 
problems, because it’s not anonymous and it’s not in the family [.…] What is the dynamics 
gonna be between the friends?’ (participant 10, phase one). 
 Another participant expressed some concern that known donation may not be fully 
voluntary: 
 
I think a direct donation has a place. I’m particularly happy with that if it’s in the 
family. So a sister to sister donation of egg for example. If it’s somebody that was 
recruited and a direct donation I’m slightly more uncomfortable with that, ‘cos there 
might be some degree of um, what’s the right word, um, coercion? Involved there. 
Um, but we wouldn’t, we wouldn’t refuse to treat somebody on a direct donation 
basis with the, with their own recruited donor. But I would want counselling involved 
very early on (participant 10, phase one) 
 
 
This participant seemed to think that coercion was less likely with family donation than with 
donating to strangers. 
 One participant even cited a case that seemed more like exploitation than coercion: 
 
I have a feeling looking at everything that donor has probably taken undue advantage 
or, I don’t know whether I should use the word “blackmail” but, you know I’m doing 
this for you, so this donor, I think this recipient broke her bank balance completely 
because the donor, her children everybody else, every time came she had to put them 
up in a hotel accommodation, so I have reservations about it (participant 15, phase 
one) 
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While these participants were perhaps a little more apprehensive than some others, they 
would still accept such donations, at least in certain circumstances. The same view came 
across at the workshop – participants felt that social issues might indicate a need for 
counselling, or extra counselling specifically targeted at things like identity issues, but in 
general the participants seemed to think that such arrangements were permissible if these 
issues were adequately addressed. 
In contrast to this, there was one participant who was uncomfortable with the 
practice of known donation full stop: 
 
I think it is like opening a can of worms or as they say. Um, you know for future of the 
baby. At least with the anonymous donor, although they can trace, uh the father at 
age 18, they at least grow up as a donor child, whereas with the known donor I don’t 
know how it works...My concerns. I don’t know, it sounds very complicated for me you 
know. Um, even if he has just provided the sperm and gone away, what the woman is 
going to tell the child, etc. Mmm, I don’t know. […] I think it’s about what relation has 
this woman got with the man [I: ok] and how it is going to affect the baby (participant 
16, phase one) 
 
 
Another participant also voiced child welfare concerns: 
 
I sit with a couple, and say um, you know, you might have a great relationship with 
your younger sister now but in 10 years’ time but in a fit of pique ‘cos you fall out she 
says that’s not your daughter that’s mine, genetically that’s true, um how do you 
think the child’s gonna feel? And you’ve gotta be open with the child’ (participant 11, 
phase one) 
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These concerns seemed to be justified with reference to the welfare of the child principle, 
due to worries about what the relationship between the child and the donor would be like 
(assuming it is known to the child that they are donor-conceived in the first place). It is not 
clear, however, given the last comment about openness, how much these concerns are 
intrinsic to known donation, or how much they are dependent on the idea of telling the child 
about their genetic heritage and the problems of secrecy. Secrecy was also mentioned by 
participant 03, who considered that there could be problems where family members neglect 
to tell each other about known donation arrangements: ‘we all know secrets are very 
dangerous in families’. This participant, however, went on to say that ‘patients have never 
come back and said do you know what happened it all fell apart’ (participant 03, phase one), 
suggesting that, at least in this their experience, these putative problems have never actually 
manifested themselves. 
Participants across all phases were not particularly concerned that using known 
donors was unfair in any way, and one participant strove to make the distinction between 
known donors and more general conditional donation: ‘I think conditional donation is 
ethically permissible only so long as it consistent with broadly construed principles of equality 
and non-discrimination (i.e. I would not allow donation only to a designated ethnic group)’ 
(participant 32, phase three). 
Another participant argued in the context of a stipulation against same-sex couples 
that the conditional donation could create child welfare issues where the child might be 
offended: ‘there’s potential for problems between people regarding welfare of the child stuff 
[….]What if the child was gay?’ (participant 02, phase two). 
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Concerns about known donors tended to be about social issues, like the stigma of a 
woman using her partner’s brother’s sperm, or about the relationship between the child and 
the donor. There was also concern about coercion in some circumstances, as in the example 
of the recruited donor, or the patient who was “blackmailed”. 
 
6.3.12 National Allocation System 
 
As with known donors, the concept of a national allocation system was raised (in the 
interviews) by direct questioning rather than by participants. It was left up to the 
participants to consider what a national system would look like, but when some of them 
asked for further information, it was explained to them that it could be a way of equalising 
waiting times across the country to prevent unfairness in this regard. At the workshop, it was 
suggested to the participants that a national system could improve fairness for patients. 
In the interviews, the idea of a national system for gamete donors and recipients was 
met with universal disapproval, though some participants were more amenable to the idea 
than others. The disapproval broadly took two forms, both of which are prominent in the 
interview data. 
 The first was practical. Some participants, particularly those who seemed to have 
more involvement with matching donors and recipients, were concerned that matching was 
difficult enough on the relatively small-scale basis within one clinic, and so doing this on a 
larger scale would be logistically difficult, expensive and untenable: 
 
 [T]he logistics would be a nightmare (participant 01, phase one) 
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[I]t would be a huge task [….] I think it would be quite a difficult one to, to manage, 
and quite big (participant 03, phase one) 
 
 
 
Absolutely not, when I see the waiting list I’ve got here, and matching characteristics 
with what we’ve got, it’s a minefield (participant 13, phase one) 
 
 
 
[T]he expense involved in having this kind of national system (participant 07, phase 
one) 
 
 
The second concern was about clinics gaining access to gametes. Participants had a sense 
that, seeing as they had put in effort to recruit donors, it would be unfair to then reallocate 
those donors to recipients in other clinics:  
 
[W]e’ve got enough to supply our own needs [I: yeah] thank you. We haven’t got 
enough eggs but nowhere’s got enough eggs. Um, we work damned hard getting 
eggs as well, um. Will people make as much effort, do you think, if it’s a national 
thing? (participant 02, phase one) 
 
 
There was a sense of ownership over the donor banks, such that staff did not want to 
relinquish control over the gametes of the donors that they had put the time into recruiting:  
 
 [W]hy should I send my you know we’ve worked bloody hard, we’ve put hours into 
these which is really mean, and small-minded, and I know all this, but you know […]. 
Am I gonna hand those nice lads off to [other clinic] who can’t be bloody arsed? And 
anyway, who are making shedloads more money than we are out of the whole deal. 
Um, ‘cos we want to keep our prices down. They don’t bother about that, and they’re 
gonna waltz off with my donors? Bugger off. It’s mine (participant 02, phase one) 
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Participant 05 was ambivalent, but ultimately came down on the same side as participant 02: 
 
I don’t think I would like it, but equally I don’t like the postcode lottery that you can 
get something one place and not something anywhere else, but that said patients we 
do very well by our patients here in [name of city] they get 8 cycles of treatment, but 
we put a lot of work into getting our donors, so I suppose I wouldn’t like the idea that 
nationally I was told I could only give them less treatment, when actually we put a lot 
of resource into supplying the donors, so I don’t think I’d be comfortable relinquishing 
that, you don’t like using the word control but I suppose that’s what it is (participant 
05, phase one) 
 
  
There was also a concern that staff liked to get to know their donors, and that this would be 
more difficult if the waiting list was nationalised: 
 
[W]e’ve always been very proactive at sperm recruitment and we’re also very fussy 
about donors. […] We want to get to know them and we want them to get to know us, 
so yeah we sort of look after them, and because we’ve got a good relationship going 
with the current donors, […] and if I don’t like ‘em if I can’t take to them I’ll go on and 
on and on and on until I know what I’m happy with. […]I justify that by saying that’s 
my bit of welfare of the child. I have a duty with regard to the welfare of the child if 
there’s something about somebody that puts me off (participant 02, phase one) 
 
 
It is not clear from the above quotation how this more personalised way of screening donors 
would impact on child welfare, but the concept of getting to know donors more personally 
came up often at the workshop. One idea was that staff wanted to personally ensure that if 
a donor-conceived person (upon reaching 18 years of age) went to meet their donor, the 
donor would treat them well. Hence, staff members suggested that they wanted to maintain 
a system where they could personally meet donors, so that if they thought that a donor 
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might compromise child welfare that far down the line, they could reconsider accepting 
them as donors. 
 The idea of a national system generated a great deal of discussion at the workshop. 
Participants went into more detail regarding the concern about “freeriding” clinics – those 
that do not make as many efforts to recruit donors benefiting from the efforts of others. 
There was a suggestion at the workshop that the sharing of gamete donors would require a 
‘cooperative element’ (participant 26, phase two) that could not exist because of the 
proportion of donor gamete treatments that are performed privately, by clinics that would 
be less likely to cooperate with each other. 
 Workshop participants also expanded on the idea from the interviews about ensuring 
that donors were ‘good’. This was with particular reference to children, as staff seemed to 
want to be able to personally ensure that if a child went to meet the donor, that donor 
would act in a certain way. 
 Practical difficulties were considered too, with some expressing concern about who 
would take responsibility for regulating the national system, and how this would be funded. 
The point about difficulty in matching also recurred, and another practical concern came up 
which pointed out that sperm would be easier to nationalise than eggs, because unlike eggs, 
sperm can be frozen without efficacy being compromised. This means that sperm can be 
readily transported around the country, whereas a national egg bank might require moving 
the donors themselves around (to enable ‘fresh’ donation), which could be costly and 
inconvenient, for clinics or for donors. 
 One of the participants in phase three presented a comprehensive strategy for how 
(s)he thought a national allocation system could work. This participant addressed the 
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concerns about some clinics freeriding on others and about the inconvenience of moving egg 
donors around the country. His/her solution to the freeriding issue was to introduce an 
endorsement scheme, whereby clinics that were good at recruiting donors (and who would 
supply other clinics with gametes) would gain official recognition for this, and that this 
recognition could be used to recruit more donors (those seeking to donate would be 
referred to these centres over other centres). This would encourage clinics to share gametes 
between them, and may result in the added benefit of recruiting a higher overall number of 
donors into the system. 
 
[W]e’re going to develop donor centres of excellence [….T]he way we try to sell the 
concept to the clinics is that it will benefit them that they are part of the donor centre 
of excellence scheme [….I]f we get ten people on board who will see their recruitment 
streamlined and with relatively little effort from themselves see their number of 
donors go up, […] other clinics will come on board as well. Admittedly, that’s not 
really ethical for clinics but their motive is commercial (participant 31, phase three) 
 
 
 
This participant’s suggestion is that clinics are provided with an incentive for successfully 
recruiting donors, and for passing these donors onto other clinics. If this incentive is 
sufficient to make clinics share donors, an allocation system could be implemented where 
donors are allocated to recipients nationally rather than locally. 
 This same participant suggested that if the practice of freezing eggs were adopted 
more widely in the UK, this would eradicate the need to move egg donors around the 
country to allocate them to recipients in different localities:  
 
[W]hat would be an idea is an egg bank. The principle of an egg bank is a very good 
one. It’s been done in some countries. At the moment, the technology or the skills 
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available in the UK aren’t good enough. […T]ypically the freezing of the eggs is a 
problem and the thawing of the eggs (participant 31, phase three) 
 
 
 
Freezing the eggs in this way would mean that the eggs could be transported, rather than 
the egg donors.  
 In summary, there was very little support for a national waiting list, with most 
participants expressing concern that it would present practical difficulties. Some participants 
also expressed concerns about fairness to those who put most effort into recruiting donors, 
only to lose the resulting gains to other clinics. One participant in phase three, was in favour 
of a national allocation system, and attempted to respond to the objections put forward by 
other participants after seeing these objections described and discussed at the workshop. 
 
6.3.13 Prioritisation and Exclusion 
 
Many phase one participants were asked directly about the prioritisation system, 
though some others mentioned fast-tracking independently of prompting. Some interview 
participants tended to be unhappy with the idea of prioritising, whereas others noted that 
certain factors could allow for fast-tracking (as noted, for example, in section 6.3.1 on age). 
At the workshop, the idea that gametes should be allocated according to a priority system 
was presented. The workshop generated some discussion about which criteria should be 
used to exclude patients from treatment altogether, and which should be used to prioritise 
them. One view was that child welfare should act only as an excluder, so that someone 
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presenting with child welfare issues should either be excluded if they are sufficiently bad, or 
otherwise allowed onto the list without this acting against them for allocation purposes. 
 There were mixed opinions about the prioritisation system in general. Some agreed 
that it could be acceptable in principle: ‘It seems to be unproblematic so long as the criteria 
for prioritisation are defensible’ (participant 32, phase three). 
 Others were uncomfortable with considering differences between patients in this 
way:  
 
[W]ell I think everyone’s sort of equal, just because we feel they’ve got a lower chance 
than someone that’s 25 coming through when who’s probably gonna get pregnant 
first time I don’t think we can say they can’t use them, I mean everyone should be 
entitled to use them equally (participant 08, phase one) 
 
I find it difficult when you’re saying about prioritising by age and having specifics that 
you would be excluded people from other than welfare of the child issues (participant 
04, phase two) 
 
Workshop participant 04 felt that the only reason that someone could be excluded from 
treatment was for child welfare reasons. 
 Other participants were more amenable to the idea of prioritisation, with one saying 
(in the context of treatment efficacy): ‘I’m not going to say everyone is entitled to every 
treatment come what may. I think that’s a bit stupid’ (participant 18, phase one). This 
suggests that this participant may have been in support of excluding for efficacy reasons. 
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It was suggested at the workshop that patients would not understand why other 
criteria were being accounted for, but that they would understand referral date as a criterion:  
‘I think patients understand the principle of referral date. They understand “referred on this 
date”, put on the list, then get treated’ (participant 22, phase two). 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
 This chapter represents a description and exposition of the findings of the empirical 
study in three phases, with contextual information provided by a survey of criteria found on 
websites. In general there seem to be some real discrepancies, both between the policies 
noted by participants, and in their views about them. Participants reported varying degrees 
of willingness to consider treating patients other than on a “first come, first served” basis, 
and different clinics seemed to have different policies on fast-tracking patients who were 
approaching the upper age limit. Indeed, clinics appeared to have different age limits for 
treatment, different ways of accounting for child welfare, and different policies regarding 
factors such as smoking, parental status, and same-sex couples. The attitudes among 
participants towards these various policies were similarly wide-ranging. The following 
chapter will consider how these results interact with the conclusions in the philosophy 
chapter, for example whether there is sufficient rigour in any view to warrant the 
modification of the theory proposed in the philosophical analysis, or whether there is 
sufficient strength of feeling to warrant a revision of the conclusions for pragmatic purposes. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter will discuss the empirical results and assess the extent to which they 
influenced the philosophical analysis. First, however, it will highlight some of the potential 
limitations of the empirical study, which must be considered when the data is used to inform 
ethical theorising. 
 
7.1 Limitations 
 
7.1.1 Other Barriers to Access to Gametes 
 
The study addressed questions of access criteria for fertility treatment at the tertiary 
level – fertility clinics to which a patient has already been referred, either from a GP at 
primary care level, or from a secondary care clinic. As Pennings suggested and as was noted 
above (page 102), the fact that a patient must pass through the system at these levels 
before reaching the fertility clinic means that they may be selected out or excluded from 
treatment at earlier stages than this study investigated. A more comprehensive study would 
have collected data from GPs and staff at secondary level, as they are also potential 
gatekeepers (i.e. people with some degree of influence over a patient’s eventual access to 
treatment – this could be in the role of helpers as well as of hinderers43). This is relevant to 
Pennings’ discussion of the distribution of eggs, where he considers ‘referral for the 
                                                          
43
 A GP might help a patient by recommending that the clinic offers them treatment, or hinder them 
by furnishing the clinic with information that may obstruct their treatment, for example child 
welfare-related issues. 
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treatment’ as the first of three ‘selective steps or stages’. He goes on to say that ‘[v]ery little 
is known about the first stage. The crucial player at this point is the general practitioner […] 
whose evaluation of the patient as a potential recipient will be decisive’ (Pennings, 2001, pp. 
56-57). The omission of GPs and secondary care practitioners from the participant group is a 
relevant limitation of the study’s scope. This more limited scope did not have a great deal of 
impact on the philosophical analysis, however, which in most cases would apply broadly 
regardless of who the decision-maker is. At the same time, the emphasis on child welfare 
was derived from the presence of that concept in the HFE Act, which only applies to clinics 
that are licensed by the HFEA. 
The conclusions may have a bearing on policy, which raises a vital point in support of 
the choice to collect data from tertiary clinicians rather than primary or secondary ones: 
much of the policy at play in questions relating to gamete allocation will apply more directly 
to staff at fertility clinics than to GPs or secondary clinicians. The HFE Act, for example, 
applies only to HFEA-licensed clinics offering treatment. This provides an additional 
justification for focussing on how tertiary practitioners operate, and what they think. Of 
course, GPs may consider the HFE Act in their decision-making, but they are not legally 
bound by it as they are not the ones providing fertility treatment under licence from the 
HFEA. Given time and budgetary constraints (not least of which related to protracted R&D 
processes) and the discussion of gamete allocation within a particular context (fertility 
clinics), it made more sense to focus on the group that is more directly affected by this 
legislation. A study that had also gathered data on how GPs make referral decisions would 
have provided a more comprehensive account of barriers to fertility treatment requiring 
donor gametes, but this study had to focus on access to treatment once patients have 
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already progressed to tertiary level. Research is needed that investigates GPs’ and other 
non-tertiary practitioners’ gatekeeping roles more specifically. 
 
7.1.2 Patient Representation 
 
This study did not gather data from patients. The research team decided not to 
interview patients or invite them to participate in the workshop. This was because given that 
one aim of the project (and indeed part of the justification for the interview methods used) 
was to uncover the ethical considerations around certain policies and practices, as identified 
by clinical staff, it was felt that given the emotional nature of involuntary childlessness, the 
patient voice may have constrained debate by making interviewers and other participants 
feel unable to challenge points for fear of causing offence or distress. It was therefore 
decided that patient representatives would be invited to participate in the workshop and to 
interviews at phase three, such that some patient views were considered, albeit in a limited 
way.  In the end, the workshop was attended by a representative of the NGDT, and the DCN. 
Phase three interviews were undertaken with a representative of the NGDT, and one from 
Infertility Network UK. This allowed patient advocates to advance a generalised patient 
perspective. It is acknowledged, however, that more patient representation in the design 
and execution of the study, for example through the use of a steering group, would have 
strengthened the patient representation in the study, but the interrogative methods 
necessary to elicit the kind of data this project required made it inappropriate to speak to 
patients directly. 
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7.1.3 Further Limitations 
 
Sometimes, interview participants were unable to offer considered responses to the 
researcher’s questions (as noted on page 153 above). This may have affected the quality of 
their answers, as during an interview there is little time to consider the question, or the 
reply, in much detail. While attempts were made to anticipate this phenomenon by offering 
participants the opportunity to read the topic guide ahead of the interview, only one 
participant accepted this offer. With hindsight, it would have been better to have been more 
specific and asked the participants to read and consider the questions in advance.  
A further limitation is the structure and time constraints of the workshop. Financial 
constraints only allowed for a one-day workshop, and several presentations needed to be 
compressed into a single day, the timing of which also needed to permit participants time to 
travel. Discussions in between presentations sometimes felt rushed, and not every view 
from every participant may have been explored to its fullest. The workshop groups and 
phase three interviews served to mitigate this somewhat, but there may still have been 
participants whose voices were too drowned out even for their views to be heard in the 
breakout groups or selected for further consideration in phase three. 
 
This chapter will now consider the conclusions from the philosophy chapter in light of 
the results of the data collection: the two phases of qualitative interviews, and the workshop. 
The opinions given by the participants are considered in light of the existing literature. 
Finally this chapter will assess whether and how the conclusions from the philosophy 
chapter need revision in the light of this comparison. 
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The structure of the discussion also reflects the move from a general reporting of the 
results to a more philosophical discussion of what they mean for the final ethical conclusions. 
It will begin with some discussions about general concepts that connected across all of the 
themes presented in the results, before moving onto some specific discussion of the themes 
themselves. Given that one of the major philosophical conclusions to arise from the analysis 
in chapter four was that a priority system should be introduced, much of the discussion 
below will consider the themes arising from the interviews in light of the proposed priority 
system, rather than the more general discussion of each of the themes that was reported in 
the results (chapter six). 
 
7.2 Fears and Concerns 
 
 Despite the fact that participants were not asked to consider and formulate their 
views ahead of the interview, thereby enabling them to provide more robust and considered 
responses, the data encouragingly shows that the majority of participants had concerns 
about at least some of the issues with which they dealt, demonstrating a degree of ethical 
engagement with their work: they worried about things like child welfare, fairness to 
patients, and the distribution of scarce resources. This section will discuss the weight that 
we should attach to the ethical concepts that the practitioners had such strong feelings 
about, and will ultimately argue that while it can be beneficial to have practitioners who are 
ethically conscientious, their fears need to have evidential support if they are to be acted on. 
 The participants’ concerns did not always have such support. A good example of this 
issue is one workshop participant’s concern about the use of welfare of the child 
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considerations being ‘selective’ (see page 229). (S)he used lesbians as an example of a 
patient group that is scrutinised for child welfare issues, while those who have been abused 
as children are not considered risks to future children by clinical staff, in spite of the 
evidence that those who abuse children are more likely than not to have been abused 
themselves (Brown et al., 1998, p. 1066). 
 The participant’s example of lesbians may not be the most appropriate in light of the 
data in this study, which did not suggest that much discrimination was occurring against 
lesbian couples. As noted on pages 91-93, however, the issue of lesbian couples’ parenting 
ability was given considerable attention in Parliament in the debate surrounding the 2008 
amendments to the HFE Act, supporting the workshop participant’s concerns that child 
welfare concerns in cases of lesbian couples are given undue attention. 
The participants may have been appealing to something akin to the precautionary 
principle (PP) with these concerns. This principle places the burden of proof on agents 
proposing action, requiring them to demonstrate that a proposed (new) action will not cause 
harm. It is thus a principle of risk-aversion. The acceptance of the PP would relieve clinical 
staff of the burden of having to demonstrate child welfare concerns – under this principle, a 
lack of demonstrated child welfare concerns for certain patient groups would be sufficient 
for them to refuse treatment. 
There are some problems with this. First, with regard to certain patient groups, there 
is evidence that there are no child welfare concerns. To remain with the example of lesbians, 
Golombok’s studies, as described in the philosophical analysis, did not uncover greater or 
increased child welfare issues relating to children raised by lesbian mothers. The PP should 
not, therefore, be used to justify discrimination against them. 
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In the philosophical analysis, however, it was also suggested that we might 
extrapolate this data to include same-sex male couples, and similarly extrapolate data about 
single mothers to include single fathers. The PP may not allow this, as there remains the 
possibility that child welfare would be compromised. 
The PP, however, is internally problematic. Holm and Harris, with presumably 
deliberate irony, recommend that the principle ‘be treated with caution’. They note that it 
‘instructs us to change [the] normal balance by giving evidence pointing in one direction 
more importance than evidence pointing in the other direction’ (Holm and Harris, 1999). 
Holm and Harris thus point out that the precautionary principle requires us to skew our cost-
benefit analyses to avoid risk, and in doing so we forgo potential benefits: ‘the PP will block 
the development of any technology if there is the slightest theoretical possibility of harm’, 
and they rightly describe this as a ‘fatal weakness’ (Holm and Harris, 1999). By definition, the 
PP leads to a loss of potential benefits that is disproportionate to the avoidance of potential 
harm, so it seems irrational to follow this principle. 
Another problem with the PP is that it breaches the principle of equality and justice 
that was a starting point of the philosophical analysis (see pages 32-33). This principle 
requires that all patients are treated equally until reason is given to do otherwise. The PP 
would suggest that clinical staff’s worries, unsupported by evidence though they may be, 
could constitute such a reason. To give staff’s unjustified worries such weight would be in 
serious tension with the theory-driven approach to empirical data being adopted in this 
thesis (see pages 27-28), where participants’ views can modify theory but cannot make such 
drastic revisions to it. The PP must thus be rejected. 
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This means that there are no theoretical reasons to subscribe to the risk-averse 
approach that seems to be favoured by some of the study’s participants. Pragmatic reasons 
to consider staff’s fears and concerns might persist even in spite of these theoretical 
shortcomings. It may be the case, however, that once made sufficiently aware of the 
evidential situation with regard to the specific fears that they have, staff members would be 
willing to revise their views in line with this evidence. This need for information provides 
support for evidence-based policy such as the recommendations being made in this thesis. 
The PP would require that the concerns of those like the participants in the study are 
given weight in spite of the lack of evidence supporting those concerns. We have seen that 
the PP is problematic in itself, and also in serious tension with the principle of equality being 
employed in this thesis. The argument against the PP thus gives general strength to the 
conclusions in the philosophy chapter, which considered the ethical status of putative 
allocation criteria in light of the available evidence regarding those criteria. 
 
7.3 Time Waiting 
 
There was strong support amongst the participants for factoring in the time that 
patients had spent waiting for treatment. Participants rarely considered what it would be 
like to have a priority system that took into account multiple factors of which time on the 
waiting list was one. Where participants opposed the prioritisation system, they felt that a 
straightforward “first come, first served” system should be used instead, which in effect is a 
priority system that only accounts for one factor: waiting time. Waiting time was hence the 
most universally supported criterion for allocation emerging from the data. There exists the 
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alternative possibility that  dispensing with the idea of a waiting list entirely, so that there is 
no list per se but rather a group of people seeking treatment, some of whom will be treated 
and some of whom will not,  may mitigate the feelings of unfairness that some staff 
experience when faced with the idea of what they see as a “queue-jumping” system. Given 
the strength of feeling in the data about waiting time, however, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that clinical staff would be satisfied with this. Further to this, the philosophical 
literature on gamete allocation supports waiting time as a criterion for gamete allocation: 
Pennings argues that longer waiting times create psychological difficulties for patients, and 
represents a way to distribute opportunities equally, though philosophical analysis 
demonstrated problems with both of these arguments. 
Indeed, one of the starting points of this thesis is that a first come, first served 
system may not account for all of the morally relevant considerations, and section 4.5.5 
(pages 105-107) struggled to come up with a justification why time on the waiting list should 
be accounted for. Characterising it as a fair or egalitarian system was shown to rely on a 
faulty and incoherent conception of equality, in spite of a strong and possibly culturally-
ingrained intuition that treating people in turn is fair. While there may be an argument that 
having to wait longer prolongs the psychological suffering associated with childlessness, this 
is undermined by the fact that all patients are undergoing this suffering, and so treating 
someone merely because they have been suffering longer does nothing to reduce suffering 
in the future, unless of course the suffering of being on the waiting list increases with time. 
Adding points based on waiting time may then be an unjustified way of making sure that 
everyone gets a chance at treatment, regardless of how many other factors speak against 
treating them. 
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 At the very least, this presents waiting time as a candidate for the kind of 
compromise considered above (page 25), which would re-align the proposed system in this 
thesis with something more akin to a waiting list rather than an out-and-out priority and 
exclusion system. Philosophically we might conclude that waiting time is irrelevant, and 
while the analysis in chapter four presented good reasons for doing this, this may be of no 
practical use if there is such opposition to excluding it from consideration. A practical 
recommendation would therefore be that waiting time is included in the priority system, if 
this makes the priority system more palatable to those who would otherwise oppose such a 
system entirely. Furthermore, unless two patients are referred to the clinic at the exact 
same time, accounting for waiting time provides an answer in tie-break situations where an 
exhaustive examination of all the morally relevant criteria relating to a patient does not give 
any reason to distinguish between patients. The inclusion of waiting time as a criterion may 
have an impact on the “effective exclusion” of patients as discussed above (page 106). This is 
because a patient’s effective exclusion will no longer be as obvious, as even patients who are 
less suitable than others based on other criteria may receive treatment on account of having 
waited longer. Nevertheless, these effective exclusions will still be maintained if a patient is 
given such low priority, based on other factors, that the priority they receive for waiting a 
long time can never override this. The waiting time criterion will mean that every patient will 
be ultimately eligible for treatment, but that some will never be treated because by the time 
they have waited long enough to receive treatment, they will be too old to do so.44 
 
                                                          
44
 It is worth noting that, if patients are de-prioritised as they age, waiting time would need to be weighted 
more heavily than age in order to have any effect. 
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7.4 Prioritisation and Exclusion 
 
One of the major conclusions suggested to participants at the workshop was that 
clinical staff should prioritise patients based on factors other than the time at which they are 
placed on a waiting list. Much of the discussion below will consider the interview themes in 
light of the proposed priority system, rather than the more general discussion of the themes 
that was reported in the results chapter. 
In many instances the various criteria that clinical staff can consider when deciding 
who to treat with donor gametes included some consideration of whether and how patients 
can be prioritised based on these criteria. Given the acceptance of prioritisation, the 
discussions of the various criteria in the sections below are directed to answering the 
following two questions: 
 
1) In light of the data collected from the study, is the criterion in question morally 
relevant such that patients should be prioritised on the basis of it? 
2) If the answer to question 1) is “yes”, what weight should be given to this criterion, 
and how is it to be used for prioritisation? 
 
There is, however, a prior question. Before going into the specific criteria and discussing 
whether (question 1 above) and how (question 2 above) they should each be used in gamete 
allocation decisions, it is necessary to consider the argument, put forth by some participants 
(predominantly in the interviews but also at the workshop), that patients should not be 
prioritised in this way at all, but rather that clinical staff should make use of exclusion only, 
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but in a specific, limited way. The concepts of exclusion and prioritisation map onto the 
concepts of access to the waiting list, and treatment once on the waiting list: if you are 
excluded, this means you (at least temporarily) are not listed. Prioritisation is the means of 
deciding who to treat amongst those who are “listed”, i.e. those who have not been 
excluded. A patient may gain access to the list and then be excluded if new information 
emerges, but this does not have any substantive effect on the distinction being made here. A 
common  view among participants, both in the interviews and workshop, was that it was 
legitimate to deny patients access to the waiting list altogether (exclusion), but that once 
they were on the list, it would be wrong to consider any factors other than how long the 
patients had been waiting for treatment (prioritisation). 
 It was suggested in the results chapter that many participants in the interviews and 
workshop were uncomfortable with the finer-grained prioritisation approach being 
proposed in the philosophical analysis. This discomfort was based on a desire to treat 
patients “equally” irrespective of factors other than their time of arrival on the list. Hence, 
we can fairly interpret this as a suggestion that treating patients on a “first come, first served” 
basis was not considered by these participants as being a violation of some principle of 
equality, whereas they would consider prioritisation based on other factors as constituting 
such a violation. As we saw in chapter four, Pennings and Pattinson do consider other factors 
than waiting time these things to be relevant factors, such that we have a moral obligation 
to account for them. Given that things like the welfare of children and the effectiveness of 
treatments have obvious moral value, we must take these things into account. 
We do not have to characterise the participants who held this view as ignoring or 
denying the moral relevance of these other factors altogether. They may think that they 
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have some moral relevance, but that they are lexically inferior to considerations of equality, 
so that when these equality considerations are present (perhaps they have to be extreme), 
they trump whichever other factors might have otherwise been at play, and exclude the 
participant. There is a tension between equality defined as treating all patients the same 
regardless of other factors influencing welfare, (the participants’ view) and equality taken as 
a starting point from which we can deviate if given reason to (the view supported in the 
philosophical analysis). 
 The participants’ invocation of equality as an argument against the prioritisation of 
patients on the list runs into two problems. The first is an issue of consistency with regard to 
the reasons for excluding patients. Participants were concerned that everyone should have 
equal access to treatment, but when it came to factors on the basis of which they were 
happy to exclude patients, this notion of equal access seemed to lose some of its force. If 
equality has the trumping status that these participants seemed to afford it in the case of 
prioritisation, then some justification is needed to explain why equality considerations do 
not apply when patients are being excluded from treatment altogether (i.e. denied access to 
the list). The inconsistency lies in the fact that patients are treated differently with regard to 
their position on the waiting list, seemingly without reason. 
For consistency’s sake we would need to do one of three things: a) invoke equality in 
the exclusion cases too, such that we must offer treatment to everyone without exception; b) 
allow that some factors can be taken into account to prioritise just as they can be taken into 
account to exclude, and that this is true regardless of how far along their fertility journey the 
patient is, or c) provide a reason to explain why equality considerations trump in some cases 
but not in others.  
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Option a) is unacceptable, given that we have already established that there are 
circumstances in which patients should be excluded (see pages 104-105. Option c) would 
provide a justification for holding the distinction between getting onto the waiting list and 
being treated once on the list, but it seems that this difference has no moral relevance that 
would ground such a distinction. Considerations like welfare or efficacy must apply on either 
side of this line. Hence, option b), allowing for prioritisation, is the most favourable. 
The parallel between this scenario and that of end of life care will help to draw out 
why there is no morally relevant difference between accounting for criteria before a patient 
is on the list, and once a patient is on the list. We can consider refusing to put a patient on 
the list as analogous with withholding treatment, and considering access criteria (with the 
potential to effectively exclude someone from treatment) once they are on the list as 
analogous with withdrawing treatment. Vincent, for instance, argues that there is ‘no ethical 
difference’ between withdrawing and withholding, because ‘[i]n both cases, the doctor 
decides whether to apply the treatment […] for the next few hours, minutes, or even 
seconds, regardless of whether the therapy is already applied at the time of the decision’ 
(Vincent, 2001, p. N52). One of Vincent’s arguments is that what has happened up to the 
time of decision-making is irrelevant, and this is consistent with the rejection of backward-
looking principles being applied in this thesis. Similarly, it is irrelevant whether a patient 
seeking donor gametes has already been placed on a list. As long as the system is 
transparent such that a patient is aware that changing circumstances may affect their place 
on the list, the moral dimensions of the situation are the same. Indeed, the General Medical 
Council’s most recent guidance on this does not draw a distinction between these two things, 
as when it considers ‘withdrawing or not starting a treatment’ (General Medical Council, 
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2010, p. 9), it places the two in the same category without distinguishing between them. This 
line of argument acknowledges that whether treatment has yet begun is not relevant to 
whether there should be treatment or further treatment in the future. 
 Another option would be not to count equality as a trumping consideration, but to 
count it as a very weighty one. This might temper the counter-intuitive conclusion above 
that consistency might require us to treat everyone, with no exclusions. Equality might be 
the primary concern, but if other considerations weigh in heavily enough, they may alter the 
obligation. For example, a patient may be an avowed child abuser who promises to abuse 
any child they gain access to. In this instance, welfare of the child considerations may 
outweigh equality ones. 
 This is the kind of weighing up system that was proposed in the chapter four, and the 
only difference between this system and that proposed in chapter four is its emphasis on 
equality as a particularly weighty consideration The philosophical analysis established that 
the welfare of the child is a weightier consideration than equality, so there is no need to 
repeat those arguments here. It is sufficient to say that the participants in this project’s 
empirical study did not provide any arguments for why equality was so important that could 
challenge the analysis already undertaken, so there is no argument for a modification of the 
weightings of equality and child welfare that operated in the philosophical analysis. 
Furthermore, some of the participants accepted the idea of a prioritisation system, so it does 
not seem that we have a pragmatic reason to compromise in this case either: the opposition 
to the philosophical analysis’s conclusion is present, but may not be sufficient for us to 
conclude that advocating such a system is unlikely to lead to any change in policy or practice. 
This response to the data is consistent with the theory-driven approach being adopted here, 
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in which data must at least illuminate flaws or limitations of the theory if it is to influence it – 
it is insufficient that contrary opinion simply disagrees with it. 
The second issue with the participants’ view on equality is that it is not clear whether 
prioritisation even counts as a violation of equality considerations. This speaks to the 
discussion in the philosophical analysis about how we ought to conceive of equality in a 
fertility treatment scenario. For this discussion, let us temporarily disregard the issue that 
excluding some patients might create inequalities between those who are excluded and 
those who are not. Hence, for now we will limit our discussion of equality to a discussion of 
equality amongst those who make it onto the list, ignoring those who are excluded 
altogether. 
In this case, it is hard to configure a conception of equality that makes a “first come, 
first served” system the most equal system. A move like defining a system as equal if it treats 
everyone in the order in which they arrived would be question-begging. In order to show this, 
let us consider some of the other ways of conceiving of equality. 
We might define equality as every patient having an equal chance of receiving 
treatment. This would mean that from the time that they get put on the list, they are treated 
just the same as everybody else (for now we will discount other factors like the potentially 
fluctuating availability of gametes). A “first come, first served” system will not satisfy this 
notion of equality, because some patients will have a worse chance than others of receiving 
treatment, for example older patients. This is true given age cut-offs imposed by the clinics, 
but even if such cut-offs were not in place, the “natural” cut off of age-related decline in 
fertility means that older patients’ chances are worse.  
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As the philosophical analysis suggests, however, there are more ways to conceive of 
equality than this, and indeed, this may not be the best one to employ in this circumstance. 
Giving everyone an equal chance of having treatment preserves equality in one respect, but 
the actual desideratum for patients is not just to have treatment, but to become parents. 
Giving everyone an equal chance to become parents would look very different to giving 
everyone an equal chance to have treatment, as it would have to take into account each 
patient’s prognosis for successful conception, implantation and bringing to term of a 
pregnancy. For example, imagine there are two patients, one of whom (if treated) is twice as 
likely to successfully have a baby as the other, and only one of these patients can be treated. 
Tossing a coin would give them an equal chance of receiving treatment. It would not, 
however, give them an equal chance of becoming a parent – one patient’s chances would 
still be twice as good as those of the other. To equalise the chances of having a baby, the 
coin toss would need to be weighted in favour of the patient with the worst prognosis, to 
factor in the fact that she is less likely to be successful in her treatment. 
The weighted coin toss conception of equality is less blunt than the first one 
described above: treating people equally, irrespective of their prognoses. It is at least 
sensitive to the value of egalitarian outcomes, and sensitive to chances of success, albeit in 
the wrong way. The philosophical analysis suggested, contra Harris and based roughly on 
(though also somewhat divergent from) ideas from Savulescu, that these conceptions of 
equality are flawed, and that we still have a reason to consider a patient’s higher chance of 
success as a reason for prioritising them, not for de-prioritising them. One participant agreed, 
directly opposing Harris’s idea that treatment should be given to all regardless of prognosis: 
‘I’m not going to say everyone is entitled to every treatment come what may. I think that’s a 
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bit stupid’ (participant 18, phase one – see page 254). The participant thus suggested that 
failing to account for efficacy, at least to an extent, appears absurd. 
The argument from equality thus fails on two counts. First, equality amongst patients 
must be considered only as one factor among many other important factors. Second, even if 
equality is considered to be the dominant consideration for fertility clinic staff, the most 
appropriate conception of equality still speaks in favour of prioritising, in order to give 
everyone on the list an equal chance of having a baby. This means that all of the more 
specific features of patients that feed into efficacy (for example whether a patient smokes, 
their age, or their BMI), could be legitimately used to prioritise, even if equality 
(appropriately conceived) was our only concern. Thus, it is not possible to use equality 
considerations to argue against prioritising amongst patients on the list, without using an 
implausible definition of “equality”. 
 A second reason was given for clinical staff’s reluctance to adopt a prioritisation 
system. This idea emerged quite distinctly in the workshop, and was a more practical rather 
than theoretical issue, based on the fact that there are certain criteria that medical staff are 
not qualified to assess and therefore to take into account. This is borne out in the fact that 
the participants stated a greater willingness to make decisions that one could interpret as 
being clinical and medical (for example, decisions based on treatment efficacy), and 
suggested that factors about patients that fed into these types of considerations (for 
example a patient’s age) were ones they could take into account, as they were qualified to 
make reasonable judgements in this area. Indeed, age is objectively verifiable (or at least 
more easily so) than many other putative allocation criteria, which may explain the 
participants’ greater degree of comfort in using it to exclude patients. On the other hand, 
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participants tended to view decision-making based on things like social concerns with 
suspicion, and some phase one participants felt that meeting a threshold with regard to 
medical concerns was the extent of their remit. This leaves scope for accepting that there 
could be a threshold for excluding or de-prioritising patients based on social factors, but that 
they would not, as things stand, feel qualified to apply the criteria. Equally, this argument 
does not rule out efficacy considerations being incorporated into a prioritisation system, and 
hence it does not rule out prioritisation once listed. 
 The fact that medical staff are not qualified to make some of the decisions that 
should feed into prioritisation does not necessarily address the fact that participants seemed 
to accept that some patients could be excluded from the list altogether. It could be argued 
that exclusion criteria and thresholds that the participants might be willing to apply are so 
extreme that less specialised skill is needed to exclude patients who meet them. For 
example, one might not feel that it is necessary to be a qualified and experienced social 
worker in order to judge that the patient who has a history of child abuse and who vows to 
abuse any child in her care should not be treated. Prioritising one patient over another may, 
however, be a more nuanced task than excluding individuals who meet extreme criteria. 
Hence, it is not necessarily the case that if clinical staff are not qualified to prioritise based 
on social factors, then they are not qualified to exclude using them either. 
 It is admirable that there was a culture of reluctance amongst the participants to 
make judgements that fell outside their areas of competence. At the same time, it is not 
obvious that, when faced with the prospect of making the wrong decision due to incomplete 
information or lack of adequate/relevant training, it is best to default to a position of doing 
nothing with this information. Given the presumption to treat mandated by the HFEA, it 
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looks like this would effectively result in patients being automatically treated in cases where 
staff felt unqualified to make a decision. 
The idea that more qualified staff, such as social services should be consulted in 
advance of listing decisions may have received implicit support at the workshop, where 
some participants offered this as an alternative to allowing social services to deal with 
problems once the child has been born. This is consistent with the HFEA’s recommendation, 
in the report of their consultation on child welfare, that: 
 
[Clinics] should collect detailed medical and social information from the patients 
themselves and they should make enquiries to any individual, agency or authority 
(such as a GP, social services or the probation service) if the clinic has concerns about 
information provided by the patient (HFEA, 2005a, p. 11) 
 
 
This seems like it would secure an adequate balance between ensuring that child welfare 
standards are met, and avoiding the requirement for clinical staff to act in ways in which 
they do not feel qualified to act. 
This section has suggested that the arguments against prioritisation put forward in 
the interviews and workshop are not sufficient to justify ignoring considerations that may 
indeed be relevant. Largely, participants’ views reflected those of Harris, when he argues 
that equality considerations require that every patient gets an equal chance of being treated. 
Ignoring questions of efficacy in a situation of resource scarcity (as is the case with gametes), 
however, is not justifiable because to do so will likely lead to a distribution that fails to make 
the best use of the scarce resource. So even if equality were as weighty as the participants 
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seemed to think, some limited prioritisation would be justifiable. Either way, there are other 
considerations outside of equality that are sufficient to motivate prioritisation. 
Now that it has been shown that the priority system is at least sometimes justifiable 
(in spite of the concerns of some of the study participants), the following sections will look at 
the participants’ views on the potential factors that could be fed into a prioritisation system, 
and consider just how they should fit into it, i.e. whether and how participants can be 
prioritised based on these factors. 
 
7.5 Age 
 
The philosophical analysis suggested that it would be justifiable to consider the age 
of patients as a reason to treat some patients ahead of others, based mostly on 
considerations of treatment efficacy, and risks to the health of the patients themselves. 
Some child welfare factors were also considered. In the philosophical analysis it was noted 
that these considerations were mostly medical; with regard to social factors relating to age, 
it was concluded that there was only limited evidence to justify their inclusion. The idea that 
older patients should be prioritised because they may not have another chance of treatment 
was considered to have some intuitive force, particularly in cases where the patient has no 
previous children. It was concluded, however, that while it may appear that refusing to treat 
such a patient would be to deprive her of something profound, treating a patient with a 
worse prognosis than another patient would actually result in more deprivations of the same 
kind (in situations of resource scarcity). While it may seem, on the face of it, insensitive to 
refuse treatment to such a patient, more patients may be enabled to become parents if 
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efficacy is the primary consideration. It was noted, however, that this is in part dependent 
on the length of the list and the ages of the patients on the list. 
In the interviews and workshop, participants’ concerns about treating older patients 
were often grounded in treatment efficacy, which is in line with the work of chapter four. 
Participants often cited the consideration of treatment efficacy as being important for 
avoiding the disappointment arising from unsuccessful treatment. In this sense, the 
participants’ views were only partly in agreement with the philosophical literature. Caplan 
and Patrizio, for example, describe one concern as ‘the safety of pregnancy for older women’ 
(Caplan and Patrizio, 2010, p. 281), and while their concern is likely more to do with direct 
obstetric risks for older women in pregnancy, it is on one level similar to the participants’ 
concerns in that it has the welfare of the mother in mind first and foremost. In sum, while 
the nature of the risks described by the participants is different to that described by Caplan 
and Patrizio (with participants describing psychological risk and Caplan and Patrizio 
describing physical risk), the participants found common ground with these authors in 
marking out the patient as an important stakeholder, perhaps unsurprisingly given their 
professional obligations, to ‘make the care of [their] patient [their] first concern’ (General 
Medical Council, 2013). The participants were interested in patient welfare issues insofar as 
they could manifest themselves either during treatment, pregnancy, or after failed 
treatment. The participants did not express many opinions about age-related ethical issues 
that might appear after the birth of a child. 
One participant (participant 11), however, was concerned about social factors such 
as stigmatisation amongst older parents, describing the ‘yuck factor’ (see page 195) that 
might be an issue in other people’s perception of such parents. This is one of the few 
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instances in the data of a participant suggesting that the age of the patient may be a social 
determinant of child welfare. Even though this participant raised this as a potential issue, 
(s)he did not think it was something clinical staff should use as a reason to disfavour older 
patients in their decision-making. The notion that such issues should not count against older 
patients is in line with chapter four’s conclusion about social factors concerning older 
parents: while Sutcliffe et al. found that children born to older mothers actually had ‘fewer 
social and emotional difficulties’ (Sutcliffe et al., 2012, p. 4, emphasis added), this study did 
not account for children over five, for whom other problems may arise, so it was concluded 
that the data on social difficulties and age provides little, if any, reason against (or for) 
treatment. 
The interview participant felt that the risk of patients or their children facing stigma 
as a consequence of being an older parent was a risk that parents should be allowed to 
choose to take, rather than having clinics decide for them. As one need only operate with a 
bare bones notion of the value of respecting autonomy to think that allowing people to run 
the risk of minor stigmatisation is their choice to make, the participant’s view seems tenable. 
As we saw in the results chapter, some participants at the workshop objected to 
social factors being taken into account at all. As this discussion diverges from the issue of 
age that is currently under consideration, we will consider that problem later in a more 
general discussion of child welfare (pages 302-309). While Sutcliffe et al. pull us in the 
direction of ignoring social factors when it comes to older parents, their study cannot 
support the notion that there are no child welfare issues at all in treating older patients, as 
social issues are not the whole picture. There might still be child welfare risks related to age 
if we consider obstetric risks to be risks for children too. 
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With regard to medical concerns relating to age that might compromise or affect 
child welfare, participants considered conditions like Down’s syndrome and chromosomal 
abnormalities. Again it is important to note that these problems are, strictly, associated with 
egg age rather than maternal age, and so in terms of gamete donation, they would only arise 
in cases of donated sperm rather than donated eggs (for simplicity’s sake the discussion will 
not consider the possibility of recruiting older egg donors). The possibility of children being 
born with such conditions raises questions about the obligations that we have regarding 
which children we create, and these worries have been voiced by (among others) Savulescu, 
Mulgan, Pennings, and in a more theoretical way by Parfit. 
 Participants did not articulate Savulescu’s view that there is an obligation to create 
the best children, but many gave the impression that they supported the position that some 
conditions were worth taking steps to avoid: ‘procreators owe a duty to the future child to be 
reasonably assured any such child will have a minimally decent life’ (participant 32, phase 
three (see page 226)). In their explanation of the reason for upper age limits, participants 
suggested that treating older patients (again, with their own eggs) presents a higher risk of 
babies being born with conditions or diseases; and the implied conclusion is that these 
conditions or diseases should be avoided. Also, in the discussion about whether clinics 
should consider treating patients with genetic diseases or conditions in order to circumvent 
the transmission of these to their offspring, one participant agreed that this would be a 
motivation (see page 225), though others did not think this was a reason to prioritise such 
patients over others. 
 This suggests that some participants were agreed that there are, at least in some 
circumstances, obligations to choose courses of action that will result in healthier children. 
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They only spoke about diseases or conditions as negative factors, though, and did not enter 
into any discussion about whether the best children should be created, and rather only 
considered that some types of children should not be created. 
This is possibly in tension with the conclusion in the philosophical analysis:  
 
4) Patients who can reproduce without donor gametes, but who can only do so at the 
risk of passing on diseases, should be given some priority on this basis. 
 
Most participants were happy to exclude patients on the basis that they did not meet a 
minimum standard of child welfare (medically conceived), for example in the Huntington’s 
case mentioned by participant 11. Participants suggested that they would be happy to treat 
patients with a lower than average outlook for child welfare, as long as they were not too 
low. The conclusion from the philosophical analysis was that fertility treatment should de-
prioritise patients whose are likely to be born with any genetic condition, whereas the 
dataset suggests that staff may only be comfortable to exclude in order to prevent or 
circumvent only conditions or diseases that meet a minimum threshold of seriousness. The 
level of opposition amongst staff here suggests that it may be unlikely for such a 
recommendation to effect any change in policy or practice. There is thus some divergence 
between what is philosophically recommended by this thesis, and what is unlikely to actually 
be implemented in practice, so a more pragmatic set of recommendations might include 
only a watered down version of conclusion 4), where only the severest diseases are taken 
into consideration. 
Returning to considerations that may be related to age, conclusion 6) was that: 
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6) Younger patients should take priority over older ones, except in cases where there 
are so few younger patients that older patients are expected to be treated anyway. 
In such cases, the older patients should take priority. 
 
Unlike conclusion 4), the impact of the interview and workshop data on this 
conclusion is less clear. The justification for this conclusion was twofold: first, that older 
patients have lower chances of successful pregnancy than younger patients, leading to 
potential gamete/donor wastage, and second, that older patients are themselves under 
increased physical risk during pregnancy. Let us now consider the participants’ views on 
these ideas. 
Participants were moderately concerned about obstetric risks to patients. Their main 
concern, however, seemed to be the chances of successful pregnancy, but none of the 
participants felt that the reason for this being problematic was gamete wastage. Rather, and 
once again likely due to professional obligations, they were more concerned about the 
psychological welfare of the patient, and the idea that it might be a waste of patients’ time 
and efforts to undergo such treatments if they were unlikely to give the patients what they 
desired. In case of self-funded treatment, they were also concerned that patients may be 
wasting their money, and that it would be wrong for the clinic to take money from patients 
when the chances of success were so low. Hence, the participants’ reasons for thinking that 
efficacy was important were characterised differently to those in the philosophical analysis. 
The participants’ views on this matter can be regarded as somewhat individualistic – they 
felt that in cases of poor prognosis, patients could be psychologically harmed if treatment 
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was offered. The philosophical analysis was more ambivalent to the weight given to 
disappointment, given the possibility that patients may gain the psychological benefit from 
unsuccessful treatment of having exhausted all possibilities. We do not therefore know 
whether it is harmful on balance, so as long as any risk of harm is explained to patients, this 
risk is no reason to deny treatment. 
The question of physical harm raised by participants was more in line with the 
philosophical analysis, where phase one participants made it clear that risks to patients 
would be taken very seriously (pages 151-152). Not all treatments with donated gametes will 
involve use of the procedures mentioned by participant 18 above, so this may not apply to 
gamete donation scenarios across the board. As an example, donor insemination does not 
necessarily require embryo transfer or egg collection, drawing a distinction between 
procedures associated with egg and sperm donation and receipt. Nevertheless, it remains 
the case that some procedures are risky and where accompanied with low chances of 
success for specific patients may result in greater risks of harm than opportunities for 
benefit, suggesting that they may not, on balance, serve those patients’ interests. 
While the health risks to patients were acknowledged in the philosophical analysis, 
the reasons given there for considering efficacy important were more global – the idea was 
that in order to maximise the number of patients who are enabled to take home a baby, 
people who have a greater chance of doing so when using the same resources should be 
prioritised for treatment. Although unfortunate for those with poor chances, the welfare 
principles being employed in this project require that we satisfy the most people rather than 
distribute resources equally without regard to each person’s ability to use those resources to 
gain benefit. 
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The philosophical analysis did not dispute that individual patient welfare is important, 
and hence the health risks still counted for something. This means that the philosophical 
analysis and the participants’ views accorded with each other insofar as they both accepted 
that harm and benefit to patients is something to account for. 
In general there was support amongst the interview participants for the view that 
efficacy was important. Given the clear connection between patient age and efficacy, then, 
the data can be interpreted as broadly in support of taking age into account in gamete 
allocation decisions. Indeed, this is one of the proposed criteria with which the interview 
participants tended to agree. In terms of the workshop, efficacy was a theme that received a 
lot less attention, in spite of the fact that the workshop presentation placed emphasis on it 
in line with the philosophical analysis. Even so, some workshop participants agreed that 
efficacy was an important consideration. 
  So far the importance of efficacy, both in itself and as a measure of other important 
things we should secure (namely the safety of the patient and the child) has been considered, 
and the conclusion drawn that we should prioritise younger patients in some cases, but not 
always. Two of the participants in phase one, however, felt that there were other reasons to 
prioritise older patients, independently of efficacy: ‘we might give preference to the 49 year 
old because she only has one opportunity left’ (participant 09, phase one (see page 198). We 
can consider this to be an argument for a different kind of prioritisation based on age, and 
one that draws upon different values such as the disbenefit of being involuntarily childless. 
We must now investigate whether concerns regarding these values are sufficient to override 
the efficacy (and related) concerns that are present when older women are treated. 
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The view that older patients should be prioritised was echoed by multiple 
participants, usually by appeal to the fact that this would be the patient’s only remaining 
opportunity to have a child. This would be a good argument if prioritising an older patient 
with only one opportunity left did not also present a lost opportunity for another patient, 
who would likely have a better chance of success. This thesis has already argued that, for 
this reason, younger patients should be prioritised, at least when we expect older patients 
on the same list never to receive treatment, and this argument about the patient’s last 
chance is in tension with this argument. 
There is thus a perception that declining to treat an older patient whose last chance 
it is for treatment is to deny them a child. In the system being proposed in this thesis, 
however, age is not a special case, because many people would be denied treatment on the 
basis that other patients are prioritised ahead of them. The “last opportunity” line of 
argument effectively suggests that everyone should be given a chance to have treatment. 
We have already seen the problems with this line of argument, in the discussion of Harris 
and equality above (pages 115-118). To accept that everyone should get a chance to have 
treatment would be to unjustifiably disregard all of the other morally relevant factors that 
are at play. 
In conclusion, while some participants in the interviews felt that patients who were 
approaching their “last opportunity” to receive treatment should be prioritised, the 
discussion of equality that has pervaded this thesis so far has shown that this argument does 
not withstand philosophical scrutiny. The main considerations with regard to age, then, are 
treatment efficacy and obstetric risks. The latter are rooted in the welfare of both the child 
and the patients themselves. These considerations mean that younger patients should be 
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prioritised in most cases, except in those cases where treating the older patients first will 
actually result in a more effective range of treatments (see tables 1 and 2 on page 79). 
 
7.6 Substance Use 
 
Another candidate for prioritisation was the patient’s status as a substance user. The 
priority system would allow for choosing patients based on their status as substance users, 
to the extent that this status increased the likelihood that they would present welfare of the 
child or efficacy problems. Hence, much of the discussion from the previous section of this 
chapter will apply here, and as such there is no need to repeat it. (This also applies to factors 
like body mass index and smoking.) As noted in the previous chapter, participants’ concerns 
about substance use were based both on welfare of the child and treatment efficacy 
grounds. The welfare of the child concerns with regard to substance use could have been 
about either psychological or physical issues. The participants’ concerns were broadly in 
accord with those described in the philosophical analysis, though there was some difference 
in opinion regarding how seriously these concerns should be taken. Stringent welfare of the 
child standards were proposed in the philosophical analysis, whereas some of the study 
participants argued for more lenient standards. With regard to substance use in particular, 
opinion was quite polarised, so it does not seem like there would be so much opposition that 
the substance abuse recommendation should be abandoned for pragmatic reasons. 
One line of thought from the interview participants was that substance use could not 
be accounted for, at least with regard to alcoholism: ‘[Y]ou can’t speak to the patients and 
say “you’re both alcoholics, we’re not gonna treat you we can’t give you a baby” ‘cos you 
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don’t know what goes on in their lives’ (participant 05, phase one (see page 209). The 
participant’s comment about knowing what is going on in the patients’ lives may reflect the 
value of being non-judgmental in lieu of concrete evidence. The suggestion that we should 
not make judgements on the basis of incomplete information is troubling – arguably we 
must do the best we can with the information we have. As described in the philosophical 
analysis, the information that a person has an alcohol problem (we can fairly take the 
participants’ comment to apply to substance abuse too) creates some serious implications 
for what the child welfare and treatment efficacy situation will be like. Hence, substance use 
problems cannot be so easily ignored. 
The final proposal regarding substance use thus remains the same: we should remain 
mindful of the potential problems relating to parental substance use, and be willing to take 
them into account when deciding who to treat. This is consistent with participant 07’s view, 
(page 209), that ‘[E]ven someone being a habitual drug user doesn’t necessarily mean that 
you feel that they have a welfare of the child issue’ (participant 07, phase one), as we can 
acknowledge that such habits do not necessarily mean welfare of the child issues, but still 
consider the fact that they can increase the likelihood of such issues as a reason to de-
prioritise a patient. 
 
7.7 Parental Status 
 
 Parental status proved to be one of the most complicated and divisive concepts, with 
little, if any, concordance emerging from the interviews with clinical staff in interviews, or as 
a result of interaction between participants at the workshop. Where some participants felt 
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that ‘[H]er need to have another child is not as high as that of somebody who hasn’t got any 
children’ (participant 09, phase one (see page 218)), others felt that ‘it may be that having a 
second child is just as important if not more important than having a first child, or what 
however many children’ (participant 04, phase one (see page 220)). Thus there was 
disagreement about whether having a first child was more significant than having 
subsequent children. 
 One participant went some of the way towards offering a justification for making 
such a distinction: ‘[E]ven if child has left the home […] I would not want to offer them, ‘cos 
they have enjoyed bringing up a child. […] It’s better to give that opportunity to someone else 
who’s never had that experience’ (participant 15, phase one (see page 221)). This participant 
offers a reason for prioritising a couple that has not had any children in the past. The 
assertion made by the participant may hint at the distress-related reason for prioritising 
childless patients, detailed in the philosophical analysis. 
 The results chapter reported a potential tension between parental status 
considerations and securing the welfare of the child. One participant’s concern was that the 
requirement that patients have ‘no child in the home’ might encourage parents to leave their 
children with other relatives, potentially in different countries, in order to qualify for NHS 
funding for treatment. If this is a welfare of the child issue, and the ‘child in the home’ 
criterion encourages this behaviour, then there is a tension occurring between de-
prioritising based on previous parenthood in this way and the duty to secure child welfare. 
Hence, there is potentially a welfare of the child-related reason to ignore parental status in 
this context. 
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 There may also, however, be such a reason to prioritise based on previous 
parenthood. Welfare of the child assessments can take into consideration a patient’s track 
record regarding other, already-existing children, such that if a child has been removed from 
the patient by social services, this may count against the patient’s getting treatment. Indeed, 
some participants suggested that any record of violence to children, regardless of their 
relationship to the patient, could count against or exclude a patient. If it is the case that a 
bad track record with children can count against a patient for treatment, perhaps then a 
good track record should count in favour of a patient for treatment. Parental status may be a 
marker for parenting capacity. This project is challenging the presumption that all patients 
should be treated solely based on their time on a waiting list, until they give staff a reason to 
delay or refuse treatment. The project is open to and takes seriously Savulescu’s idea that 
staff have an obligation, in some cases, to do more good than they otherwise could, rather 
than taking a sufficientarian approach. Welfare of the child considerations thus offer us 
mixed messages about whether to take parental status into account. 
 The child welfare issues of the previous parenthood criterion could be dealt with by 
operating with a different version of it that does not account for a child’s residential status. 
In addition, there is an asymmetry with regard to the track record issue – a person’s having a 
history of child abuse speaks against them, in comparison to other patients, in a way that a 
person’s having a history of being a good parent does not speak for them, in comparison to 
other patients. This is because in the latter case, those who have not had children have not 
yet had the chance to prove themselves as parents. There is no evidence that those with 
children already will make better parents than those who have not yet had this chance. 
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 While opinion on this matter was very much polarised amongst participants in the 
interviews and workshop, in light of the evidence, provided by Epstein and Rosenberg, 2005 
and Greil et al., 2011, that having a first child is psychologically more important than having 
another child, we should distinguish between patients on this basis. In terms of how parental 
status should be conceived, it looks as though defining it based on the residential status of 
the child (i.e. whether they live with the parents) may give rise to child welfare issues, which 
is a possibility that may need to be investigated further in determining how to conceive of 
parenthood in this context. Given the earlier discussion that established that the 
desideratum in fertility treatment is not merely genetic/biological reproduction, but to take 
home a baby and ultimately have a parenting experience, those who have never had the 
opportunity to parent should be prioritised, with those with existing relationships with their 
children given lower priority. The spectrum of relationships with children is large, so 
clinicians would need to operate using coarse-grained thresholds for practical purposes. This 
could be determined based on the approximate level of involvement that the parents have 
with their children, for example how much contact they have with them. Further research 
could help to determine a consensus as to how close the relationship between a parent and 
child needs to be before a patient is de-prioritised on this basis, but we can still conclude 
that, all other things being equal, patients who have enjoyed less experience of parenting 
should be given priority over those who have enjoyed more. 
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7.8 Same-Sex Couples and Single Patients 
 
The philosophical analysis concluded that the research into whether children born to 
single women and same-sex couples are disadvantaged as a result when compared to 
children born to heterosexual couples could find no evidence of disadvantage. Not only is it 
crucial to an impartial ethical framework that we do not discriminate against anyone without 
a morally relevant reason for doing so, it is made explicit in the HFEA Code of Practice: ‘[i]t is 
presumed that all prospective parents will be supportive parents, in the absence of any 
reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be born, or any other child, may be at 
risk of significant harm or neglect’ (HFEA, 2009, section 8.11). In light of the lack of evidence 
about a child’s need for two opposite-sex parents (see pages 91-93), it does not seem that 
the participants’ views constituted the reasonable cause for concern required by the HFEA. 
Participant 10 (phase one)’s statement that his/her clinic would not treat same-sex 
male couples may at first come across as discriminatory based on sexuality, but the 
participant’s explication of this shows that this policy actually discriminates based on sex. 
While the concept of single male patients was never mentioned, the ethical justification of 
the policy offered by the participant was that children need a mother.45 Hence, the clinic 
would presumably refuse to treat single males, too. Similarly, the participant singled out 
same-sex male couples, implying that they would treat lesbian couples. This participant’s 
comment suggests the additional consideration that the sex of putative parents is morally 
                                                          
45
 Given that the term “mother” was used as a justification for refusing to treat any male couples, we 
can reasonably assume that it is a term meaning “female parent” rather than referring to a kind of 
parenting role. 
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relevant. This bears on both single patients and same-sex patients, but not in cases where a 
female will raise the child. The concept of the relevance of the sex of patients thus falls 
under the theme of “same-sex couples and single parents” because only members of these 
groups could be affected. Not all members of these groups would, however, be affected – it 
is actually men in general who would be discriminated against by the policy outlined by this 
participant, rather than just gay men. 
 It may be that the view about children’s need for a mother was partly influenced by 
the 2008 change in legislation. Where the 1990 HFE Act states that staff must account for 
‘the need for a father’ (HFEA, 1990, section 13 (5)), this was changed in 2008 to ‘supportive 
parenting’ (HFEA, 2008, section 14 (2)), acknowledging that previous legislation had 
discriminated against lesbians and single women without justification. In short, the need for 
a father (or a male parent) had been assumed rather than demonstrated. The idea that the 
sex of parents is relevant may lead to a perception that a mother is the essential factor in 
parenting, rather than a father, suggesting a potential misinterpretation of the rationale for 
the change in legislation. In light of the evidence on same-sex parenting, this perception also 
seems to rest on an assumption. 
 There are social reasons to be explored here as well, though. If a father is more likely 
to become absent than a mother, then this may give rise to specific legislation for clinics to 
consider this as a possibility, rather than suggesting that a father is more important than a 
mother. Similarly, given the technical difficulties in treating single men or same-sex male 
couples (as they require a surrogate), and the relative infrequency of surrogacy 
arrangements in 1990 compared to today, it may have been unnecessary to legislate for the 
child’s need for a mother, as in the vast majority of cases treatment would be being given to 
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a woman. Regardless of how notion of a child’s needing a mother came about, the evidence 
does not support this view, as would be required both by a suitably impartial and non-
discriminatory ethical framework, and by the Code of Practice. 
 Most of the other interview and workshop participants had no problems with the 
idea of treating same-sex couples or single patients, though it is possible that they did not 
consider single men. Participants in any phase were not asked specifically about conclusion 
11, which suggested that couples should be prioritised over single patients. This was based 
on the argument that it provides greater patient welfare by helping two patients rather than 
one. Given the general willingness to avoid discriminating against single patients, however, 
we can imagine that there would be initial opposition to this conclusion. In addition to this, 
the recent change in legislation, removing the stipulation for the need for a father, better 
accommodates single women (alongside lesbian couples). During the parliamentary debate 
surrounding this change, one of the arguments for it, advanced by Emily Thornberry, was 
that it would make clearer that these groups should not be discriminated against:  
 
If there is a lack of clarity in the current law, we have an opportunity to sort it out 
today. If we were to confirm the need for a father, […] there would be increased 
confusion – or worse, no clear law at all. Many hospitals would have eligibility criteria 
for IVF treatment as explicit as that published in Birmingham (HC Deb 20 May 2008, 
vol 476, col 176) 
 
 
This may make it unlikely that the suggestion that single patients should not be treated will 
be implemented in practice. At any rate, the conclusion has theoretical justification, 
independently of these arguments based on non-discrimination, in terms of its providing 
additional welfare benefits for use of the same gametes, so while it is included in the final 
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conclusion set, it is not expected to gain any practical ground, though some may be 
amenable to the idea that patient welfare is improved by offering treatment more parents 
rather than fewer. 
 In conclusion, somebody’s status as a member of a same-sex couple does not provide 
enough of a reason to distinguish between them in terms of the priority system, as is 
required by the principle of equality being used here. This means that this is not a criterion 
that staff should take into account in their decision-making. The reasoning that has led to 
this conclusion will have some bearing on the arguments on known donors (below), as we 
will once again fall back on the line of argument that without sufficient reason to 
discriminate against a certain group or forbid a certain action, we should not do so. The 
argument against treating single patients remains philosophically supported. 
 
7.9 Patient Choice 
 
7.9.1 Matching and Recipient Choice 
 
 Participants rarely considered matching an ethical issue in its own right. Instead, it 
tended to arise in the context of other discussions. For example, participants sometimes 
cited the difficulty of matching as a problem associated with the treatment of same-sex 
couples, or as an argument against the introduction of a national waiting list. It is unclear 
from the data whether the staff operated under the presumption that matching these 
physical characteristics was desirable (such that its importance outweighed the benefits of 
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such things as a national list), or whether matching occurred at the request of patients 
themselves. 
The presumption of matching physical characteristics was formerly recommended by 
the HFEA in the Code of Practice, but was removed after the 6th edition (HFEA, 2003, p. 32). 
The HFEA later stated that ‘[t]here is little evidence available about the value or 
effectiveness of donor-recipient matching, particularly in relation to the welfare of resulting 
children’ (HFEA, 2005b, page 8), so if there is a presumption to match in clinics today, it is 
something of a “hangover” from guidance that no longer exists.  If clinics automatically 
match patients based on physical characteristics, this could be ethically problematic, as they 
may disadvantage certain patients by assuming that they should have a certain kind of donor. 
For example, if gametes from black people are rare, a black couple may be disadvantaged if 
they are made to wait for sperm from a black man, on the presumption that they would not 
or should not use sperm from a man with an ethnicity that would make the child look 
ethnically different from his/her parents. 
Some participants suggested that matching at least sometimes occurred at the 
request of the recipients, for example stating that red-headed donors were ‘not very popular’ 
(see page 240). In such cases, matching is less morally problematic, because patients create 
the disadvantage46 for themselves by making stipulations, rather than having disadvantage 
imposed on them by the clinic’s allocation system. There was, however, one case where 
matching would be automatic unless the patient requested otherwise (see page 242). If a 
                                                          
46
 Of course, a patient may not view this as disadvantage if they do not want gametes of a particular 
kind. For convenience’s sake, however, this discussion will continue to speak of this as “disadvantage” 
from the perspective of their attempt to access treatment. 
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patient is unaware that this matching is taking place, then they could be disadvantaged if the 
gametes relating to their ethnicity are rare. It is thus appropriate to ensure that those on the 
waiting list are given sufficient opportunity to express their desires with regard to matching, 
so that they are not unduly disadvantaged in this way. 
The suggestion of this section is thus that the presumption of matching should be 
done away with altogether. It is unclear that children or their families are worse off in cases 
where children do not look ethnically similar to their parents. If recipients want donors who 
are matched to them, this may provide a reason to seek ethnic matching, but otherwise 
there seems to be no justification for doing this. It should thus not be assumed that patients 
want donors whose characteristics physically match their own. Instead, they should have 
these options discussed with them in the name of transparency. 
 
7.9.2 Donor Choice 
 
The participants in this study expressed two concerns about donor choice in the 
interviews. The first was a practical one, regarding the increased difficulty of finding suitable 
recipients for a donor’s gametes if the donor chose to place stipulations on who could 
receive their gametes. This practical concern is not addressed in Pennings’ argument, but 
should be taken into account if it exists. 
 The second issue, raised by participant 02 (phase one – though (s)he discussed it 
again during phase two), was one regarding the welfare of the child to be born as the result 
of treatment. This participant was concerned that if a donor decided to exclude, say, lesbian 
parents from being recipients of his sperm and the resulting child turned out to be gay or a 
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lesbian, the donor’s stipulation, if discovered, might cause the child some upset and distress. 
We can generalise this case and say that the concern is that if a child turns out to be a 
member of any group against which the donor has discriminated, that child may experience 
distress at being the genetic offspring of somebody who would discriminate against people 
of the same type as them. 
Another point on this matter is the question of how seriously this compromises the 
child’s welfare. There are two elements to this point: first, there is the question of whether 
such stipulations compromise child welfare so much that the child should not exist. 
Importantly, child welfare considerations arising from donor stipulations are unlike other 
child welfare considerations, because in these cases we are not comparing the welfare of 
that child with another child that could be born in its place. If these are true stipulations, 
then we are to imagine that the donor will not donate unless (s)he is satisfied that they will 
be upheld. This means that the child either comes to be, or no child does.  
Now we are in a win-win situation, because even if, for theoretical reasons, we 
cannot make a comparison between a person’s life if they were to exist and their life if they 
were not to exist, so much the better: we cannot say it would be better for the child not to 
exist, so the stipulation can go ahead. If we can make this distinction, then it is unlikely that 
a child who is offended by the stipulations of their donor would have such a low quality of 
life that they would be better off not existing. Both of these conclusions suggest that we 
should just accept the donor’s stipulation. 
The second element regarding the claim that donor stipulations might affect child 
welfare is a less theoretical, empirical one: we do not have any evidence that such 
stipulations compromise children’s welfare. Among the studies on the views of donor-
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conceived people about their mode of conception (for example Turner and Coyle, 2000; 
Scheib et al., 2005; Jadva et al., 2009; Mahlstedt et al., 2010), there is no evidence available 
regarding what donor-conceived people think about stipulations that their genetic, donor 
parent may have made, or indeed the extent to which social parents disclose information 
about such stipulations to their children. 
 Pennings has tried to be careful about the donor stipulation situation by only 
allowing discrimination against certain groups, and the nature of these groups must be pre-
ratified with respect and regard for certain ‘moral communities’ (Pennings, 1995, p. 2738). 
This system could work if certain groups are more sensitive to this discrimination than others 
– we can say that the most sensitive groups are protected from such discrimination. The 
sexual orientation groups seem like they would fall into this sensitive category; participant 
02 (phases one and two)’s example derives its force from positing a gay or lesbian person 
who is offended, upset, or distressed by the discovery that their genetic parents (whatever 
their relationship, if any, with them) chose to discriminate against gay or lesbian patients 
when choosing who could receive their gametes. Pennings’ argument implicitly suggests that 
there are groups of people who would be less offended to learn that their donor had chosen 
to discriminate against people of their group. I take this suggestion as implicit because it is 
the logical corollary of stating that some groups can be discriminated against by gamete 
donors and others cannot, if what is at stake is the welfare of the potential child. 
This, however, is also an empirical claim, and will fall foul of the same lack of 
evidence problem as the more general claim that donor stipulations harm children. Let us 
consider a hypothetical example. Say a person, Fred, learns that he was conceived through 
the use of a donor, and the donor specifically requested that his or her gametes do not go to 
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consequentialists. Fred’s parents, as devout deontologists, were allocated this donor, and he 
was born. Now, let us say that Fred grew up to be an avowed consequentialist before 
learning this truth about his donor parent. The question at hand is whether it would cause 
Fred any less upset to learn about his donor’s stipulation than it would cause upset to the 
gay or lesbian person (potentially a child) to learn that their donor had discriminated against 
gay or lesbian people. For Pennings’ view to be tenable, some work needs to be done to 
show that, and explain why, certain groups are more vulnerable to this offence than others, 
such that we can drive a wedge between these groups, permitting discrimination against 
some but forbidding discrimination against others. Until this work is done, we have no 
reason to allow certain kinds of donor stipulations and not others on the basis of some being 
more or less offensive than others. 
We now know that we cannot sensibly draw a distinction between discriminating 
against some groups and discriminating against others, or indeed summon sufficient 
evidence that donor stipulations compromise child welfare. Given the benefits that 
stipulations may bring in terms of increasing the donor pool, however, they should be 
permitted. 
 
7.9.3 Known Donors 
 
 One of the project’s aims is to analyse the ethics of the use of known donors. 
Participants were asked what they thought about the use of known donors in all of the 
interviews, and this topic was also discussed during the workshop. The philosophical analysis 
described some potential problems with known donors, but concluded that given the 
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general advantage that their use confers with regard to speeding up the waiting list, they 
should be accepted. 
 As noted in the results, all of the participants thought the use of known donors was 
morally permissible, at least in some circumstances. That is to say that nobody thought it 
was conceptually wrong. Some participants expressed concerns about social issues, such as 
the identity of the child, the child’s relationship to the donor, or the issue of growing up in a 
non-standard family environment, for example where a child’s biological (genetic) father is 
his/her social grandfather (as would be the case where a man donates sperm on behalf of 
his son). Many of these issues are related to child welfare, but could also affect patients. 
Some participants also expressed concern about the possibility of people being coerced into 
donating their gametes. Participants were satisfied, however, that these possibilities could 
be investigated, and that there could be situations in which their concerns about them 
would be sufficiently dispelled to warrant going ahead with treatment. The discussion below 
(page 312) will consider how staff should consider evidence for and against treating a given 
patient. 
 If social problems for children, patients, or families, were generated from the use of 
known donors, perhaps these should speak against this practice, providing these problems 
were sufficiently bad and insurmountable. Avoiding them might not mean refusing 
treatment, however – perhaps those who perceive problems are prejudiced against non-
standard families and should change their views. The question that would need answering 
first, however, is whether these problems actually exist. These social problems are rather 
nebulous, but let us spend some time looking into whether the participants considered what 
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the content of them might actually be, and whether this gives us any reason to be concerned 
about them without evidence of their presence. 
 No participant cited any actual cases of anything ever going awry in a social sense in 
these known donation cases, but they may have just been unaware of it. This problem could 
be analogous with the same-sex couple and single patient cases, which might suggest that 
we need to be offered more serious reasons for refusing to perform a certain action, and 
thus that in the absence of those reasons, it is permissible to perform the action. The same-
sex and single patient cases may appear to have slightly different content, because in those 
cases it is clear that we are considering reasons for discriminating between groups of people. 
In the case of known donation, it looks as though we are not discriminating between groups 
of people per se, but rather deciding whether a certain type of donation should be allowed. 
This can be reframed, however, to mirror the language of discrimination in the same-sex and 
single patient cases. We can say that to forbid known donation is to discriminate against 
those who bring in their own donors. This is not to say that they are being disadvantaged, 
but just that they are being denied the opportunity to benefit from their circumstances. 
 It seems, then, that if we cannot discriminate against same-sex couples or single 
patients without good reason, then we cannot similarly discriminate against the hopeful 
recipients of gametes from a known donor, either. We need sufficient reason to forbid or 
condemn such activities, and mere speculation about potential harm should not be 
considered sufficient, though actual evidence of harm might be. Concern about social issues 
provides insufficient justification for denying patients the option of coming in with known 
donors. 
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 Coercion, on the other hand, is perhaps a possibility that requires less empirical work 
to justify our fears about. Whilst the social problems associated with known gamete 
donation are vague, we can easily conceive of a situation where somebody is coerced into 
donating gametes for a friend or relative. This could be problematic, as known donations 
more readily open the door to coercion or exploitation than anonymous donations. These 
problems may be remedied by taking measures to ensure that donations are undertaken 
voluntarily. 
 This discussion has raised the complex question of how risk, or perceived risk, should 
be managed. It has been argued that risk needs to be demonstrated rather than simply 
feared if it is going to be used as a justification for restricting action or forming policy. This 
demonstration need not be comprehensive, but there needs to be more than just a feeling 
of concern that a problem might exist, because as we have seen in the same-sex couple and 
single patient scenarios, sometimes this risk can be overstated, where staff worry about 
problems that the evidence shows do not exist. 
 The analysis suggests that there is at least nothing theoretically wrong with the use 
of known donors, then. As has been shown, a commitment to patient choice allowing donors 
to stipulate their gamete recipients more generally must, in order to be consistent, also 
motivate a commitment to allowing donors to direct their gametes to particular individuals. 
There may indeed be risks of coercion and the like in instances like these, but those risks do 
not present insurmountable ethical obstacles to some forms of known donor treatments 
being used. Given the overall benefits generated by donor stipulations, they should be 
accepted. 
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7.10 Welfare of the Child 
 
Participants also spoke more generally about child welfare, and this discussion 
sometimes became more abstract, moving away from ideas about how particular putative 
decision-making criteria (for example age and substance use) affected welfare of the child. 
Instead, the discussion was sometimes theoretical, with some patients explaining why 
welfare of the child was important at all, or how it weighed up against the welfare of others, 
for example other existing children or the patients themselves. This discussion may help us 
to consider how seriously we should take welfare of the child considerations as reasons for 
and against treatment in our consideration of the particular criteria with which we have so 
far been concerned. In short, this section will consider whether the emphasis on the 
importance of child welfare is supported by what the participants said in the interviews. If it 
is not, we will need to reconsider whether welfare of the child should have pride of place in 
our ethical decision-making, as I have so far argued that it should. 
 As noted in the results (see page 227), while one participant suggested that ‘the 
welfare of the mother during pregnancy, it’s a bigger concern’ (participant 15, phase one), 
the participant effectively undermined this statement by adding ‘in the short term’. This 
participant did not articulate his/her views about the relative importance of patient welfare 
and child welfare. Hence, this statement offers us nothing in our considerations of how to 
weigh these things up. 
 Participant 05 (phase one) was asked about the importance of child welfare between 
the children born from treatment, and other children affected by the birth (in line with the 
stipulations in the HFE Act). The participant suggested that they were both important, and 
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then commented that ‘I don’t spend my life thinking which one’s more important than the 
other’ (participant 05, phase one). Perhaps we can infer from this that this participant felt 
that these groups were equally important, and any difference would be so negligible as to be 
not worth considering. 
 Within a framework where impartiality dictates that we should be reluctant to 
deviate from a standpoint of equality when it comes to considering who/what to value, the 
participants’ reluctance to attribute greater value to any one group over another is laudable. 
As the philosophical analysis showed (page 50), however, the fact that children are at 
increased risk of undergoing harm suggests that in practice, their welfare should be 
considered a priority over the welfare of others. 
We have now considered, in light of the study data, how child welfare is to be 
weighed against the welfare of other stakeholders. Let us now consider how it weighs 
against considerations regarding the specific groups and characteristics discussed in the 
philosophical analysis. Recall that some participants felt that total reliance on child welfare 
as a prioritisation criterion for gametes could result in patients being prioritised based on 
‘morally repugnant’ (participant 30, phase two – see page 229) reasons. The question that 
this raises is why these prioritisations would be morally repugnant. If a prioritisation system 
satisfies requirements of child welfare but still produces morally repugnant results, then 
some principle other than child welfare must be appealed to in order to demonstrate the 
repugnance of such a system. Indeed, the philosophical analysis did not suggest that child 
welfare was the only consideration, and much attention was paid there to the potential 
tensions between considerations of equality and considerations like welfare (of which child 
welfare is obviously a part). The philosophical analysis did, however, suggest that child 
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welfare was more important than (i.e. weightier than but not able to trump) other 
considerations, and it seems that some of the workshop participants felt differently about 
this, given their view that in some situations, even large returns in child welfare should be 
foregone for the sake of other considerations. 
 One participant at the workshop gave an example of this (see page 229). (S)he 
argued that it would be morally repugnant to prioritise patients based on their sexuality, 
regardless of whether there was evidence about trends in child welfare between families 
with same-sex parents and those with heterosexual parents. It is important to note that this 
is not an empirical question about the effects of these factors on child welfare. Rather, it is a 
theoretical question about the value of child welfare versus the value of avoiding 
discrimination on intuitively repugnant grounds. This is not only a concern for those who 
would maximise outcomes for children, but for anyone who thinks there is a point at which 
child welfare would be so low that it would be wrong to bring that child into existence (this 
would include Mulgan, Pennings, and Harris). Furthermore, a consideration like parental 
financial status would not definitively demonstrate a particular level of child welfare – it can 
only give us an indication. 
 There are far-reaching historical and political reasons why people find it unsavoury to 
discriminate based on certain factors like these. Discrimination (in the non-moral sense) 
based on sexual orientation, race, or sex is uncomfortable because people of certain sexual 
orientations, races or sexes have historically been systematically disfavoured and 
discriminated against, often solely on the basis of their membership of groups relating to 
these characteristics. Discomfort about discrimination based on financial status may come 
from a sense that certain rights are universal and should not be more easily accessible for 
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the financially privileged. Reproductive rights would be a good candidate for such a right, if 
any. Further, there may be a concern with NHS-funded treatment that the prioritisation of 
wealthy patients would be an unfair way of distributing funds that people from a more 
diverse set of socioeconomic backgrounds pay into. This may depend, however, on more 
general ideas about how such resources should be distributed: Draper and Sorell note that a 
welfare state is ‘justified by the belief that a decent society ought to use what resources it 
can to support the weakest and poorest’ (Draper and Sorell, 2002, p. 344). While it seems at 
first glance that prioritising the wealthy would be to confer benefit on those who need it 
least, we must remember that the reason for this is to ensure a greater level of child welfare. 
Hence, the fact that it helps the wealthy is only a by-product of its maximising the benefits 
experienced by ‘the weakest and poorest’ – the child to be born from treatment. There is 
thus a general reluctance to discriminate on these grounds. 
 The philosophical analysis has already considered that while it may be worthwhile 
being wary about such discrimination, the fact that many of them have historical contexts 
does not make them special, in the sense that it may be just as wrong to discriminate on the 
basis of arbitrary characteristics that do not have such a history. Thus it is not clear that 
there must be an absolute constraint about discriminating based on certain characteristics, if 
membership of certain groups relating to these characteristics is associated with moral 
considerations that we wish to take seriously, for example child welfare. 
 One participant raised a concern about the “selective” use of child welfare as a 
means of disproportionately discriminating against certain groups for which there was 
actually no evidence base. The concern was that child welfare was often invoked as a 
justification for refusing to treat same-sex couples or single women, but that the same child 
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welfare principle would apply more seriously to others such as those who had been the 
victims of abuse when they themselves were children, and was ignored in such cases. This 
selective use of child welfare is a serious concern, but it can also cut the other way. We can 
legitimately invoke equality considerations in some contexts if we are concerned about one 
group being systematically discriminated against, but if we are to do so then we must be 
willing to invoke them wherever they apply, at the risk of being inconsistent. If we think that 
equality considerations apply between certain groups and not to others, justification needs 
to be offered for this. It is not clear that the characteristics on whose basis we usually want 
to secure equality are more important than some others. As has been argued, equality 
considerations are certainly important, but the vulnerability of children means that their 
welfare must take priority, and hence if it is true that certain groups are able to secure 
better levels of welfare, they should be treated first. 
This relies on the argument in the philosophical analysis that concluded that a good 
allocation system for gametes also needs to take seriously Savulescu’s principle of 
Procreative Beneficence (PB), where there is an obligation to create the best child possible. 
The interview data suggest that clinical staff were often not in agreement with this idea. 
They tended to report a preference for exclusion rather than prioritisation, in the sense that 
they were happy to exclude patients altogether in extreme cases, but not to prioritise one 
non-excluded patient over another in cases that were more similar. This suggests that they 
did not subscribe to PB, but rather adopted a threshold view where only a minimum, “good 
enough” standard of child welfare was required. This could be regarded as a kind of 
sufficientarianism with regard to child welfare, though we might consider that it is perhaps 
more nuanced than that. 
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If we are talking solely about efficacy outcomes, this sufficientarianism is in line with 
Savulescu’s comment that a good approach ‘allow[s] that patients with lower but reasonable 
prognosis should have a share of public resources’ (Savulescu 1998: 212). When it comes to 
child welfare, however, Savulescu argues that the principle of Procreative Beneficence 
applies, creating an obligation to create the best child possible. The conclusions of the 
philosophical analysis were in agreement with this latter principle from Savulescu, but not 
the former; indeed, some justification is needed if maximisation is obligatory in one 
circumstance (child welfare) and not in another (efficacy). The philosophical analysis 
concluded that considerations of equality, as defended by Harris and Savulescu, were not 
sufficient to ground this difference, and that clinical staff should adopt a maximising, rather 
than sufficientarian, approach to both child welfare and efficacy, with only limited 
exceptions for the sake of practicality in terms of managing waiting lists. The approach taken 
by many of the staff in the interviews does not fall foul of the consistency problem, as by and 
large they were sufficientarians across both camps. Their views diverge from the 
recommendations of the philosophical analysis, then, as their acceptance of exclusion but 
reluctance to prioritise means that they would favour a system that permits suboptimal 
treatments, whether the suboptimality refers to child welfare or efficacy outcomes.  
There is evidence in the data, both from the workshop and from the interviews, that 
speaks directly to these two categories of suboptimality and the idea that at least some 
participants are in agreement with them. As discussed previously (see page 254), participant 
08 (phase one) felt that considerations of equality were what gave rise to allowing people 
with poorer prognoses to have treatment: ‘everyone’s sort of equal, just because we feel 
they’ve got a lower chance than [someone else] I don’t think we can say they can’t use them, 
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I mean everyone should be entitled to use them equally’ (participant 08, phase one). This 
speaks to the debate between Savulescu and Harris about equality versus outcomes, in 
which Harris argues for equal treatment regardless of outcomes, and Savulescu argues for 
equal treatment amongst patients but with a cut-off point for efficacy, below which a 
patient should be excluded for treatment. The participants’ views were sometimes in line 
with Savulescu’s view that there is a lower cut-off for efficacy below which someone should 
be denied treatment, and many participants took this approach with regard to child welfare, 
too. This is in line with the view advocated in the philosophical analysis, though in this case it 
seems to be a concession to equality whereas the philosophical justification for not 
recommending that staff aim for maximally healthy children was due to pragmatism. Given 
the problematic nature of equality as discussed previously in this chapter, the participants’ 
deference to equality at the expense of child welfare and efficacy, both of which were 
deemed to be more important than equality, cannot be viewed as legitimate. At any rate, 
the conclusion is the same, and staff would thus be permitted to make decisions where 
suboptimal children are created. The location of the threshold still needs to be cashed out, 
though the emphasis on child welfare and the problems with equality detailed in this thesis 
might suggest that at present, staff are operating with too low a threshold (i.e. they are not 
excluding often enough) than is justifiable. Within the context of a priority system, staff 
could effectively exclude patients if child welfare considerations are weighted so heavily that 
patients cannot expect ever to receive treatment. 
This section has teased out some of the more general and theoretical ideas about 
welfare as they appeared in the interview and workshop data. It has been shown that we 
must still consider child welfare to be an important consideration, both with regard to the 
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welfare of other stakeholders, and other potential values such as equality. Child welfare 
considerations can therefore be considered as reasons to prioritise or de-prioritise patients. 
 
7.11 National Allocation 
 
Pattinson states that gamete allocation could be variable between clinics (Pattinson, 
2012, p. 577), and this was supported by the interview data. Pattinson then describes 
support for a national system, and the HFEA’s SEED review suggested that this might be the 
case (see page 118). The interview results, however, do not indicate that the participants 
were in support of this idea. Two practical reasons for this were that participants felt that 
there would be difficulties with matching donors on a bigger list, and that they were 
concerned with the cost of implementing a national system. 
It is unclear how matching would be much, if at all, more difficult with a national list 
than with the individual clinic lists. Complexities may arise in matching when a clinic 
attempts to match in such a way as to maximise the usage of its donors. Let us consider an 
example of matching following a recipient’s stipulation: imagine there are two recipients, 
one of whom specifies their desire for, say, a university-educated sperm donor. The other 
recipient has made no stipulations and does not mind about the education level of their 
donor. Now, if a group of donors comes in, one of whom is university-educated, it of course 
makes sense to use this donor with the recipient who has made the stipulation, because 
even though this donor could be used with others, the recipient may only be used with him.  
Financial costs could be an issue. On the basis that the argument for a national list 
comes from the standpoint of fairness to recipients (re: the postcode lottery issue), and 
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fairness is less important than maximising effective treatments (as argued above), then an 
increase in financial costs at the expense of the number of treatments that can be offered 
would suggest that we should dispense with the idea of a national system. 
Part of the strength of this objection to the national allocation system would depend 
on the source and nature of funding. Without going into this complicated question here, it 
would be good to consider first whether such a system would indeed cost more, and if so to 
consider means of funding for such a system and whether its implementation would really 
be detrimental to patient outcomes. Only once this costing work has actually been done can 
we legitimately consider letting go of the idea of a national system. Until then, it remains on 
the table as a viable and justifiable system by virtue of its increased fairness and 
transparency. 
Another argument against the national list was the complaint that people at each 
clinic worked hard to recruit donors (see pages 249-250), and that they would consequently 
not want to see donors used at other clinics that might gain financial benefits from their 
work and efforts, and this idea also received attention at the workshop. It is understandable 
that a staff member may be concerned about this, but this does not represent a decisive 
argument against a national allocation system, as a national system does not necessarily 
mean that the fruits of staff members’ labour will be redistributed in this way. A perhaps 
straightforward way around this may be to also nationalise recruitment (though the concern 
about cost may reappear here). This was part of the system advanced by one of the 
participants in phase three (see pages 251-253). This would alleviate the problem of staff 
members feeling that the benefits of their work were disappearing elsewhere. It is worth 
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noting that organ and blood donation functions using a system of local recruitment and 
national allocation. 
The conclusion regarding the national waiting list, then, is a tentative one. This 
discussion has tried to establish that the objection, raised by the interview participants, that 
a national system would be too cumbersome in terms of matching, cannot be considered 
decisive until more thought has been put into the logistics of it, and the burden of proof 
would be on the detractors to explain why matching would become untenably difficult under 
a national system when it is functional under a local system. The cost issue is perhaps more 
pressing, but the same principle applies: the national system would have benefits, in terms 
of potentially increasing the number of donors, and in terms of fairness, where criteria 
would be more standardised. Importantly, it may provide a better platform for 
implementing the best allocation criteria, ensuring better practice nationwide. These 
advantages need to be weighed up against the disadvantages (i.e. cost) of implementing a 
national system. We must not simply assume that this cost would be too great. The 
participants’ concern that the distribution of costs and benefits to themselves with regard to 
recruitment and allocation would become unfair is yet another issue that needs further 
consideration, but it appears that there are solutions on the table regarding this. We should 
therefore take factual details into account about alternative arrangements for the national 
list, before any firm conclusions can be reached. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS FOR GAMETE ALLOCATION 
 
 Before moving onto the final conclusions for gamete allocation, it is necessary to 
comment on how they ought to be used. Many of the final conclusions that will be made in 
this chapter relate to information about patients. For example, conclusion 2) suggests that 
any patient’s substance use and/or domestic violence problem should be taken into account. 
This raises the question of how clinical staff will come to know this information, and how 
sure they can be of its veracity. It is suggested, consistently with the concept of using 
probability to establish approximations of truth as outlined in section 5.2, that staff consider 
the probability that a patient presents such a problem, rather than there being an 
expectation of cast-iron evidence, which may render the relevant conclusions useless if 
clinical staff cannot gain full access to information. There must, however, still be a 
requirement for some evidence – a staff member’s fears or intuitions are not enough to 
speak against treating a patient, as this too readily allows the expression of prejudice. 
 The final conclusions for gamete allocation are shown in a list below, before some 
brief explication. It is hoped that the application of these conclusions will be adopted in 
future practice. 
 
1) There must not be a presumption that patients will simply be treated in the order in 
which they arrive at the clinic or on the waiting list. A priority system should be 
adopted to ensure that as many morally relevant factors as is pragmatically viable are 
taken into account. 
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Much work has been done to show the justifiability of conclusion 1), in light of the plurality 
of moral factors that are relevant and may be being ignored under a “first come, first served” 
system (see page 100). This first conclusion will influence the way that following conclusions 
are used. 
 
2) If any patient, any patient’s partner, or any person who is expected to have a 
significant role in rearing a child born of treatment, is revealed to have a continuing 
problem with substance use (including smoking), alcoholism, violence or domestic 
discord, this should be taken as a reason against further consideration of this patient 
for treatment. 
 
Conclusion 2) is relatively uncontroversial, as the participants’ views in the data were 
broadly in agreement with it. The importance of considering child welfare has been argued 
for extensively in this thesis, and is also supported in the HFE Act. Furthermore, the 
relevance of the above factors to child welfare has been linked to empirical evidence. This 
discussion can be found on pages 44-58, and pages 302-309. 
 
3) Any other factors that call into question the expected welfare of children affected by 
treatment, including the potential recipient’s ability to parent the child, should be 
seriously considered as reasons against treatment unless they can adequately 
demonstrate that such factors do not present a risk to child welfare. The relationship 
between these factors and child welfare issues must be supported by empirical 
evidence. 
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Conclusion 3) will be more controversial given the extra weight that some participants 
seemed to want to give to equality considerations. The relationship between welfare and 
equality has been discussed in this thesis, however, and it has been concluded that child 
welfare is a legitimate basis on which to treat patients unequally (pages 108-114). The 
amendment to this conclusion aims to be sensitive to the concern that welfare of the child 
issues may sometimes be used “selectively” (see page 229). 
 
4) Patients who can reproduce without donor gametes, but who can only do so at the 
risk of passing on diseases, should be given some priority on this basis. 
 
Conclusion 4) was met with widespread disagreement amongst most participants. The 
justification for this conclusion is based on child welfare. The discussion (pages 45-47) took 
seriously Savulescu’s argument that practitioners should account for wider societal concerns, 
in cases where no harm will be done by so doing. This thesis argued that the avoidance of 
children with heritable conditions constitutes a legitimate wider concern, and that 
prioritising patients for this reason would not cause harm. Given the participants’ 
disagreement with this conclusion, however, it is deemed that while it is a point of future 
philosophical interest, it is unlikely to make any ground in practical terms. 
 
5) Patients should be prioritised based on the chance of the treatment being successful, 
and the risks to their health of undergoing treatment, with those with higher chances 
and lower risks the higher priority. 
 
315 
 
Conclusion 5) is one of the most important conclusions, and many considerations will be 
relevant to these ideas of efficacy and risk (see pages 60-61 for discussion), which are 
predominantly grounded in the welfare of patients. This conclusion will ensure that gametes 
are used in a way that confers the most benefit to patients. 
 
6) Younger patients should take priority over older ones, except in cases where there 
are so few younger patients that older patients are expected to be treated anyway. 
In such cases, the older patients should take priority. 
 
Conclusion 6) will do the same, and relates to conclusion 5) insofar as, in the case of donor 
sperm, age is a good yardstick for treatment efficacy. The application of this conclusion will 
depend on the size and population of the waiting list in question.  
 
7) Gametes can be allocated on the basis of conditions set by the gamete donors, 
including conditions based on the protected characteristics in the Equality Act. 
 
Conclusion 7) is based on the fact that conditions will increase the number of donors, 
increasing the numbers of gametes available and thus allowing more patients to be treated. 
The discussion on pages 61-71 suggested that this may not constitute a breach of the 
Equality Act, as no individual is disadvantaged by it. 
 
8) Patients who can recruit donors to donate to them, or to the general pool, should be 
given some priority. 
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Conclusion 8) acknowledges the points advanced by Pennings and Pattinson regarding the 
benefits of a mirror exchange system in increasing numbers of donors. As with conclusion 7), 
this is grounded in patient welfare as it allows more patients to be treated. 
 
9) Parental status should be accounted for in prioritising patients, so that patients with 
less parenting experience are prioritised over those with more parenting experience. 
Staff may wish to generate some discrete cut-off points to negotiate the fact that the 
spectrum of parenting experience is very broad. 
 
Conclusion 9) reflects the fact that there is evidence of psychological differences between 
primary and secondary infertility patients (see pages 88-90), so that parental status is 
included in the priority system. 
 
10) Staff should not base their decisions on the sexual orientation of patients. 
 
Conclusion 10) aims to make explicit that certain criteria are morally irrelevant to this 
decision-making and thus should not be accounted for. Evidence was presented showing 
that same-sex parenting has no deleterious effects on child welfare (see pages 91-93). 
Recommending against decisions based on sexual orientation and relationship status reflects 
the legal status quo, but staff should be wary of indirect ways that these groups can be 
discriminated against. 
 
317 
 
11) Staff should give priority to parenting arrangements involving greater numbers of 
parents. 
 
Like conclusion 4), it is not expected that conclusion 11) will gain any practical ground, but it 
remains a philosophically interesting problem nonetheless, and is based on the idea that it is 
better to help more people where possible. If parenting is seen as a good for patients, then it 
makes sense to provide this opportunity to as many patients as possible with the same 
resources. 
 
12) A national allocation system should be adopted, unless it proves to be so costly as to 
disadvantage patients. 
 
Conclusion 12) has been tempered slightly to account for the fact that many of the study 
participants opposed the national allocation system. The national system still remains a 
potentially good way of ensuring fairer allocation, and increasing donor numbers. This 
reflects the discussion of Pattinson (2012) above (pages 118-120). 
 
13) Patients whose BMI would pose risks to their health if treated, or whose treatment 
might be less effective due to their BMI, should be de-prioritised on this basis. 
 
BMI was not originally considered in the philosophical discussion, on the grounds that the 
ethical issues associated with it would be discussed with relation to other putative criteria. 
Indeed, ethical issues pertaining to BMI include patient welfare and efficacy, both of which 
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have been discussed extensively so far (see pages 59-61). Nevertheless, participants 
identified BMI as significant, giving rise to conclusion 13). 
 
14) There should not be a presumption that recipients should be matched to donors with 
matching physical characteristics. If there is, patients should be able to opt out of this 
system and request gametes from a non-matching donor. This option should be 
made explicit to them at an early stage. 
 
Conclusion 14) has been added in light of the fact that matching arose as a theme in the 
empirical study (as reported on pages 241-242), and out of concern for the fact that patients 
may be disadvantaged if it is presumed that they want donors with matching physical 
characteristics. 
 
15) Patients should be prioritised based on how long they have been waiting for gametes. 
 
Finally, conclusion 15) is totally at odds with the suggestions of the philosophical analysis, 
but the data showed overwhelming support for the idea that waiting time should be 
accounted for, as reported on page 214 above . In order for the priority system in general to 
be more palatable to staff, it is thus recommended that waiting time be accounted for. This 
acknowledges the importance of compromise as outlined by Huxtable (2013) and discussed 
above (page 25). 
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8.1 Summary 
 
 This discussion has tried to take seriously the views of participants in the interviews 
and in the workshop, and consider the extent to which they should impact upon the 
conclusions drawn from the philosophical analysis. An overarching theme in this discussion 
has been an emphasis on equality and fairness from participants, which has been shown to 
be somewhat difficult to defend, given the peculiarities of accepting some conceptions of 
equality in this context. With the difficulties of relying too heavily on equality in mind, it has 
tended to be the case that the original recommendations can withstand many of the 
criticisms and concerns raised by the participants. 
 The discussion calls for a revision of our evaluation of the relationship between 
equality considerations and welfare considerations in the healthcare setting. This chapter 
has argued that equality considerations are often given too much weight, and that once this 
concern is taken seriously, intuitive anxieties about priority systems lose their bite. Serious 
consideration of child welfare issues means that clinical staff must be readier to exclude 
those who pose a risk to children, either through their own behaviour or by passing on 
conditions or diseases. 
 Finally, while it may not be ideal for donors to make stipulations about their gametes, 
the fact of the matter is that this may confer advantage on some patients without 
disadvantaging anyone. So, while we may feel an intuition or principled response against 
allowing people to make stipulations if we think they might be repugnant, autonomy 
considerations in combination with the problem of levelling down based on such principles 
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(which again represents an overemphasis on equality) mean that we must allow such 
stipulations to occur. 
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9. FINAL COMMENTS 
 
9.1 Reflexivity 
 
The question of how my own personal views and biases may have entered into the 
project is a complicated one, given the philosophical nature of the project, and the 
overarching philosophical questions about whether ethical viewpoints can ever be more 
than matters of opinion or reflections of personal desires. I have attempted to offer 
justifications for every argument I have advanced, but one problem is that the ethical 
principles on which those justifications are founded may also be matters of personal 
preference. 
 I make no secret of my allegiance to consequentialist moral theory, and my choice to 
take a consequentialist approach in this thesis is a reflection of that. Undoubtedly a Kantian 
approach to the same question could yield vastly different results and conclusions. This, 
however, is where the strength of the empirical aspect of the study arises – to test these 
ideas against those of others in the field. Where appropriate, conclusions that were 
obviously consequentialist and potentially at odds with other ways of thinking were 
suggested tentatively. 
 Another avenue for reflexivity regards my own personal experiences of (in)fertility 
and the world of reproduction, assisted or otherwise – I have none. I have no plans to have 
children at any stage in my life, and I have tried to allow this to give me a more objective 
vantage point from which to discuss these issues. Part of the rationale for the fieldwork and 
empirical elements of this project was that it would allow me to avoid the charge of having 
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written this thesis without a true understanding of the plight of the involuntarily childless, 
and I think this thesis gives adequate weight to the suffering associated with that plight. 
 
9.2 Conclusion 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis was a list of philosophically robust conclusions 
about how gametes ought to be allocated, including whether to allow known donors, and 
whether a national waiting list of donors and recipients should be used. This was achieved by 
a survey of the philosophical literature and the legal context surrounding the allocation of 
donor gametes to fertility patients. These conclusions were then considered against the 
responses of participants in an in-depth empirical study. The study also aimed to gain an 
understanding of the current status quo of gamete allocation practice. This understanding 
was facilitated by the compilation of publicly-available information regarding gamete 
allocation criteria, collected from the HFEA’s website, and from the websites of individual 
clinics themselves. The collection of this publicly-available data helped to identify some of 
the salient ethical aspects of gamete allocation, for discussion in the philosophical analysis. 
An empirical bioethics methodology was deemed appropriate for the study, given its 
aim of establishing ethical conclusions that accounted for the views and practices of real-
world service providers. The thesis devoted considerable time to explicating the complex 
relationship between the data collected in this study and the philosophical analysis 
undergone beforehand, aiming to strike a balance between theoretical rigour and practical 
applicability. The thesis is original in that it represents, to date, the most in-depth 
investigation of both the ethical dimensions of some of the putative criteria for gamete 
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allocation, and the views of clinical staff with regard to the question of gamete allocation. As 
a result, this thesis has produced a set of fifteen empirically-informed philosophical 
conclusions about how gametes donated for human reproductive purposes should be 
allocated. These conclusions may now be put forward as guidelines for future clinical 
practice. 
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10. APPENDICES 
 
10.1 Appendix 1 – Participant Invitation Letter (Phase One - Coordinators) 
 
 
 Primary Care Clinical Sciences 
School of Health and Population Sciences 
College of Medical and Dental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham B15 2TT 
 [Date] 
[Recipient address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
My name is Simon Jenkins, and I am a PhD student at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham. Enclosed is an information sheet about my doctoral research 
study, in which I hope you will be interested in participating. My research is about how 
gametes are allocated in fertility clinics in the UK. I am writing to you because in your role as 
sperm/egg donor coordinator, you are likely to be in a position to make decisions about such 
allocation.  
 
Dr Sue Avery, director of the Fertility Centre at Birmingham Women’s Hospital, is part of my 
supervisory team, and I enclose a covering letter from her. The enclosed Participant 
Information Sheet will give you more information. If you would like to participate in this 
study, please complete the enclosed reply slip and return it to me.  You can also contact me 
by telephone, text or email. If you do not want to participate in the study, just disregard this 
letter. You will be sent a reminder letter about this study in approximately two weeks. If you 
do not wish to receive this reminder, please tick the appropriate box on the reply slip and 
return it to me. Alternatively, if you disregard this letter and the reminder letter, we will not 
contact you about this study again. 
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No one from the research team will tell anyone from your place of work about any interest 
you show in the study, and your personal information will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
If you wish to contact me be email or phone, details are as follows: 
Email: spj029@bham.ac.uk 
Phone: 0121 414 7483 
Alternatively you can contact me using the stamped and addressed envelope enclosed with 
this letter. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this, and I hope you will consider participating. Also, if 
you know of anyone else who you think may be suitable for the study and is interested in 
participating, please do not hesitate to pass this information on to them. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Simon Jenkins 
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10.2 Appendix 2 – Participant Invitation Letter (Phase One - Directors) 
 
 
 Primary Care Clinical Sciences 
School of Health and Population Sciences 
College of Medical and Dental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham B15 2TT 
 [Date] 
 
[Recipient address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
My name is Simon Jenkins, and I am a PhD student at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham. Enclosed is an information sheet about my doctoral research 
study, in which I hope you will be interested in participating. My research is about how 
gametes are allocated in fertility clinics in the UK. I am writing to you because in your role as 
director of a fertility clinic, you may be in a position to make decisions about such allocation. 
Whether or not you are in this position yourself, it would be helpful if you could circulate 
this information to those in your clinic who are. 
 
Dr Sue Avery, director of the Fertility Centre at Birmingham Women’s Hospital, is part of my 
supervisory team, and I enclose a covering letter from her. The enclosed Participant 
Information Sheet will give you more information. If you would like to participate in this 
study, please complete the enclosed reply slip and return it to me.  You can also contact me 
by telephone, text or email. If you do not want to participate in the study, just disregard this 
letter. You will be sent a reminder letter about this study in approximately two weeks. If you 
do not wish to receive this reminder, please tick the appropriate box on the reply slip and 
return it to me. Alternatively, if you disregard this letter and the reminder letter, we will not 
contact you about this study again. 
 
No one from the research team will tell anyone from your place of work about any interest 
you show in the study, and your personal information will be kept strictly confidential. 
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If you wish to contact me be email or phone, details are as follows: 
Email: spj029@bham.ac.uk 
Phone: 0121 414 7483 
Alternatively you can contact me using the stamped and addressed envelope enclosed with 
this letter. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this, and I hope you will consider participating. Also, if 
you know of anyone else who you think may be suitable for the study and is interested in 
participating, please do not hesitate to pass this information on to them. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Simon Jenkins 
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10.3 Appendix 3 – Covering Letter from Sue Avery 
 
 
Dr Sue Avery 
Fertility Centre 
Birmingham Women’s Hospital 
Metchley Park Road 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham B15 2TG 
 [date] 
 
[address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
I am currently supervising a PhD project that seeks to explore how gametes are currently 
allocated in fertility centres and what ethical issues (if any) arise from those allocation 
procedures. The student, Simon Jenkins, is hoping to interview staff at fertility clinics across 
the UK to get an idea of how decisions about gamete allocation are made. It would be very 
helpful if you could participate in this research, or pass this information on to anyone who 
has a role in decision-making regarding access to waiting lists or gamete allocation in your 
clinic (for example, directors of clinics or donor coordinators). Please find the relevant 
documents enclosed, and thank you for your time. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dr Sue Avery 
Director 
Fertility Centre 
Birmingham Women’s Hospital 
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10.4 Appendix 4 – Participant Information Sheet (Phase One) 
 
 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
Chief Investigator: Simon Jenkins, PhD student, University of Birmingham 
Supervisors:  
Lead supervisor: Professor Heather Draper, University of Birmingham 
Dr Sue Avery, Fertility Centre, Birmingham Women’s Hospital 
Dr Jonathan Ives, University of Birmingham 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide, it’s 
important for you to understand why we’re doing this research, and what participation 
would involve for you. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully, and feel 
free to speak to others about the study if you wish. If you would like more information on 
any aspect of the study, or if there is anything in this information sheet that you don’t 
understand, then please ask us. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
 
The study aims to find out how staff at fertility clinics in the UK make decisions about which 
patients to treat with donated eggs and sperm. The information you give us will become part 
of a larger project looking at the best way to allocate eggs and sperm. The purpose of this 
study is to explore the ethics of the allocation of donated eggs and sperm, and to identify 
best practice. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
We’re trying to find out how people make decisions about how to allocate donated gametes. 
Because of your role in the fertility clinic as a decision-maker, we imagine that you have a 
significant level of influence in this process. We’re hoping to interview between twelve and 
fifteen people like you from selected clinics across the UK so that we can see if there are any 
similarities or differences in people’s approaches to allocation. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
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You do not have to participate in this study if you don’t want to. It is entirely up to you 
whether or not you do so. Once you’ve read this information sheet and had time to think, 
you can contact us to take the process further. We’ll ask you to sign a consent form to show 
that you’ve agreed to take part. Even after signing the consent form, you’ll be free to 
withdraw from the study at any time up until 48 hours after your interview has finished, 
without giving any reason. Withdrawing from the study won’t affect your job in any way – 
we won’t tell anyone you work with about your participation in the study or any interest you 
show in it. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you do decide to participate, you’ll be asked to attend an interview lasting about an hour, 
during which you’ll be asked some questions about how you decide which patients receive 
treatment with donated eggs and sperm. We’ll record and transcribe the interview so that 
we can analyse your responses and compare them to what other people say. 
We’ll try to make the interview as convenient as possible for you by arranging for it to take 
place where you work, so you don’t have to travel. You won’t get any money for 
participating but you might find it interesting and helpful to talk about issues that arise in 
your daily working life. 
 
You can also choose to attend a workshop in 2012 (date to be confirmed), and you may 
choose to participate in a second interview after the workshop. At this workshop we will 
present the findings from the first interview phase, and you’ll have the chance to contribute 
your views in a group setting. You do not have to take part in either of these if you do not 
want to, and you can use the last page of this form to let me know if you do not want to be 
contacted about them. 
 
What will happen to my details and the information that I give? 
 
Your personal details will be kept confidential, and anything you say during the interview will 
be anonymised. We’ll follow legal and ethical practice so that all information about you is 
handled in confidence, and so no one but the research team will be able to find out that 
you’ve participated in the study unless you tell them yourself. Your contact details will be 
stored on a respondent database on a password-protected personal University of 
Birmingham computer, in an office that is only accessible through two swipecard-secured 
doors. Interviews and the workshop will be audio recorded using a portable audio recording 
device, transferred to the University computer at the earliest available opportunity, and then 
deleted from the original recording device. The recordings will then be transcribed, and 
stored on the University computer. The recording of the interview needs to be kept because 
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the study is being written up for a PhD thesis. The transcriptions will be anonymised, and a 
key for the purpose of linking personal details to individual recordings/transcripts will be 
kept in a different location on the same computer. All electronic files will be backed up on a 
firewall-protected University server. Paper files (for example reply slips and consent forms) 
will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in the same office as the computer. Personal details 
and audio recordings will be destroyed after the PhD project has been examined. Transcripts 
and consent forms will be kept and securely stored for ten years before being destroyed. 
 
The research team will talk about the findings of the study as a whole, and the results will be 
published.  Sometimes we will use word-for-word quotations, but we’ll never identify you by 
name, and any other information that might identify you will be removed. Once the study is 
complete, you’ll be allowed to see a summary of the results, if you wish to. 
 
Will I get any money for taking part? 
 
You won’t be paid for participating in this study. As the interview will take place in your usual 
place of work, you won’t incur any extra travel expenses. 
 
What are the possible risks and disadvantages of taking part? 
 
The interview should not be burdensome, and does not carry significant risk. However, we 
understand that some of the questions we’ll be asking in the interview might cause a bit of 
discomfort, as we are asking questions about how you do your job and how you justify the 
decisions you make.  If you do find the interview uncomfortable you are free to withdraw at 
any time during the interview or for up to 48 hours afterwards, and you don’t have to give 
any reason for this. 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
 
Simon Jenkins, a PhD student at the University of Birmingham, is organising the study. 
Professor Heather Draper and Dr Jonathan Ives from the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham will supervise the study, along with Dr Sue Avery from the Fertility 
Centre at Birmingham Women’s Hospital. The Arts and Humanities Research Council is 
funding the research. 
 
What if I have a complaint? 
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If you have any concerns about any aspect of the study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher who will do his best to answer any questions you have. If you wish to complain 
formally, you can contact Professor Heather Draper with the following information: 
 
Professor Heather Draper 
Centre for Biomedical Ethics 
Primary Care Clinical Sciences Building 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT, UK 
0121 414 6941 
h.draper@bham.ac.uk 
 
What do I do if I want to participate or find out more? 
 
For questions about the study, this document, or to participate in the study, please contact 
Simon Jenkins: spj029@bham.ac.uk 0121 414 7483 
 
You can also contact Dr Sue Avery, Director of the Fertility Centre at Birmingham Women’s 
Hospital, with the following information: 
 
Dr Sue Avery 
Birmingham Women’s NHS Foundation Trust 
Metchley Park Road, Edgbaston 
Birmingham B15 2TG 
0121 627 2797 
 
We may also want to contact you about future phases of the study. We are planning to host 
a workshop to which people will be invited hear our findings so far and contribute their 
views. There may also be another interview session after this to explore people’s views 
further. The reply slip will give you an opportunity to tell us whether you’re happy for us to 
contact you about these events. You can still participate in this first interview even if you 
don’t want to come to the workshop or do the second interview. 
 
 
 
333 
 
Reply Slip: 
Return this slip to Simon Jenkins at the University of Birmingham in the stamped and 
addressed envelope provided. 
 
Name: 
 
 
Preferred contact 
address: 
 
 
 
Home Telephone at 
preferred address: 
 
 
Mobile: 
 
 
Email address: 
 
 
I’d like to take part in this interview: 
 
I don’t want to take part. 
Please don’t contact me again: 
 
 
I’m happy for you to contact me  
about other study phases, 
like the workshop and second 
interview: 
 
If you’re happy to take part, please tick your preferred means of contact: 
 
Phone call 
 
Email 
 
Post Text message  
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Please use this space to let us know if there are any times that are particularly convenient or inconvenient to 
contact you. We will do our best to be flexible and arrange an interview time that suits you. 
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10.5 Appendix 5 – Consent Form (Phase One) 
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10.6 Appendix 6 – Participant Reminder Letter 
 
 
 Primary Care Clinical Sciences 
School of Health and Population Sciences 
College of Medical and Dental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham B15 2TT 
 [Date] 
 
[Recipient address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
My name is Simon Jenkins, and I am a PhD student at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham. About two weeks ago we contacted you inviting you to participate 
in a research study. This letter is a polite reminder to offer you another chance to involve 
yourself in the study, should you want to. The information sheet about the study is enclosed 
again in case you have mislaid the first one. If you do not respond to this letter, we will not 
contact you about the study again. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Simon Jenkins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
337 
 
10.7 Appendix 7 – Topic Guide 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
This guide comprises a list of topics and instructions that the researcher can use to generate 
discussion in interviews and to keep the discussion on track. The researcher will not 
necessarily use all of them in each interview – this will depend on the extent to which the 
participant answers the research questions without being prompted. 
 
Guidance for interviewer: 
 
 Begin by introducing yourself and try to ensure that the participant is relaxed. Explain 
that the interview will go on for about an hour. Loosely describe the 3 parts of the 
interview, in particular emphasising that you want to know about waiting list access 
and gamete allocation amongst those already on waiting lists (otherwise the 
questions may seem repetitive and confusing). 
 
Section 1 – Patients’ Access to Waiting Lists 
 
 Clinics’ decision-making – A general picture of how the participant perceives how the 
clinic decides who gets onto waiting lists for gametes. Prompt: How does the clinic 
decide who to put on the waiting list for donated gametes? 
 
 Official or agreed policy at clinic. Prompt: What official or agreed guidelines or policy 
are there at your clinic for deciding how patients gain entry onto waiting lists for 
gametes? 
 
 Ethical considerations that underlie current policy/decision-making. Prompt: Which 
ethical considerations appear to underlie guidelines, policy or decision-making at the 
clinic? (N.B. if the participant states that there are guidelines already then ask about 
this. If not then ask about decision-making more generally.) 
 
 Participant’s opinion about these considerations. Prompt: What do you think about 
these considerations? 
 
 Any problems associated with these considerations. Prompt: To what extent do these 
considerations pose problems? 
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 Occurrence of deviation from agreed practice/policy. Prompt: To what extent does 
deviation from guidelines/policy occur? (N.B. this question is only relevant if the 
participant states that there are guidelines.) 
 
Section 2 – Allocation of Gametes 
 
 Clinics’ decision-making – A general picture of how the participant perceives how the 
clinic decides who finally gets treatment with donated gametes. Prompt: How does 
the clinic decide how to allocate gametes? 
 
 Official or agreed policy at clinic. Prompt: What official or agreed guidelines or policy 
are there at your clinic for deciding how gametes are allocated? 
 
 Ethical considerations that underlie current policy/decision-making. Prompt: Which 
ethical considerations appear to underlie such guidelines/policy? (N.B. if the 
participant states that there are guidelines already then ask about this. If not then 
ask about decision-making more generally.) 
 
 Participant’s opinion about these. Prompt: What do you think about these 
considerations? 
 
 Any problems associated with these. Prompt: To what extent do these considerations 
pose problems? 
 
 Occurrence of deviation from agreed practice/policy. Prompt: To what extent does 
deviation from the guidelines/policy occur? (N.B. this question is only relevant if the 
participant states that there are guidelines.) 
 
 
Section 3 – Known Donors and National Waiting List 
 
 Opinion on known donors. (A known donor is somebody known to the recipient, who 
donates their gametes for the exclusive use of that particular recipient.) Prompt: 
What do you think of the idea of using known donors? 
 
 Patients “shopping around”. Prompt: To what extent do you think patients to “shop 
around” at different clinics to get the treatment they want? 
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 Opinion on a national register. Prompt: What do you think about the idea of a 
national waiting list for donors and recipients? 
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10.8 Appendix 8 – Participant Invitation Letter (Phase Two – Previous Participants) 
 
 Primary Care Clinical Sciences 
School of Health and Population Sciences 
College of Medical and Dental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham B15 2TT 
 [Date] 
[Recipient address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
Thank you once again for your participation in the interview for my research study. When we 
recorded your consent on that occasion, you kindly agreed for me to contact you again regarding 
future phases of the study. I would like to invite you to take part in the next phase of the study, 
which is a workshop at Birmingham Women’s Hospital. 
 
The enclosed Participant Information Sheet will give you more information. If you would like to 
participate in this workshop, please complete the enclosed reply slip and return it to me.  You can 
also contact me by telephone, text or email. If you do not want to participate in the workshop, just 
disregard this letter. You will be sent a reminder letter about this workshop in approximately two 
weeks. If you do not wish to receive this reminder, please tick the appropriate box on the reply slip 
and return it to me. Alternatively, if you disregard this letter and the reminder letter, we will not 
contact you about this study again. 
 
If you wish to contact me be email or phone, details are as follows: 
 
 
Alternatively you can contact me using the stamped and addressed envelope enclosed. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this, and I hope you will consider participating. Also, if you 
know of anyone else who you think may be suitable for the study and is interested in participating, 
please do not hesitate to pass this information on to them. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Simon Jenkins 
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10.9 Appendix 9 – Participant Invitation Letter (Phase Two – New Participants) 
 
 
 Primary Care Clinical Sciences 
School of Health and Population Sciences 
College of Medical and Dental Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham B15 2TT 
 [Date] 
[Recipient address] 
 
Dear [name], 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
My name is Simon Jenkins, and I am a PhD student at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham. I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. My 
research is about how gametes are allocated in fertility clinics in the UK. We have conducted 
interviews with practitioners on this subject, and also looked at the ethical implications of a 
range of allocation methods. We would like to present our initial findings to get a picture of 
what people think. 
 
[Personalised section – this paragraph will contain information about why the particular 
person is being invited, and will differ depending on their professional or public role] 
 
The enclosed Participant Information Sheet will give you more information. If you would like 
to participate in this workshop, please complete the enclosed reply slip and return it to me.  
You can also contact me by telephone, text or email. If you do not want to participate in the 
workshop, just disregard this letter. You will be sent a reminder letter about this workshop in 
approximately two weeks. If you do not wish to receive this reminder, please tick the 
appropriate box on the reply slip and return it to me. Alternatively, if you disregard this 
letter and the reminder letter, we will not contact you about this study again. 
 
If you wish to contact me be email or phone, details are as follows: 
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Alternatively you can contact me using the stamped and addressed envelope enclosed. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this, and I hope you will consider participating. Also, if 
you know of anyone else who you think may be suitable for the study and is interested in 
participating, please do not hesitate to pass this information on to them. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Simon Jenkins 
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10.10 Appendix 10 – Recruitment Poster 
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10.11 Appendix 11 – Participant Information Sheet – Phase Two 
 
 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
Chief Investigator: Simon Jenkins, PhD Student, University of Birmingham 
Supervisors: 
Lead supervisor: Professor Heather Draper, University of Birmingham 
Dr Sue Avery, Fertility Centre, Birmingham Women’s Hospital 
Dr Jonathan Ives, University of Birmingham 
 
We are holding a workshop, to which you are invited. The study aims to find out how staff at 
fertility clinics in the UK make decisions about which patients to treat with donated eggs and 
sperm. The purpose of the workshop is to present the initial findings of the study, so that we 
can find out what people think about them, and to generate some discussion around the 
ethical issues that arise. So far we have conducted interviews with clinical staff and 
performed an ethical analysis using these, and considered the implications of different 
models that staff could use when making gamete allocation decisions. We’d now like to 
invite people to come and contribute to a discussion about these guidelines. 
 
If you choose to participate, we’ll follow legal and ethical practice so that all personal 
information about you is handled in confidence. Your contact details will be stored on a 
respondent database on a password-protected personal University of Birmingham computer, 
in an office that is only accessible through two swipecard-secured doors. The workshop will 
be audio recorded using a portable audio recording device, transferred to the University 
computer at the earliest available opportunity, and then deleted from the original recording 
device. The recording will then be transcribed, and stored on the University computer. The 
recording of the workshop needs to be kept because the study is being written up for a PhD 
thesis. The transcription will be anonymised. All electronic files will be backed up on a 
firewall-protected University server. Paper files (for example reply slips with your contact 
details on them and consent forms) will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in the same office 
as the computer. Personal details and audio recordings will be destroyed after the PhD 
project has been examined. The transcript and consent forms will be kept and securely 
stored for ten years before being destroyed. 
 
Please be aware that the meeting will be audio recorded. If you are not willing to be 
recorded, you will not be able to participate in the workshop. 
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If you wish to take part, there is a reply slip enclosed for you to return using the stamped 
addressed envelope provided. I have also enclosed a flyer about the workshop, which will 
give you some more information about the programme for the day and other practical 
information. You may wish to display this in staff areas at your organisation to help us recruit 
for the workshop. If you have any concerns or questions about the workshop or any aspect 
of the study, you should ask to speak to the researcher who will do his best to answer any 
questions you have. For questions about the study, this document, or to participate in the 
study, please contact Simon Jenkins: 
 
 
The workshop will be phase 2 of a study with 3 phases. On the reply slip you can indicate 
whether or not you’re happy for us to contact you to invite you to phase 3, which will be a 
one-to-one interview, in which we’ll explore people’s views in a bit more depth. If you do 
not want to do an interview, you are still allowed to participate in the workshop. 
What if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have any concerns about any aspect of the study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher who will do his best to answer any questions you have. If you wish to complain 
formally, you can contact Professor Heather Draper with the following information: 
 
Professor Heather Draper 
Centre for Biomedical Ethics 
Primary Care Clinical Sciences Building 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT, UK 
 
 
 
You can also contact Dr Sue Avery, Director of the Fertility Centre at Birmingham Women’s 
Hospital, with the following information: 
 
Dr Sue Avery 
Birmingham Women’s NHS Foundation Trust 
Metchley Park Road, Edgbaston 
Birmingham B15 2TG 
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Reply Slip: 
Return this slip to Simon Jenkins at the University of Birmingham in the stamped and addressed 
envelope provided. 
 
 
Name: 
 
 
Preferred contact 
address: 
 
 
 
Home or mobile 
telephone (in the unlikely 
event of the workshop’s 
being cancelled at short 
notice): 
 
 
Email address: 
 
 
I’d like to take part in this workshop. 
Please reserve me a place: 
 
I don’t want to take part. 
Please don’t contact me again: 
 
 
I’m happy for you to contact me  
about phase 3, the 
interview: 
 
If you’re happy to take part, please tick your preferred means of contact: 
 
Phone call 
 
Email 
 
Post Text message  
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10.12 Appendix 12 – Consent Form (Phase Two) 
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10.13 Appendix 13 – Participant Information Sheet (Phase Three) 
 
 
 
The ethical allocation of gametes donated for the purpose of fertility treatment 
 
Chief Investigator: Simon Jenkins, PhD student, University of Birmingham 
Supervisors:  
Lead supervisor: Professor Heather Draper, University of Birmingham 
Dr Sue Avery, Fertility Centre, Birmingham Women’s Hospital 
Dr Jonathan Ives, University of Birmingham 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide, it’s 
important for you to understand why we’re doing this research, and what participation 
would involve for you. Please take the time to read this information sheet carefully, and feel 
free to speak to others about the study if you wish. If you would like more information on 
any aspect of the study, or if there is anything in this information sheet that you don’t 
understand, then please ask us. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
 
The study aims to find out how staff at fertility clinics in the UK make decisions about which 
patients to treat with donated eggs and sperm. The data collection for the study will take 
place in 3 phases, and this information sheet is about the third and final phase. Thus the 
information we want to collect now will become part of a larger project looking at the best 
way to allocate eggs and sperm. The purpose of this study is to explore the ethics of the 
allocation of donated eggs and sperm, and to identify best practice. We have already 
conducted interviews with practitioners and hosted a workshop to discuss our findings so far. 
A summary of the research so far and of the workshop is enclosed. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
We’re trying to find out how people ought to make decisions about how to allocate donated 
gametes, and see how people feel about the idea of a national register of donors and 
recipients. You have been invited either because you attended our workshop at phase 2 of 
the study, or because you are someone whose views we think will be valuable to our study 
because of your professional or public role. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
You do not have to participate in this study if you don’t want to. It is entirely up to you 
whether or not you do so. Once you’ve read this information sheet and had time to think, 
you can contact us to take the process further. We’ll ask you to sign a consent form to show 
that you’ve agreed to take part. Even after signing the consent form, you’ll be free to 
withdraw from the study at any time up until 48 hours after your interview has finished, 
without giving any reason. Withdrawing from the study won’t affect your job in any way – 
we won’t tell anyone you work with about your participation in the study or any interest you 
show in it. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you do decide to participate, you’ll be asked to attend an interview lasting about an hour, 
during which you’ll be asked some questions about the allocation of eggs and sperm, with 
particular regard views that you expressed at the workshop if you attended, or to your views 
on the enclosed summary of the workshop.   We’ll record and transcribe the interview so 
that we can analyse your responses. 
 
We’ll try to make the interview as convenient as possible for you by arranging it to take 
place where you work, so you don’t have to travel. If this isn’t convenient for you then we 
can arrange something else, and reimburse you for travel expenses too. You won’t get any 
money for participating but you might find it interesting and helpful to talk about ethical 
issues. 
 
What will happen to my details and the information that I give? 
 
Your personal details will be kept confidential, and anything you say during the interview will 
be anonymised. We’ll follow legal and ethical practice so that all information about you is 
handled in confidence, and so no one but the research team will be able to find out that 
you’ve participated in the study unless you tell them yourself. Your contact details will be 
stored on a respondent database on a password-protected personal University of 
Birmingham computer, in an office that is only accessible through two swipecard-secured 
doors. Interviews and the workshop will be audio recorded using a portable audio recording 
device, transferred to the University computer at the earliest available opportunity, and then 
deleted from the original recording device. The recordings will then be transcribed, and 
stored on the University computer. The recording of the interview needs to be kept because 
the study is being written up for a PhD thesis. The transcriptions will be anonymised, and a 
key for the purpose of linking personal details to individual recordings/transcripts will be 
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kept in a different location on the same computer. All electronic files will be backed up on a 
firewall-protected University server. Paper files (for example reply slips and consent forms) 
will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in the same office as the computer. Personal details 
and audio recordings will be destroyed after the PhD project has been examined. Transcripts 
and consent forms will be kept and securely stored for ten years before being destroyed. 
 
The research team will talk about the findings of the study as a whole, and the results will be 
published. Sometimes we will use word-for-word quotations, but we’ll never identify you by 
name, and any other information that might identify you will be removed. Once the study is 
complete, you’ll be allowed to see a summary of the results, if you like. 
 
Will I get any money for taking part? 
 
You won’t be paid for participating in this study. As the interview will take place in your usual 
place of work, you won’t incur any extra travel expenses. 
 
What are the possible risks and disadvantages of taking part? 
 
The interview should not be too burdensome, and does not carry significant risk. However, 
we understand that some of the questions we’ll be asking in the interview might cause a bit 
of discomfort, as we are asking personal questions about ethical viewpoints. If you do find 
the interview uncomfortable you are free to withdraw at any time during the interview or 
for up to 48 hours afterwards, and you don’t have to give any reason for this. 
 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
 
Simon Jenkins, a PhD student at the University of Birmingham, is organising the study. 
Professor Heather Draper and Dr Jonathan Ives from the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Birmingham will supervise the study, along with Dr Sue Avery from the Fertility 
Centre at Birmingham Women’s Hospital. The Arts and Humanities Research Council is 
funding the research. 
 
What if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have any concerns about any aspect of the study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher who will do his best to answer any questions you have. If you wish to complain 
formally, you can contact Professor Heather Draper with the following information: 
 
Professor Heather Draper 
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Centre for Biomedical Ethics 
Primary Care Clinical Sciences Building 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT, UK 
 
 
 
What do I do if I want to participate or find out more? 
 
For questions about the study, this document, or to participate in the study, please contact 
Simon Jenkins:  
 
You can also contact Dr Sue Avery, Director of the Fertility Centre at Birmingham Women’s 
Hospital, with the following information: 
 
Dr Sue Avery 
Birmingham Women’s NHS Foundation Trust 
Metchley Park Road, Edgbaston 
Birmingham B15 2TG 
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Reply Slip: 
Return this slip to Simon Jenkins at the University of Birmingham in the stamped and addressed 
envelope provided. 
 
Name: 
 
 
Preferred contact 
address: 
 
 
 
Home Telephone at 
preferred address: 
 
 
Mobile: 
 
 
Email address: 
 
 
I’d like to take part in this interview: 
 
I don’t want to take part. 
Please don’t contact me again: 
 
 
If you’re happy to take part, please tick your preferred means of contact: 
 
Phone call 
 
Email 
 
Post Text message  
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Please use this space to let us know if there are any times that are particularly convenient or inconvenient to 
contact you. We will do our best to be flexible and arrange an interview time that suits you. 
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10.15 Appendix 15 – Sample of Coded Transcript 
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10.18 Appendix 18 – Workshop Exercises 
 
Questions 
 
1. To what extent do you agree that child welfare should be the 
paramount consideration? What do you take “paramount” to mean in 
this context? 
 
2. To what extent do you agree that a patient’s previous parenthood 
should be taken into account, and for what reasons? What do you 
think counts as previous parenthood, and if there are different ways of 
conceiving of parenthood, should they count differently (i.e. have 
different weight)? 
 
3. To what extent do you agree that the use of known donors 
disadvantages no one? What do you think are the risks of allowing 
donors to stipulate who can use their gametes? 
 
4. To what extent do you agree that a national waiting list would be fairer? 
What do you think the costs of such a system would be? 
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10.19 Appendix 19 – Phase Three Topic Guides 
 
Participant 32 
 
1. What do you think about clinics allowing donors to make stipulations about who can 
receive their gametes? 
2. What do you think are the issues surrounding safeguarding child welfare when the 
child in question is yet to be conceived? 
3. What do you think of the idea of prioritising patients rather than treating them on a 
“first come, first served” basis? 
4. How do you think the HFEA would view the prioritisation scheme, and the ideas 
presented at the workshop about what criteria should be used? What practical 
difficulties do you foresee for the proposals, both personally and from the 
perspective of the HFEA? 
 
Participant 31 
 
1. What do you think is the solution to the freeriding issue that arose with regard to 
having national waiting lists for donated gametes? (This was the issue that some 
clinics would not see the benefit of the recruitment that they themselves undertook). 
2. How do you think efficiency could be improved to meet scarcity issues? 
3. How do you think welfare of the child should be assessed, if at all? 
 
Participant 38 
 
1. How do you think welfare of the child should be assessed, if at all? 
2. What do you think about the idea of a priority system where patients are not treated 
on just a first come, first served basis? (This would mean that other factors are 
considered, such as the patient’s age, whether they smoke, or whether they already 
have children, and these factors would be used to create a treatment “score” that 
would determine the order in which patients get treated.) 
3. What do you think of the idea of a national waiting list for donors and recipients of 
gametes, so that instead of clinics each having their own lists, all patients would wait 
on one larger national list? 
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10.20 Appendix 20 – Research Ethics Committee Favourable Opinion Letter and Other 
Correspondence 
  
387 
 
 
 
388 
 
 
389 
 
 
 
390 
 
 
391 
 
 
 
392 
 
 
 
393 
 
 
 
394 
 
 
 
395 
 
 
396 
 
 
397 
 
 
398 
 
 
399 
 
 
400 
 
 
401 
 
 
402 
 
 
403 
 
404 
 
 
405 
 
 
406 
 
 
407 
 
 
408 
 
 
409 
 
 
 
410 
 
 
 
411 
 
 
 
412 
 
 
 
413 
 
414 
 
415 
 
416 
 
417 
 
418 
 
419 
 
420 
 
 
 
421 
 
422 
 
423 
 
424 
 
425 
 
  
426 
 
11. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, (2011) The Equality Act – What’s new for 
employers? [online]. Available from: 
http://www.acas.org.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=2833&p=0 [Accessed 28 February 13] 
 
Ammerman, R. T., Kolko, D. J., Kirisci, L., Blackson, T. C. and Dawes, M. A. (1999) Child abuse 
potential in parents with histories of substance use disorder. Child Abuse & Neglect, 23(12), 
pp. 1225-1238 
 
Anderson, H. and Cook, D. (1997) Passive smoking and sudden infant death syndrome: 
review of the epidemiological evidence. Thorax, 52(11), pp. 1003-1009 
 
Appleyard, K. Berlin, L., Rosenbalm, K. and Dodge, K. (2011) Preventing Early Child 
Maltreatment: Implications from a Longitudinal Study of Maternal Abuse History, Substance 
Use Problems, and Offspring Victimization. Prevention Science, 12(2), pp. 139-149 
 
Archard, D. (2009) Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts. 
Bioethics, 25(3), pp. 119-127 
 
Ayer, A. J. (2001) Language, Truth and Logic. London: Penguin 
 
Beauchamp, T. and Childress, J. (1989) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2nd edn., New York: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Beauchamp, T. and Childress, J. (2013) Principles of biomedical ethics, 7th edn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Becker, H.S. (1996) “The Epistemology of Qualitative Research”, in Ethnography and Human 
Development: Context and Meaning in Human Enquiry, ed. by Richard Jessor, Anne Colby, 
and Richard A. Schweder. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
 
Benatar, D. (2006) Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. New 
York: Oxford University Press 
 
Bentham, J. (1948) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: 
Hafner 
 
Bewley, S., Ledger, W. and Nikolaou, D. (eds.) (2009) Consensus views arising from the 56th 
Study Group: Reproductive Ageing. London: Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists Press, pp. 353-356 
 
Borry, P., Schotsmans, P. and Dierickx, K. (2004) What is the role of empirical research in 
bioethical reflection and decision-making? An ethical analysis. Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, 7, pp. 41-53 
427 
 
Boyle, R. J. and Savulescu, J. (2001) Ethics of using preimplantation genetic diagnosis to 
select a stem cell donor for an existing person. BMJ, 323(7323), pp. 1240-1243 
 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3(2), pp. 77-101 
 
British Fertility Society (2008). British Fertility Society calls for national infrastructure to 
improve sperm donor recruitment in the UK [online]. Available from: 
http://www.fertility.org.uk/news/pressrelease/08_11-DonorRecruitment.html [Accessed 27 
September 2013] 
 
Broome, J. (1998) Good, Fairness and QALYs. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 
23, pp. 57-73 
 
Broome, J. (1999) Ethics out of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Broome, J. (2004) Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Brown, C. (2011) Consequentialize This. Ethics, 121(4), pp. 749-771 
 
Brown, J., Cohen, P., Johnson, J. G. and Salzinger, S. (1998) A longitudinal analysis of risk 
factors for child maltreatment: findings of a 17-year prospective study of officially recorded 
and self-reported child abuse and neglect. Child Abuse & Neglect, 22(11), pp. 1065-1078 
 
Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Caplan, A. L. and Patrizio, P. (2010) Are you ever too old to have a baby? The ethical 
challenges of older women using infertility services. Seminars in Reproductive Medicine, 
28(4), pp. 281-286 
 
Caws, P. (1995) Minimal Consequentialism. Philosophy, 70(273), pp. 313-339 
 
Centre for Maternal and Child Enquiries (CMACE) (2011). Saving Mothers’ Lives: reviewing 
maternal death to make motherhood safer: 2006-08. The Eighth Report on Confidential 
Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in the United Kingdom. British Journal of Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology, 118 (Suppl. 1), pp. 1-203 
 
Chaffin, M., Kelleher, K. and Hollenberg, J. (1996) Onset of physical abuse and neglect: 
Psychiatric, substance abuse, and social risk factors from prospective community data. Child 
Abuse & Neglect, 20(3), pp. 191-203 
 
Children Act (1989) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41/section/1 [Accessed 31 August 2012] 
 
Cochrane, A. (2009) Undignified Bioethics. Bioethics, 24(5), pp. 234-241 
428 
 
Cohen, A., Lindheim, S. R. and Sauer, M. V. (1999). Donor age is paramount to success in 
oocyte donation. Human Reproduction, 14(11), pp. 2755-2758 
 
Cnattingius, S., Forman, M.R., Berendes, H. and Isotalo, L. (1992). Delayed childbearing and 
risk of adverse perinatal outcome. A population-based study. Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 268(7), pp. 886-90 
 
Dancy, J. (1982) Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 42(3), pp. 395-
408 
 
Dancy, J. (2004) Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Darby, H. and Hamm, D. (2011) Donating sperm and eggs. Have your say… [online]. 
Available from http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Authority_presentation_-FINAL.pdf [Accessed 
2 August 2013] 
 
Dor, J., Seidman, D.S., Ben-Shlomo, I., Levran, D., Ben-Rafael, Z. and Mashiach, S. (1996). 
Cumulative pregnancy rate following in-vitro fertilization: the significance of age and 
infertility aetiology. Human Reproduction, 11(2), pp. 425-428 
 
Draper, H. and Sorell, T. (2002) Patients’ Responsibilities in Medical Ethics. Bioethics, 16(4), 
pp. 335-352 
 
Dreier, J. (1993) Structures of Normative Theories. The Monist, 76(1), pp. 22-40 
 
Dunn, M. and Ives, J. Methodology, epistemology, and empirical bioethics research: a 
constructive/ist commentary. The American Journal of Bioethics, 9(6-7), pp. 93-95 
 
Epstein, Y. M. and Rosenberg, H. S. (2005). Depression in primary versus secondary infertility 
egg recipients. Fertility and Sterility, 83(6), pp. 1882-1884 
 
Equality Act (2010) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents [Accessed 29 July 2013] 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (2011) Services, public functions and associations: 
Statutory Code of Practice [online]. Available from 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/EqualityAct/servicescode.pdf 
[Accessed 3 August 2013] 
 
Expert Advisory Group on Infertility Services in Scotland (1999) Evidence & Equity: A 
National Service Framework for the Care of Infertile Couples in Scotland [online]. Available 
from: http://www.show.scot.nhs.uk/publications/me/eagiss.pdf [Accessed 6 August 2013] 
 
Fontana, A. and Frey, J. H. (1994) “The Art of Science”. In Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
429 
 
 
Foot, P. (1978). Virtues and Vices. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 
 
Frith, L. (2009) Use or ornament? Clinical ethics committees in infertility units: a qualitative 
study. Clinical Ethics, 4(2), pp. 91-97 
 
Frith, L. (2012) Symbiotic Empirical Ethics: A Practical Methodology. Bioethics, 26(4), pp. 
198-206 
 
General Medical Council (2010) Treatment and care towards the end of life: good practice 
in decision making [online]. Available from http://www.gmc-
uk.org/Treatment_and_care_towards_the_end_of_life___English_0513.pdf_48902105.pdf 
[Accessed 21 August 2013] 
 
General Medical Council (2013) Good medical practice [online]. Available from: 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/static/documents/content/GMP_2013.pdf_51447599.pdf [Accessed 
27 September 2013] 
 
Gert, B. (2005) Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Oxford University Press, USA 
 
Glaser, B. G., and Strauss, A. L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research, Chicago: Aldine 
 
Glasser, M., Kolvin, I., Campbell, D., Glasser, A., Leitch, I. And Farrelly, S. (2001) Cycle of child 
sexual abuse: links between being a victim and becoming a perpetrator. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 179, pp. 482-494 
 
Golombok, S. (2000) Parenting: What Really Counts? Hove: Routledge 
 
Golombok, S., and Badger, S. (2010) Children raised in mother-headed families from infancy: 
a follow-up of children of lesbian and single heterosexual mothers, at early adulthood. 
Human Reproduction, 25(1), p. 150-157 
 
Golombok, S., and MacCallum, F. (2004) Children raised in fatherless families from infancy: A 
follow-up of children of lesbian and single heterosexual mothers at early adolescence. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45, pp. 1407-1419 
 
Golombok, S., Tasker, F. and Murray, C. (1997) Children raised in fatherless families from 
infancy: family relationships and the socioemotional development of children of lesbian and 
single heterosexual mothers. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 38, pp. 783-792 
 
Gordon, J. (2012) Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts! A Reply to David Archard. Bioethics 
[online]. Available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
8519.2012.02004.x/pdf [Accessed 31 July 2013] 
 
430 
 
Greil, A. L., Shreffler, K. M., Schmidt, L. and McQuillan, J. (2011) Variation in distress among 
women with infertility: evidence from a population-based sample. Human Reproduction, 
26(8), pp. 2101-2112 
 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1994) “Competing paradigms in qualitative research”. In: 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage 
 
Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral 
judgement. Psychological Review, 108(4), pp. 814-834 
 
Hare, R. M. (1965) Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Harris, E. (2008) House of Commons Hansard Debates, column 172 [online]. Available from: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080520/debtext/80520
-0005.htm [Accessed 21 July 2013] 
 
Harris, J. (1975) The Survival Lottery. Philosophy, 50(191), pp. 81-87 
 
Harris, J. (1999) Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care. Bioethics, 13(5), pp. 392-404 
 
Harris, J. (2000) The Welfare of the Child. Health Care Analysis, 8, pp. 27-34 
 
HC Deb 20 May 2008, vol 476, col 172 
 
Hedgecoe, A. M. (2004). Critical Bioethics: Beyond the Social Science Critique of Applied 
Ethics. Bioethics, 18(2), pp. 120-143 
 
Herstein, O. J. (2013) Why ‘Nonexistent People’ Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No 
Wellbeing at All’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), pp. 136-145 
 
Hester, M., Pearson, C., Harwin, N. and Abrahams, H. (2007) Making an Impact: Children 
and Domestic Violence, 2nd edition. London: Jessica Kingsley 
 
Heyd, D. (1992) Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press 
 
Holm, S., and Harris, J. (1999) Precautionary principle stifles discovery. Nature 400, p. 398 
 
Hooker, B. (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
431 
 
Hsieh, H.F. and Shannon, S. E. (2005) “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis”, in 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), pp. 1277-1288 
 
Hull, M.G., Fleming, C.F., Hughes, A.O. and McDermott, A. The age-related decline in female 
fecundity: a quantitative controlled study of implanting capacity and survival of individual 
embryos after in vitro fertilization. Fertility and Sterility, 65(4), pp. 783-90 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), section 13 (5) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37/section/13 [Accessed 21 July 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/contents [Accessed 26 July 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2003) Code of Practice, 6th edn. [online]. 
Available from http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition.pdf [Accessed 
22 August 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2004) Sperm, Egg, and Embryo Donation 
(SEED) policy review. Findings of the clinic survey [online]. Available from 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Clinics_survey_Seed_review.pdf [Accessed 25 September 
2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2005a) Tomorrow’s Children: Report of the 
policy review of welfare of the child assessments in licensed assisted conception clinics 
[online]. Available from: http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/TomorrowsChildren_report.pdf 
[Accessed 16 July 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2005b) SEED Report: A report on the Human 
Fertilisation Embryology Authority’s review of sperm, egg and embryo donation in the 
United Kingdom [online]. Available from http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SEEDReport05.pdf 
[Accessed 28 September 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2008). A long term analysis of the HFEA 
Register data (1991-2006) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Latest_long_term_data_analysis_report_91-06.pdf(1).pdf 
[Accessed 10 January 2014] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2009) Code of Practice, 8th edn. [online]. 
Available from: http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/8th_Code_of_Practice.pdf [Accessed 16 May 
2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013a) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/76.html [Accessed 19 August 2013] 
 
432 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013b) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/498.html [Accessed 3 August 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013c) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ivf-figures-2006.html#1280 [Accessed 12 September 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013d) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2587.html [Accessed 25 September 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013e) [online]. Available from:  
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/7091.html [Accessed 10 July 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013f) [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/500.html [Accessed 10 July 2013] 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Ethics and Law Advisory Committee (2011) 
Donation Review – Conditional Donation [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2011-06-08_ELAC_paper_-_conditional_donation.pdf 
[Accessed 24 June 2013] 
 
Huxtable, R. (2013) Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not to 
Treat? Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Ives, J. (2013) A method of Reflexive Balancing in a Pragmatic, Interdisciplinary and Reflexive 
Bioethics. Bioethics [online]. Available from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12018/full#bioe12018-note-0001 
[Accessed 22 August 2013] 
 
Ives, J., and Draper, H. (2009) Appropriate Methodologies for Empirical Bioethics: It’s All 
Relative. Bioethics, 23(4), pp. 249-258 
 
Jadva, V., Freeman, T., Kramer, W., and Golombok, S. (2009) The experiences of adolescents 
and adults conceived by sperm donation: comparisons by age of disclosure and family type. 
Human Reproduction, 24(8), pp. 1909-1919 
 
Jolly, M., Sebire, N., Harris, J., Robinson, S. and Regan, L. (2000) The risks associated with 
pregnancy in women aged 35 years or older. Human Reproduction, 15(11), pp. 2433-7 
 
Jones, S. (1985) “Depth Interviewing”. In R. Walker (ed.) Applied Qualitative Research. 
Aldershot: Gower 
 
Kaufman, J.S., Ortega, S., Schewe, P.A., Kracke, K. and Safe Start Demonstration Project 
Communities. (2011) Characteristics of young children exposed to violence: the safe start 
demonstration project. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26(10), pp. 2042-2072 
 
433 
 
Lee, E., Macvarish, J. and Sheldon, S. (2012) Assessing Child Welfare: Under the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act: The New Law [online]. Available from 
http://kar.kent.ac.uk/32881/1/Summary_Assessing-Child-Welfare-final.pdf [Accessed 3 June 
2013) 
 
Leridon, H. (2004) Can assisted reproduction technology compensate for the natural decline 
in fertility with age? A model assessment. Human Reproduction, 19(7), pp. 1548-1553 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2011) Indirect Discrimination: Some Puzzles [online]. Paper given at 
Society for Applied Philosophy Conference. Available from: 
cesem.ku.dk/papers/Indirect_Discrimination.doc [Accessed 19 July 2013] 
 
Lotz, M. (2009) Procreative Reasons-Relevance: On the Moral Significance of Why We Have 
Children. Bioethics, 23(5), pp. 291-299 
 
Mahlstedt, P. P., LaBounty, K. and Kennedy, W.T. (2010) The views of adult offspring of 
sperm donation: essential feedback for the development of ethical guidelines within the 
practice of assisted reproductive technology in the United States. Fertility and Sterility, 
93(7), pp. 2236-2246 
 
Malizia, B. A., Hacker, M. R. and Penzias, A.S. (2009) Cumulative Live-Birth Rates after In 
Vitro Fertilization. The New England Journal of Medicine, 360, pp. 236-243 
 
Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative Researching. London: Sage 
 
McCracken, G. (1988) The Long Interview, Newbury Park: Sage 
 
Mill, J. S. (1991). On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Mill, J. S. (1998) Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Milne, A. M., Myers, D. E., Rosenthal, A. S. and Ginsburg, A. (1986) Single Parents, Working 
Mothers, and the Educational Achievement of School Children. Sociology of Education, 59(3), 
pp. 125-139 
 
Moorlock, G. (2012) An Empirically Informed Ethical Analysis of Conditional and Directed 
Deceased Organ Donation [a thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy] 
 
Mulgan, T. (2001) The Demands of Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Mulgan, T. (2006) Future People. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
434 
 
Musschenga, A. W. (2005). Empirical Ethics, Context-Sensitivity, and Contextualism. Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 30(5), pp. 
467-490 
 
National Gamete Donation Trust (2011) Becoming a Sperm Donor [online]. Available from: 
http://www.ngdt.co.uk/downloads/Becoming%20a%20Sperm%20Donor%20V10.pdf 
[Accessed 12 September 2012] 
 
National Gamete Donation Trust (2011) Becoming an Egg Donor [online]. Available from: 
http://www.ngdt.co.uk/downloads/Becoming%20an%20Egg%20Donor%20V8.pdf  [Accessed 
12 September 2012] 
 
National Health Service (2013) Infertility [online]. Available from 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/infertility/Pages/Introduction.aspx [Accessed 8 January 2013] 
 
National Health Service (2014a) Alcohol and drugs during pregnancy [online]. Available from 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/pages/alcohol-medicines-drugs-
pregnant.aspx#close [Accessed 10 January 2014] 
 
National Health Service (2014b) Stop smoking in pregnancy [online]. Available from 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/pages/smoking-pregnant.aspx#close 
[Accessed 10 January 2014] 
 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2004) Fertility: assessment and treatment for 
people with fertility problems [online]. Available from: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/pdf/CG011niceguideline.pdf [Accessed 19 July 2013] 
 
Noyes, N., Hampton, B. S., Berkeley, A., Licciardi, F., Grifo, J. and Krey, L. (2001). Factors 
useful in predicting the success of oocyte donation: a 3-year retrospective analysis. Fertility 
and Sterility, 76(1), pp. 92-97 
 
Padilla, S.L. and Garcia, J.E. (1989). Effect of maternal age and number of in vitro fertilization 
procedures on pregnancy outcome. Fertility and Sterility, 52, pp. 270-273 
 
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Pattinson, S.D. (2012) The Value of Bodily Material: Acquiring and Allocating Human 
Gametes. Medical Law Review, 20(4), pp. 576-603 
 
Paulson, R.J., Hatch, I.E., Lobo, R.A. and Sauer, M.V. (1997) Cumulative conception and live 
birth rates after oocyte donation: implications regarding endometrial receptivity. Human 
Reproduction, 12(4), pp.835-839 
 
Pennings, G. (1995) Should donors have the right to decide who receives their gametes? 
Human Reproduction, 10(10), pp. 2736-2740 
435 
 
 
Pennings, G. (1999) Measuring the child welfare: in search of the appropriate evaluation 
principle. Human Reproduction, 14(55), pp. 1146-1150 
 
Pennings, G. (2001) Distributive Justice in the Allocation of Donor Oocytes. Journal of 
Assisted Reproduction and Genetics, 18(2): 56-63 
 
Pennings, G. (2004) Saviour siblings: using preimplantation genetic diagnosis for tissue typing. 
International Congress Series, 1266, pp. 311-317 
 
Pennings, G. (2005) Gamete donation in a system of need-adjusted reciprocity. Human 
Reproduction, 20(11), pp. 2990-2993 
 
Pennings, G. (2007). Mirror gametes donation. Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & 
Gynecology, 28(4), pp. 187-191 
 
Perrin, E. C. and the Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health (2002). 
Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents. Pediatrics, 109, 
pp. 341-344 
 
Piette, C, de Mouzon, J, Bachelot, A. and Spira, A (1990). In-vitro fertilization: influence of 
women’s age on pregnancy rates. Human Reproduction, 5(1), pp. 56-9 
 
Rachels, J. (1975) Active and Passive Euthanasia. The New England Journal of Medicine, 292, 
pp. 78-80 
 
Rawls, J. (2005) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press 
 
Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Ross, W.D. (2002) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Robertson, John. A. (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive 
Technologies. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993) Proceed With Care. Ottawa: 
Ministry of Government Services Canada 
 
Sandelowski, M. (2010) What’s in a name? Qualitative description revisited. Research in 
Nursing & Health, 33(1), pp. 77-84 
 
Sauer, M. V., Paulson, R.J. and Lobo, R.A. (1996). Oocyte donation to women of advanced 
reproductive age: pregnancy results and obstetrical outcomes in patients 45 years and older. 
Human Reproduction, 11(11), pp. 2540-2543 
 
436 
 
Savulescu, J. (1998a) Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice. Bioethics, 12(3), pp. 
212-235 
 
Savulescu, J. (1998b) The present-aim theory: a submaximizing theory of reasons?. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(2), pp. 229-243 
 
Savulescu, J. (1999) Should doctors intentionally do less than the best? Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 25, pp. 121-126  
 
Scheffler, S. (1982) The Rejection of Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Scheffler, S. (ed.) (1988) Consequentialism and its critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Scheib, J. E., Riordan, M. and Rubin, S. (2005) Adolescents with open-identity sperm donors: 
reports from 12-17 year olds. Human Reproduction, 20, pp. 239-252 
 
Schwartz, D and Mayaux, M.J. (1982). Female fecundity as a function of age: results of 
artificial insemination in 2193 nulliparous women with azoospermic husbands. The New 
England Journal of Medicine, 306, pp. 404-406 
 
Scott, R.T., Opsahl, M.S., Leonardi, M.R., Neall, G.S., Illions, E.H and Navot, D. (1995). 
Infertility: Life table analysis of pregnancy rates in a general infertility population relative to 
ovarian reserve and patient age. Human Reproduction, 10(7), pp. 1706-1710 
 
Scottish Government (2013). NHS IVF services to be fairer and faster [online]. Available 
from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/05/IVFservices15052013 [Accessed 
28 September 2013] 
 
Sheldon, S. and Wilkinson, S. (2004a) Hashmi and Whitaker: An Unjustifiable and Misguided 
Distinction? Medical Law Review, 12, pp. 137-163 
 
Sheldon, S. and Wilkinson, S. (2004b) Should selecting saviour siblings be banned? Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 30, pp. 533-537 
 
Sidgwick, H. (1901) The Methods of Ethics. London: MacMillan 
 
Singer, P. (1972) Moral Experts. Analysis, 32(4), pp.115-117 
 
Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Slote, M. and Pettit, P. (1984) Satisficing Consequentialism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes, 58, pp. 139-163+165-176 
 
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. (1973) Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
437 
 
 
Smith, D. K., Johnson, A. B., Pears, K.C., Fisher, P. A., and DeGarmo, D. S. (2007) Child 
Maltreatment and Foster Care: Unpacking the Effects of Prenatal and Postnatal Parental 
Substance Use. Child Maltreatment, 12(2), pp. 150-160 
 
Soames, S. (2003). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, volume 1. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Stacey, J., and Biblarz, Timothy J. (2001) (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
Matter? American Sociological Review, 66(2), pp. 159-183 
 
Steinbock, B. (1986) The Logical Case for ‘Wrongful Life’. Hastings Center Report, 16(2), pp. 
15-20 
 
Stovall, D., Toma, S., Hammond, M. and Talbert, L. (1991). The effect of age on female 
fecundity. Obstetrics and Gynecology, 77(1), pp. 33-6 
 
Strachan, D. and Cook, D. (1997) Health effects of passive smoking. 1. Parental smoking and 
lower respiratory illness in infancy and early childhood. Thorax, 52(10), pp. 905-914 
 
Sutcliffe, A. G., Barnes, J, Belsky, J., Gardiner, J. and Melhuish, E. (2012). The health and 
development of children born to older mothers in the United Kingdom: observational study 
using longitudinal cohort data. BMJ, 345:e5116 
 
Tan, S.L., Royston, P., Campbell, S., Jacobs, H.S., Betts, J., Mason, B. and Edwards, R.G. (1992). 
Cumulative conception and livebirth rates after in-vitro fertilization. The Lancet, 339(8806), 
pp. 1390-1394 
 
Taylor, M. C. (2005) “Interviewing”. In Holloway, I. (ed.) Qualitative Research in Health Care. 
New York: Open University Press 
 
Taylor, R., Najafi, F. and Dobson, A. (2007) Meta-analysis of studies of passive smoking and 
lung cancer: effects of study type and continent. International Journal of Epidemiology, 
36(5), pp. 1048-1059 
 
Temkin, L. (1993) Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Temkin, L. (2002) “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”. In Clayton, M. and 
Williams, A. (eds.) The Ideal of Equality. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 
 
Thornberry, E. (2008) House of Commons Hansard Debates, column 176 [online]. Available 
from: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080520/debtext/80520
-0006.htm [Accessed 18 September 2013] 
 
438 
 
Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians (2010). Passive smoking and 
children [online]. Available from 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/sites/default/files/documents/passive-smoking-and-
children.pdf [Accessed 19 July 2013] 
 
Turner, A. J and Coyle, A. (2000) What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity 
experiences of adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications for counselling 
and therapy. Human Reproduction, 15(9), pp. 2041-2051 
 
University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust (2011) NHS Funding for Assisted Conception 
Treatment: A Guide for Patients [online]. Available from: 
http://www.leicesterfertilitycentre.org.uk/userfiles/patient-information/NHSFundingInfo-
WPS010-1007334.doc [Accessed 7 December 2012] 
 
Vaismoradi, M., Turunen, H., and Bondas, T. (2013) Content analysis and thematic analysis: 
Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study. Nursing and Health Sciences 
(online only) 
 
van Noord-Zaadstra, B. M., Looman, C. W. N., Alsbach, H., Habbema, J. D. F., te Velde, E. R. 
and Karbaat, J. (1991) Delaying childbearing: effect of age on fecundity and outcome of 
pregnancy. BMJ, 302, pp. 1361-1365 
 
VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. (2003) Environmental Ethics & Policy Book, 3rd ed., Belmont: 
Thomson/Wadsworth 
 
Vasireddy, A., and Bewley, S. (2013). IVF is safe over 50 if it is not fatal. American Journal of 
Perinatology, 30(10), pp. 881-882 
 
Vincent, J. (2001). Cultural differences in end-of-life care. Critical Care Medicine, 29(suppl), 
pp. N52-N55 
 
Wainright, J. L., and Patterson, C.J. (2006). Delinquency, victimization, and drug, tobacco, 
and alcohol use among adolescents with female same-sex parents. Journal of Family 
Psychology, 20, pp. 526-530 
 
Wainright, J. L,. Russell, S. T., and Patterson, C. J. (2004). Psychosocial adjustment, school 
outcomes, and romantic attractions of adolescents with same-sex parents. Child 
Development, 75, pp. 1886-1898 
 
Warnock, M. (1984) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology [online]. Available from: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Warnock_Report_of_the_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Huma
n_Fertilisation_and_Embryology_1984.pdf [Accessed 26 July 2013] 
 
439 
 
Welsh, E. (2002). Dealing with Data: Using NVivo in the Qualitative Data Analysis Process. 
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(2), art. 26 
 
Widdershoven, G., Abma, T. and Molewijk, B. (2009). Empirical Ethics as Dialogical Practice. 
Bioethics, 23(4), pp. 236-248 
